“THE SECOND FRONT IN THE WAR ON TERROR”
US Military Back In Philippines With
A Vengeance
Murray
Horton
President George Bush has had no more loyal ally than Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in his “war on terror”. Yes, Gloria has been even more loyal than New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Helen Clark, and that’s saying something. Before the dust had even settled from the September 11, 2001 attacks, Gloria had declared the Philippines’ full support for the war effort and thrown the country open to the US military. Behind the scenes, the two governments attempted to push through the highly controversial Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement (MLSA), allowing the US military to use Philippine support facilities for ten years.
There were immediate rewards – the US earmarked $US70.2 million in military aid
for the Philippines in 2002 (up from $US22.1 million in 2001). This repeats the
pattern of US aid throughout the Marcos dictatorship, namely that military aid
outweighs any money for anti-poverty programmes. And this military aid comes
with strings attached – the August 2002 American Service Members Protection Act
allows the US to withhold such aid from countries that refuse to sign a pledge
giving US troops immunity from the newly created International Criminal Court
(to prosecute war crimes). So the pressure was put on the Philippines to sign
such a pledge.
The Philippines played no direct role in the war against the benighted people
of Afghanistan (unlike New Zealand) but it allowed US warplanes to overfly
Philippine airspace, and warships and planes to refuel in Philippine ports.
Right from the very beginning of the “war on terror”, it went much further than
that. Before 2001 was out, US military “advisers” had arrived in Mindanao to
train the Armed Forces of the Philippines and to assist them, in a non-combat
capacity, in their battle with the Abu Sayyaf Group, a ragtag bunch of
murderous kidnappers operating in the southernmost Philippines, primarily the pirate
islands between Mindanao (the major southern island) and Borneo. This area is
situated in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao - ARMM* (Basilan, four
other provinces and one city, with a combined population of 2.5 million), which
is the poorest region of the Philippines. Three quarters of the population live
below the poverty line; maternal and infant health and basic education
indicators are the worst in the country.
* The ARMM arose out of the 1996 peace agreement between the Government and
the Moro** National Liberation Front (MNLF). Nur Misuari, the veteran MNLF
leader, became the first Governor of the ARMM. In 2001 he was replaced as MNLF
leader, due to dissatisfaction with corruption and incompetence. In November
2001 he led an unsuccessful and bloody uprising aimed at thwarting the election
of his successor as Governor. Misuari fled to Malaysia, was arrested and
returned to the Philippines, where he and some of his supporters remain in
prison, awaiting trial for rebellion. ** Moro – generic name for Philippine
Muslims. Ed.
As
with Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden himself, Abu Sayyaf was an example of what
US Intelligence agencies call “blowback”, i.e. a Frankenstein monster invented
by the Philippine military itself, to split and discredit the much larger,
legitimate and credible Muslim guerilla armies that had been fighting a major
war for self-determination since the 1970s. Comprised of former mujahedins
(holy warriors), who had fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s,
Abu Sayyaf even had a historic link with bin Laden, dating back to its very
early days, and it was originally described in the Western media as Muslim
separatists. But it is nothing more than a bigger and more ruthless
manifestation of that old Mindanao tradition, namely
pirates/kidnappers/bandits. An authentic terrorist organisation, a criminal
gang, with a penchant for beheading its unfortunate victims (including one
American hostage) and a capacity to terrorise whole populations greatly
disproportionate to its size (just a few hundred at its core). Basically, it
has nothing in common with the genuine Muslim separatists, who have extensive
political and cultural networks and their own armies in Mindanao, namely the
MNLF and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Abu Sayyaf committed various
atrocities throughout the 1990s but hit the global media big time in 2000 when
it spectacularly kidnapped dozens of Western tourists from another country
(Malaysia) and held them hostage for months, until rewarded with a
multi-million dollar ransom (paid out by Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi).
Abu Sayyaf got a taste for the international limelight and for being
multi-millionaires, so in 2001, it struck again, kidnapping Americans from a
Filipino resort and outrunning the Philippine Navy to get them back to its
stronghold on the southernmost islands. Macapagal-Arroyo vowed to pay no ransom
and promised “total war” (as had President Estrada before her), succeeding only
in imposing the usual death and destruction on innocent civilians. Over 55,000
were displaced in and around the island of Basilan (in Mindanao as a whole,
more than 150,000 people have been displaced by the war against the various
Muslim armies). But money talks and Abu Sayyaf has a good working relationship with
the military. It escaped from an “escape proof trap”, rounding up more hostages
in the process and beheading one of the Americans for good measure. Then it
vanished into the jungle, still holding hostage an American couple (veteran
missionaries Martin and Gracia Burnham) and one Filipina (Ediborah Yap). That
was the status quo when the US advisers arrived on the island of Basilan
(pre-September 11, the US had shown little or no interest in Abu Sayyaf, even
when it was holding American hostages).
From the outset, this American military deployment in Mindanao rang alarm bells
(but not among Mindanao’s Christian majority, who welcomed it, and who are
being courted by the President as an important bloc of voters in her bid for
re-election in 2004). This was the first time since the 1950s that US military
advisers had been allowed to take an active part in a Philippine war (and that
had only been a handful of Americans, in the war against the Communist Huk
guerillas). The post-Marcos 1987 Constitution expressly forbids any foreign
military bases, troops or facilities, except under a treaty. As columnist Randy
David wrote: “Independent nations must fight their own wars, especially when
these are being waged within their own territory against some of their own people.
Governments that enlist foreign help in quelling local insurgencies compromise
their independence. They deserve the contempt of their citizens…The deployment
of US troops in Mindanao represents to me a reversal of the 1991 paradigm shift
in Philippine-US relations. It is worth asking if we are being quietly led back
to an era of presidents handpicked by America” (Philippine Daily Inquirer
{PDI}, 13/1/02.
The broadbased progressive movement that had fought against the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) throughout the 1990s reconstituted itself to fight this
American military presence on Philippine soil. Nor was the opposition confined
to Leftists – plenty of Senators and Congressmen (including those of the Right)
and even the Vice President, Teofisto Guingona, publicly opposed the American
military becoming directly involved in Philippine affairs. This was the main
reason why Macapagal-Arroyo did not refer the matter to the Senate, claiming to
have executive power in foreign policy matters by dint of existing treaties and
the Constitution. The President assumed command of the Visiting Forces
Agreement Commission, thus sidelining Guingona, who had previously chaired it
in his capacity as Foreign Affairs Secretary (he had embarrassed both
governments by itemising US breaches of the VFA during earlier exercises). She
was both unrepentant and pugnacious, saying that anyone who opposed the
American military presence was “not a Filipino…If you are not a Filipino, then
who are you? A protector of terrorists, a cohort of murderers, an Abu Sayyaf
lover. You care more for terrorists than for your own soldier who defends you.
You care more for bandits and the camp of Osama bin Laden than your own
country, which seeks to help you…We’re either for or against democracy, freedom
and prosperity. There can be no bystanders…” (PDI, 9/2/02). This all
proved too much for Guingona who, in June 2002, announced his resignation as
Foreign Affairs Secretary (whilst remaining Vice President). He considered what
was happening to be unconstitutional. The opposition has had its effect however
– the US continues to push for the signing of the MLSA; the Philippines has not
yet said that it is ready to do so.
In January 2002 it was announced that the US and Philippine military would hold
a joint exercise entitled Balikatan 02-1 (it translates as “shoulder to
shoulder”). In the decade since the US military had been kicked out of its
previous gigantic Philippine bases (the best known of which were Subic Naval
Base and Clark Air Force Base, on the main island of Luzon), there had
continued to be an annual series of these Balikatan exercises, held under the
auspices of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, as the politicians and generals in
both countries tried to soften up Philippine public opinion to allow the US
military back in. But Balikatan 02-1 would be different – it would last six
months (as opposed to the few weeks of standard exercises), it would be a live
ammunition exercise in a war zone, and it would be in a part of the Philippines
(namely Basilan and southernmost Mindanao) not previously used for such
exercises. And the American commander was to be the chief of the US Special
Operations Command for the entire Pacific. To spell out how important it was to
the US, General Richard Myers paid the first ever visit to a Balikatan exercise
by the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (they have been running annually
since 1981). The Terms of Reference were very ambiguous on the subject of any
Filipino command role in the exercise.
There
is a historical irony in this – the 1899-1901 Philippine American War was a
genocidal affair, with the Americans only being able to colonise the country
after the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Filipinos. The Moro Wars in the Muslim
South continued until 1911 and the US was never able to subjugate the Muslims
(guerilla warfare against the Americans continued for another couple of years).
Yet, at the turn of the 21st Century, here was the US military back in Muslim
Philippines. Nor was Balikatan confined to Mindanao – parts of it were to be
conducted in Cebu whilst, simultaneously, 400 US military personnel took part
in the month-long Balance Piston 02-1 exercise operating out of the former
Clark Air Force Base in Central Luzon.
The pretence of the Americans simply training the Philippine military didn’t
last long. Before the exercise had even started, it was stated that 660
Americans (including 160 Special Forces troops) would be joining the 7,000
Philippine military personnel in the hunt to find and rescue the American
hostages, and could return fire if fired upon. Indeed, in June 2002, there was
a firefight between US troops and suspected Abu Sayyaf gunmen, on Basilan. That
same month it was announced that US troops would go on combat patrols with the
Filipinos, which would greatly increase their chances of getting directly
involved in any fighting.
This was starting to look more and more like the US getting directly involved
in a dirty little local war (not even that really, simply a police operation
against a criminal gang). This would be the first time since WW2 that American
troops had fought on Philippine soil. Indeed even the training aspect is more
theoretical than real. Philippine Air Force pilots complained that they weren’t
allowed to fly the US warplanes used in the Balance Piston exercise, describing
their flights in them as simply joy rides. “We try to learn from the chats, by
observing when we’re included in the crew” (PDI, 4/2/02). Not that the
US military couldn’t do with a little more training and better equipment
itself. In February 2002, a Chinook helicopter crashed at sea off Mindanao,
killing ten GIs (eight of them from an elite Special Forces unit), the biggest
single loss of US military lives since September 11.
As in the Vietnam War, the US military set out to win “hearts and minds” on
Basilan, assisted by US NGOs. For example, they showed Hollywood movies such as
“Shrek” to the local kids. The sergeant in charge of the nightly movie showings
said the aim was to “basically share our culture with Filipinos and, at the
same time, learn from them” (PDI, 27/2/02). It could be an uphill battle
– media photos of guntoting US troops at a Mindanao bank caused uproar among
locals. In March it was announced that another 300 non-combat US troops,
primarily Navy Seabees*, would be arriving on Basilan to carry out “civic
action work” – building roads and bridges, medical missions, etc. A small
contingent would stay beyond the end of the exercise to carry out a
“humanitarian project”. * Seabees = CBs = Construction Battalions. Ed.
It was made plain from early on that Balikatan 02-1 (which ended in July) would
be just the start of what is aimed at becoming a permanent US military presence
back in the Philippines. The modus operandi are these “exercises” as allowed
for under the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement. Thus, it was admitted that there
would four such Balikatan exercises in 2002, with the rotation of US troops in
and out of the country ensuring what the State Department called “a
permanent-temporary presence”. Another 2,665 US troops arrived in Central Luzon
in April for Balikatan 02-2 (boosting the number of US troops in the country to
more than 3,800, the highest number since the bases closed in 1992). More than
5,000 US troops are expected for Balikatan 2003. Paul Wolfowitz, the US Deputy
Defense Secretary, visited the Philippines in June 2002 and said: ”It would be
a very misleading impression to suggest, especially to Filipinos, that as soon
as the Burnhams are rescued the Americans will lose interest in the
Philippines. This is a much bigger question …We are very much committed to
helping the Government across the board” (Sydney Morning Herald,
5/6/02).
Nor will that American military presence be aimed exclusively or even
predominantly at the Philippines – the Pentagon sees its renewed presence as
vital in projecting American military power into the entire South East Asian
region. Indonesia, for example, is seen as a potential hotbed of Muslim
extremism, and Malaysia is also regarded warily. The Americans started pushing
for the Philippines to host a multinational military exercise (named “Team
Challenge”) that would involve military forces from a number of Asia/Pacific
countries, and which would be explicitly based on scenarios of China as the
aggressor/invader in its ongoing dispute with the Philippines over the Spratly
Islands.
Even as far as the Philippines is concerned, the major US media started running
stories urging the Pentagon to get involved in fighting the war against “the
real bad guys”, namely the estimated 12,000 guerillas of the MILF (for
instance, see Time, 25/2/02; “Picking a fight”). Philippine military
officials helpfully started trumpeting the MILF’s alleged links to Osama bin
Laden’s al-Qaeda group, which is the itchy trigger finger name as far as the US
is concerned.
On June 7 2002, the immediate objective of the US military presence was
accomplished. Filipino Scout Rangers, the Special Forces of the Philippine
Army, caught up with the Abu Sayyaf members holding the three hostages, on the
Zamboanga Peninsula (mainland Mindanao) and attacked. To coin a phrase, the
operation was a success but the patient died. Martin Burnham and Ediborah Yap were
killed; Gracia Burnham was wounded but rescued and returned to her family in
the US. That same day the Philippine military tracked down Abu Sabaya (the nom
de guerre of one of the most high profile Abu Sayyaf leaders and the one
holding custody of the hostages throughout their more than one year in
captivity), and rammed the boat he was using to try to escape. He was allegedly
shot and seen to fall into the sea. His body has never been recovered. It was
later revealed that Filipino Intelligence agents had been able to get close
enough to him (delivering food and the like) to plant a tracking device on him,
that enabled the US and Philippine militaries to follow and find him.
But this did not signal an end to the US military presence – Macapagal-Arroyo announced
that the end of Balikatan 02-1, on Basilan, would be followed by a sustained
programme of “security cooperation and counter-terrorism training and
assistance”, spread throughout the country (PDI, 2/7/02). Between 80 and
100 US Special Forces troops will remain on Basilan until October 2002, when
another Balikatan will start, taking place in Sulu province (which includes the
island of Jolo, another Abu Sayyaf stronghold) and in the traditional areas on
Luzon. Low profile joint exercises involving units of the rapidly expanding US
Special Forces continue to be held on the beautiful and environmentally fragile
island of Palawan (Abu Sayyaf snatched their hapless hostages from a Palawan
resort in 2001). In July, the annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
joint naval exercise was held, involving 1,400 Americans and an equal number of
Filipinos, in and off various parts of Luzon. This is also a “winning hearts
and minds” affair, featuring doctors, dentists and even vets.
So the scene has been set for the “permanent-temporary presence” of the US
military back in the Philippines. To claim that it is there as the “second
front in the war on terror” is nonsense. The Abu Sayyaf Group is simply a gang
of criminals of the kind that have plagued the southern Philippines and South
East Asia for centuries. Any link with Osama bin Laden is entirely historical
and dead. The Philippines has been fighting internal wars on several fronts for
decades – against the Muslim separatist armies in the South and the New
People’s Army (NPA) of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) across the
whole country.
For the first time the US is now getting directly involved in the civil war
with the Communists. In August 2002 the Bush Administration added the CPP
and the NPA to its list of “foreign terrorist organisations”, along with Jose
Maria Sison, the alleged leader of the CPP. Ludicrously the US has publicly
linked the CPP with bin Laden. Nothing could be more unlikely – the two are
mortal enemies. The relevant US Executive Order freezes any assets held in the
US or controlled by US persons. Sison (who did a speaking tour through New
Zealand in 1986, following his release from years of torture and imprisonment
without charge during the Marcos martial law dictatorship) lives as a political
refugee in Dutch exile, along with other leading figures of the National
Democratic Front of the Philippines (which includes the CPP). American pressure
led the Dutch government to declare a freeze on the assets of both him and the CPP.
And that American pressure resonated in New Zealand, where the Reserve Bank
posted the US notice on its Website and stated: “Note that the United States
Order does not have legal force in New Zealand. However the United States has
indicated it will penalise any institution that does not take action to support
the United States, if that institution has assets in or links to the United
States” (Reserve Bank of New Zealand Website, 23/8/02).
But primarily the Pentagon wants to be back in the Philippines to suit its own
interests, not the internal security concerns of its former colony. Its major
political and military targets lie elsewhere, far from the Philippines – in the
obsession with Saddam Hussein and latterly with bin Laden. The Philippines has
always been a home away from home for Uncle Sam, and is now likely to be the
base for American power projection into the whole East Asian region. The
Philippine people have kicked out the US military once before. Now it seems
that they will have to do it all over again. I have no doubt that they are up
to the job.
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