SIS – NEW BOSS, BUT SAME OLD STORY by Murray Horton

Peace Researcher 33 – November 2006

Richard Woods, described by former colleagues from his days as a diplomat as “honourable, prudent, bland, a bit of a snob and altogether too British” (Press, 28/1/06; “Spymaster ensnared by Zaoui”, Dan Eaton), became Director-General of the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) in 1999. Another former colleague from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Woods served as Ambassador to several countries) said: “If you asked central casting to send you a spymaster, you would get Richard” (ibid.). Courtesy of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US and the ensuing open-ended US-led “War On Terror”, the bumbling, incompetent SIS found itself thrust into the front lines. Woods’ term in office saw a huge boost in both staff numbers (to around 150) and budget. For the 2005/06 year it was $23.2 million, but surges up to $43.4 million in the 2006/07 year (some of which is for fitting out its brand new headquarters in Wellington’s new Defence Building), levelling off at $32 million by the end of this decade. Par for the course is that the Government provides no word of justification as to what this massive extra expenditure and staff increase is for.

Muslims Have Replaced The Reds Under The Beds

As a good and faithful servant of its ideological masters (the much bigger Intelligence agencies of the US, Britain and Australia), the SIS parroted the line that New Zealand is threatened by Islamic terrorists. Its 2005 Annual Report, which was not tabled in Parliament until April 2006, made the alarming, but totally unsubstantiated, claim that sympathisers of al Qaeda, with links to overseas extremists, are already living amongst us. What’s more, it said that there are people living in NZ who already have experience of waging jihad, specifically in the 1990s’ war in Bosnia (in the former Yugoslavia). The trouble with this latter claim is that these people are “our” jihadis, because New Zealand faithfully supported the US and its European allies in waging war on the Serbs in Bosnia. It’s an inconvenient fact to have to remember but it was only in the last decade that the West militarily backed, and fought on behalf of, Muslims in several of the vicious 1990s’ Balkan wars. So, indeed we do have Bosnian Muslim war veterans here, and they are here as our guests, at our invitation, as refugees brought here to start a new life.

“…To draw an analogy. Speaking of the potential of homegrown Islamic terrorists is akin to saying there are potential Catholic terrorists in New Zealand. The syllogism is simple. There are Opus Dei members in the country (Opus Dei being a Roman Catholic sect). Since Opus Dei has been linked to acts of violence in Latin America, Spain, Italy and elsewhere, and because it has proven links with fascists fleeing Europe after World War Two, by the SIS's reasoning they would have to constitute a potential, even probable threat to New Zealand. After all, they violently oppose abortion, abhor secular humanism, and believe reverently in the afterlife, all in marked opposition to the ideological and material foundations of New Zealand's modern social order. Yet there is no mention of the terrorist threat posed by potential Catholic warriors in the SIS report.

“Instead, the SIS worries about local jihadis. In fact, the report states that counter-terrorism is the biggest single component of the SIS's activities. That is and is not surprising. Comparatively speaking, it is surprising that a small democracy with no history of conflict with Islam would see counter-terrorism against Islamic extremists as its foremost intelligence preoccupation. Countries in similar situations like Chile, Portugal and Uruguay certainly do not. Yet it is not surprising if New Zealand law is factored into account.

“Under the terms of current anti-terrorist legislation, anyone who rhetorically expresses understanding of what might motivate someone to join al-Qaeda's cause or oppose Western imperialism in Muslim lands is a potential terrorist. It includes anyone who believes that the citizenry have the right to take up arms against oppressive government (which basically means that by New Zealand's interpretation anyone in the US who believes in the Second Amendment [to the Constitution, guaranteeing the right to bear arms. Ed.] is a potential terrorist). It could even cover Opus Dei members. But it is the threat of domestic Islamic terrorism that the Director-General chose to underscore.

“To buttress its concerns, the SIS Annual Report draws parallels between local al-Qaeda sympathisers and revenue generators, the London and Madrid bombers and Australian Muslim radicals. It speaks of a shift, after 2002, in al-Qaeda's strategy towards more decentralised, local cells inspired by the 2001 attacks and notions of martyrdom. The trouble with the parallels is that the strategic situation of the countries mentioned is fundamentally different than that of New Zealand. New Zealand not a member of the coalition that invaded Iraq under pretext (unlike the other three). In its treatment of the resident Muslim population it does not exhibit the alienating, ostracising, ghettoising features of the other three. As a post-colonial society it has no history of independent grievance or dispute with any Muslim nation (its only post-imperial conflicts being with secularising regimes like the modern Indonesian dictatorships or extremist theocracies like the terrorist-sponsoring Taliban). It is, in effect, a country that is more strategically akin to Chile, Portugal and Uruguay than it is to Australia, Great Britain and the United States. Its terrorist threat assessments should reflect that fact.

“With regard to Bosnian jihadis, it may well be true that they have combat experience and maintain links with former comrades in arms. But if that is the criteria upon which terrorist potential is assessed, than anyone coming from a conflict zone or party to foreign armed conflicts, including more than a few Americans, British citizens and South Africans, are also potential terrorists. Yet they are not listed, and if reports are correct, Bosnian refugees in New Zealand are more likely to be heavy metal listeners rather than nostalgic jihadis looking to return to the fight. Thus, in terms of internal and external security, the threat potential posed by Muslims in or towards New Zealand is leagues apart, for the better, than the countries that Director-General Woods so pointedly used as case examples in his report…

“…If we take stock of recent terrorist events in New Zealand such as the anti-American cyanide letter writer, the Waiheke hoof and mouth hoaxer, the animal rights militants who destroy laboratories and threaten company executives (and their families), environmental militants of various stripes, ethnic gangs with economic clout, or indigenous separatists, the common denominator is clear: they are neither Muslim nor are they foreign. On a scale of possibility these indigenous threats are probable, actual and imminent yet do not figure in the SIS Director- General's report. Instead, the spectre of Islamic fundamentalism is raised as a red herring designed to focus public apprehension on a minority, potential enemy within rather than those most likely to do terrorist harm to Kiwis…

“…For the rest of us the question remains: are we getting good value for dollar from our Intelligence services? The SIS budget has gone up since 2001, as has the scope and depth of the anti-terrorist legislation that it uses as a justification for its activities. Yet the quality of SIS reporting remains suspect. Put another way: If present trends continue, does this mean that within a few years non-micro chipped (urban) dogs will be added to the list of targeted terrorist suspects? Especially if their owners are Muslim? After all, the potential is there (Scoop, www.scoop.co.nz 12/5/06; “Of Myth And Reality In Terrorist Threat Assessment”, Paul G. Buchanan).

Spies On Campus

The SIS also reported that it was holding discussions with the heads of New Zealand’s universities to advise them on protecting the nation’s campuses against infiltration by foreign terrorists, raising the alarming scenario of these said foreigners being intent on stealing materials and technology for use in weapons of mass destruction (presumably not the non-existent ones in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq). The union representing academics, the Association of University Staff, doubtless mindful of the SIS’ dreadful historical track record on various NZ campuses, expressed disquiet about this revelation, pointing out that, similar activities in other countries had led directly to harassment of Islamic scholars and students.

Paul Buchanan’s Scoop article exposed a glaring contradiction in this policy also: “… As for the belated scrutiny of university labs for potential terrorist activity, there is an interesting twist to the issue. When (Pakistani) President Musharraf visited New Zealand in 2005, the Labour government signed an agreement whereby up to 1,000 Pakistani students would be offered visas to pursue university education in a range of hard sciences, including chemistry, physics, agronomy and other forms of engineering. Yet that agreement had no provisions for security vetting of Pakistani applicants either in Pakistan or in New Zealand… In fact, SIS interest in laboratory security appears to be an after-the-fact exercise given that the Immigration Department has no means of ascertaining the terrorist threat posed by applicants approved by the Pakistani government. It is left for Mr. Musharraf's regime to prevent would-be jihadis from utilising a student visa to advance their technical skills in New Zealand. His regime, to state it diplomatically, is fragile and thus suspect on its terrorist threat assessments offered to friendly Western nations…” (ibid.).

Oversight? What Oversight?

And if you have any fond illusions that there is any sort of effective oversight of the spies, dream on. Peace Researcher has written about the Intelligence and Security Committee and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security since both institutions were created, in the 1990s. The Committee is, most deliberately, not a Select Committee, it is a committee of Government, not Parliament. It has five members, with the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition automatically so. Helen Clark gets to appoint two more (currently, her Deputy, Michael Cullen, and Winston Peters, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Leader of New Zealand First). Don Brash appointed Rodney Hide, Act Leader.

Green MP Keith Locke has been exposing the scandalous shortcomings of this Committee for years. “…Through a Parliamentary Question I have discovered that the Intelligence and Security committee met only once in 2005, on June 14, for 43 minutes. It met two times the previous year for a total of 84 minutes. That’s hardly enough time to pour their coffee and listen to a couple of briefings… The Committee’s abysmal record demonstrates the need for a proper Select Committee to supervise the Intelligence services, rather than the current statutory committee made up of National and Labour appointees… Overseas, Intelligence service failings over Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction, and the misuse of intelligence by governments, has prompted inquiries and moves towards greater accountability. Here, Labour and National leaders seem to be asleep on the job. Who is watching the watchers? Certainly not Labour or National" (press release, 15/3/06; “Who is watching the watchers? Labour and Nats aren’t”). And, crucially, neither the Committee nor the Inspector-General are allowed to investigate “operational matters”.

“…A case in point is the expulsion of Rayed Mohamed Abdullah Ali, a Saudi Arabian man travelling on a Yemeni passport, who was granted a visa to study English but was ejected after he enrolled in a flying school. Mr Ali, who had lived in the US for several years and spoke good English, had flatted with Hani Hanjour, believed to be the man who flew the passenger jet into the Pentagon on September 11 (2001). The Intelligence and Security Committee has been briefed on the case, but members have been sworn to secrecy. That means Kiwis are unlikely to ever know whether Ali posed a threat – he had been questioned at length by US authorities about September 11 and released – and, if so, how he was able to slip through the net. The case has been clouded by the Government’s insistence that it is not really an SIS issue as Immigration is the lead agency on border control and Police are in charge of counter-terrorism. Mr Locke says that raises questions about the need for a separate SIS at all. ‘Given that the Police are tasked to do everything the SIS does, basically, why not fold it into the Police, because at least the Police are a bit more accountable’…” (Dominion Post, 23/6/06; “Who will watch the spies?”, Martin Kay).

Paul Buchanan, in his Scoop article, wrote: “… in effect, there is no independent oversight of Intelligence assessments like the SIS annual reports. What passes for Intelligence oversight in New Zealand is a Parliamentary committee constituted along partisan lines whose members have little Intelligence experience prior to appointment to the committee (for example, Don Brash), and an Inspector-General who depends on the SIS Director-General for logistical support and information. The Inspector-General handled nine cases in 2005 and half of these were related to personnel matters, not policy issues or operational concerns. Both of these oversight bodies can be denied access to classified information if the intelligence is foreign derived… The bad news is that political manipulation of intelligence reporting and terrorist threat assessments in contemporary New Zealand may not reflect personal bias on the part of the Director-General, but may reflect a cultural mindset in the civilian intelligence bureaucracy. Without independent oversight to counter bureaucratic self-interest and organisational myopia that spells trouble more imminent than any homegrown jihadi wanna-be's...” (ibid.).

Out Of the Woods, Now It’s Tucker Time

It is the obsession with “Islamic terrorists” that proved the downfall of Richard Woods as SIS Director-General. The victim of this obsession, of course, is the hapless Ahmed Zaoui who came to New Zealand as an illegal refugee fleeing the Algerian military dictatorship which was intent on imprisoning and/or killing him and his fellow Islamists. For his pains, Zaoui spent two years in prison, with no charge or trial, and his case is still very far from over. The incredible bungling incompetence and outright malicious lying of New Zealand’s security apparatus in the Zaoui case continues to cut a swathe through that apparatus. It put an end to the career of Laurie Greig, the first Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; Woods’ contract was extended once by the Government but not a second time, and the Prime Minister publicly announced that he would step down when his term expired, in late 2006. What’s more, the SIS Director-General’s job was publicly advertised for the first time.

But any members of the public fancying a new career as a spyboss were out of luck, as the job went to the ultimate insider, namely Warren Tucker, who was already Director of the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), the country’s biggest (329 staff, as against 150 for the SIS) and most secretive Intelligence agency. Both Tucker and the GCSB are well known to the Anti-Bases Campaign, because the GCSB is the agency which runs the Waihopai spy base. And Warren Tucker takes great pride in his spies, as evidenced by his unprecedented January 2006 press statement vigorously defending the GCSB from criticism by the likes of us (see my article “Waihopai 2006: Longrunning Campaign Gets Second Wind”, Peace Researcher 32, March 2006, which can be read online at http://www.converge.org.nz/abc/pr32-129.html, for details of Tucker’s press statement and the context in which it occurred).

There is an interesting parallel here. Tucker has spent his long Intelligence career working in the GCSB on SIGINT (signals intelligence) and ELINT (electronic intelligence). He is now the head of NZ’s HUMINT (human intelligence) agency, the SIS. The equivalent (and much bigger) US agencies are the National Security Agency (NSA), which is the biggest of the GCSB’s Big Brothers, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). President Bush’s 2006 choice as the latest Director of the CIA is Air Force General Michael Hayden, who had very recently served as NSA Director. Hence, in both countries, the ELINT men are being put in charge of the HUMINT agency. The parallel goes even further with the announcement that Tucker’s replacement as GCSB Director is Air Marshal Bruce Ferguson, the former Chief of Defence Force. So, out with the old and in with the old.

Zaoui Waits In Limbo

Let’s see if Tucker can unstick the SIS from the Zaoui tar baby. It ranks as one of the first great scandals of 21^st Century New Zealand history. For several years now, Peace Researcher has covered the Zaoui case in exhaustive detail. For our most recent article, see PR 30, March 2005, “Ahmed Zaoui: New Zealand’s Very Own Political Prisoner”, by David Small, which can be read online at http://www.converge.org.nz/abc/pr30-107.html. After two years in prison (nearly half of that in solitary confinement in maximum security), Zaoui has been on bail since late 2004, living under court-imposed conditions (such as a nightly curfew) with a Catholic religious order in Auckland. He is separated from his wife and sons (who are illegally living in hiding in South East Asia), not allowed to work, receive any sort of benefit or earn any income at all, so he is entirely dependent on the support of the huge number of New Zealanders who have taken him to their hearts.

And the numerous legal processes involving him go grinding on. In June 2005, the Supreme Court upheld the Crown’s appeal against a 2004 Court of Appeal decision that the Government must take Zaoui’s human rights into account when deciding whether to deport him. But the Court also ruled that the Government can not deport him to any country where he faces the likelihood of persecution (he was sentenced to death in his absence in his native Algeria, and would face the very real likelihood of imprisonment and torture by the State if returned there, or murder by the military-backed death squads that terrorise the population). So both sides claimed victory in that case.

But the central feature of Zaoui’s case is that he is the first person in New Zealand to ever be the subject of a Security Risk Certificate, issued against him by the SIS Director-General in 2003. Amazingly, more than three years later, that Certificate has still not been confirmed by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, as is required by law. If he upholds it, the Minister of Immigration has three days to accept or deny that decision. If the Certificate is upheld, then Zaoui can be ordered to be deported. The SIS has always said that it holds classified information from unidentified foreign Intelligence services (the likes of the French, who are in cahoots with their Algerian counterparts) that Zaoui is a security risk. In May 2005 it was reported that SIS agents had visited, unannounced, the homes of a number of Auckland Algerians and interrogated them about Zaoui, asking patently absurd questions such as whether he had ever killed anyone in Algeria (no such allegation has ever been made against him. It’s worth reminding ourselves that he was an academic and an elected member of the Algerian Parliament).

Finally, in 2006, the Inspector-General, Paul Neazor, announced that he would conduct NZ’s first ever hearing on a Security Risk Certificate, starting on August 7^th. He decreed that it would be in private and not open to observers from the likes of Amnesty International or the International Commission of Jurists. Zaoui’s lawyers started assembling a large number of overseas character witnesses to testify or present affidavits in his defence. The Inspector-General appointed a leading Queen’s Counsel, Stuart Grieve, to be Zaoui’s special advocate. As neither Zaoui nor his lawyers will be allowed to see classified material cited against him, the special advocate will be allowed to do so - but cannot disclose it to Zaoui. Grieve will then represent Zaoui at the closed hearing.

Historic Hearing Indefinitely Postponed

But these untested waters are going to remain untested for the indefinite future. In July 2006, just weeks before the scheduled commencement of the Security Risk Certificate hearing, the Inspector-General announced that it was postponed until a date to be announced, because the SIS wasn’t ready and needed more time. Green MP Keith Locke, who has been the lone voice in Parliament in support of Zaoui, demanded that the Minister of Immigration should now withdraw the Certificate.

"…It would be just too cruel to keep Mr Zaoui in limbo for yet another year, separated from his family. The August 7 hearings had been a deadline sought by the SIS and the Inspector-General. The Zaoui defence team were ready to go, and had booked flights for expert witnesses from around the world. The SIS had ample time to prepare. The High Court told them in December 2003 to prepare a summary of allegations. The Court of Appeal reminded them in October 2004. Yet now, on the eve of the review, they have failed to provide a coherent and complete summary of their allegations. It now transpires that some 30 of the 55 files of SIS evidence so far, do not even mention Mr Zaoui by name.

"The failures have occurred on three levels. For the SIS, this has been the latest in a series of bungles. The Inspector-General must take some responsibility for the SIS being left to slow the process down. The Prime Minister must also share some blame for inadequately resourcing the Inspector-General, so that he can get through the work comprehensively, and on time. In this year's Budget, the Government cut the funding for the Inspector-General's office.

"In correspondence earlier this year with Mr Neazor, I was left with grave doubts as to whether key decisions had yet been made on procedures for the review. In a letter on 18 May for instance, Mr Neazor seemed to envisage using the SIS Director-General as a source of expertise in evaluating the evidence, and credibility of witnesses: 'The Director-General’, Neazor wrote 'may well be a source of information for me in respect of what people may have said in the hearing.' This hardly seems the 'arm's length relationship' from the Director-General urged by the High Court. The question of whether Mr Neazor has any independent source of advice and analysis of the security evidence remains an unknown. Essentially, the SIS has failed to front up to the deadline. The Minister should end this tragic farce and allow Mr Zaoui - who has been living quietly in the community for 18 months - to be reunited with his family" (press release, 11/7/06; “Minister should withdraw Certificate against Zaoui”).

One interpretation is that the SIS and the Government is spinning out the whole disgraceful saga in the hope that Zaoui will crack and decide to leave the country, reunite with his fugitive family and try his luck somewhere more accommodating, without any of the shabby secrets of the Intelligence world ever having to be revealed. If so, they look to be disappointed. But, in the meantime, he is left in a stateless limbo, Immigration laws are being tightened up to “prevent another Zaoui”, and the legal bill has cost the taxpayer $2.4 million and counting.

For the whole time that he’s been in the country, Zaoui has been portrayed as being somehow associated with terrorists, if not actually one himself. So, it’s useful to see how allied countries treat Algerians of his ilk. “Across the Tasman, for instance, Zaoui’s political party, the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut), is seen as so benign that his Aussie equivalent – Samir Bennegadi – has been given a security clearance and works at a nuclear facility in Sydney. Anwar Haddam, the FIS leader in the US, lives freely in the community and has met (former President) Bill Clinton. Only in New Zealand has such harsh treatment been meted out – and that treatment has been entirely reliant on the judgement of the SIS whose track record hardly leaves one exactly brimming with confidence…” (Listener, Editorial, 14/5/05; “Take two”, Gordon Campbell).

Time To Pull The Plug

So the Zaoui case is the “jewel in the crown” of the SIS’ public relations campaign to convince New Zealanders that we need it and its vastly increased budget to protect us from… what exactly? Stateless Arab refugees fleeing here in fear of their lives? Deposed Islamist elected MPs who have run out of other places to go? If the much more sinned against than sinning Ahmed Zaoui is the best evidence it can produce that this country really is under threat from “Islamic terrorists”, then the SIS, under its new/old Director-General, really is dog tucker.

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