Peace Researcher 34 – July 2007
As soon as
the US Marine convicted of raping a Filipina* was in the custody of US Embassy
officials, the United States announced that it would push through with the
Balikatan training exercises involving US and Filipino troops scheduled for
February 2007. It had earlier cancelled the exercises to protest the Philippine
courts' refusal to release Lance Corporal Daniel Smith to US authorities while
his case is on appeal.
* In late
2005 several US soldiers, in the country for one of the permanent series of
“exercises” that provides the flimsy justification for the renewed US military
presence, went out for some “rest and recreation” in the Americans’ old stamping
ground of Olongapo (home to the former Subic Bay US Navy Base). They ended up
being arrested and charged with raping a Filipina, identified only as “Nicole”.
So, an unprecedented situation arose with American soldiers charged with a very
serious, non-bailable crime. The
Yet unknown
to many, a contingent of US Special Operations Forces that had been stationed
in the southern Philippines since January 2002 was clearly staying on despite
the Balikatan exercises' cancellation. While the US and Philippine governments
maintain that these troops are not doing anything beyond training Filipino
soldiers and conducting humanitarian projects, questions persist regarding
their actual mission here. In 2002, a petition was lodged before the Philippine
Supreme Court claiming the US troops about to be deployed here were going to
war "under the guise of an exercise". But while the Court agreed with
the petitioners that US troops are indeed constitutionally banned from engaging
in an "offensive war" in the Philippines, it held that whether they
are actually going to do so was "a question of fact" that had to be
proven first. Five years after the deployment and in the midst of the uproar
over Smith, new and accumulated information on the actions of US troops in the
Philippine south provide grounds for revisiting this question.
Distinguishing “Exercises" From
"Special Operations"
It is
important, however, to first draw a distinction between US soldiers who join
the regular joint training exercises in various parts of the country and those
who are part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).
Media coverage and public discussion on the presence of US troops in the
country have tended to lump those who take part in the JSOTF-P with those who
take part in the exercises, but there are important differences.
For
instance, while participants of the regular training exercises come from
different branches and services of the US military, those under the JSOTF-P are
drawn specifically from the Special Operations Forces (SOFs), or those units
that, as their name implies, conduct "special operations". According
to the SOF's own definition, "special operations" are those
"conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments"
and that require "covert, clandestine, or discreet capabilities". The
US Army Field Manual — a guide for military missions and procedures — meanwhile
says that SOFs are the "force of choice" for "dynamic,
ambiguous, and politically volatile situations".
The number
of participants in the training exercises is also publicly disclosed prior to
each exercise. In the case of the JSOTF-P, however, this information has been
withheld. Various media reports place the number of troops deployed to the
southern Philippines between 160 and 350, but it isn't clear what the actual
figure is for a specific period. US Embassy spokesman Matthew Lussenhop has
said that it "wouldn't be above 100". But US Lieutenant Colonel Mark
Zimmer, JSOTF- P Public Affairs Officer, also said it varies "depending on
the season and the mission".
Many of the
exercises are conducted inside military training camps or other designated
training areas, and are done so with no specified target or enemy in mind. By contrast,
the JSOTF-P has been operating in an area in which combat with forces seen as
hostile to the Philippines government has ensued and is still ongoing. The
exact coverage of its area of operation remains unclear, but the JSOTF-P has
been explicit in targeting "terrorists," in particular the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG)*, and lately, the Jemaah Islamaiah, both of which are listed as
"designated foreign terrorist organisations" by the US State
Department.
* Abu
Sayyaf Group. This bona fide terrorist group (they are not Muslim separatists,
but the latest in a long line of pirates and bandits who have terrorised their
fellow countrymen and neighbours in the far South for centuries) is a classic
example of “blowback” – a Frankenstein monster of armed Filipino mujahedin
created by the US Central Intelligence Agency in the 1980s to fight America’s
proxy jihad against the Russians then occupying Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden is
the most famous of those Muslim terrorists who have “blown back” into the faces
of their 1980s’ American creators. This tiny band of criminals, confined to the
southernmost islands and the southernmost part of Mindanao, are now the flimsy
reason for the Americans to get a foothold back in their old colony and for
Bush to have proclaimed the Philippines to be the “Second Front in the ‘War on
Terror’”. Ed.
In truth,
from the very start, US and Philippine officials announced that the deployment
was part of the US-led "global war against terror". The JSOTF-P's
deployment here was even labelled by the US military as "Operation
Enduring Freedom-Philippines" (OEF-P), signifying that the nature and the
goal of the deployment was in the same league as the original "Operation
Enduring Freedom" - the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.
Finally,
the regular training exercises are close-ended and usually last for no more
than a week or two, after which the participating units return to their home
bases. But the JSOTF-P's stay has been indefinite. Contrary to the 2002
assurance by then National Security Adviser Roilo Golez that the US troops
would "be gone" after six months, the troops remain. US and Filipino
officials are mum about any exit date. In a March 2006 interview, Captain Eddie
Paruchabutr, then JSOTF-P information officer, could only say: "It's
continuous as long as we are allowed to stay".
Special Warfare
In writings
meant principally for internal US military consumption, JSOTF-P members reveal
how they actually understand the nature of their mission in the Philippines. For
example, in an article for the US Army Combined Arms Center's Military Review
journal, the first Commander of the JSOTF-P, Colonel David Maxwell said their
mission was "to conduct unconventional warfare in the southern Philippines
through, by, and with the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] to help the
Philippine government separate the population and destroy the terrorist
organisation". Their key tasks included "denying the ASG
sanctuary," "surveilling, controlling, or denying ASG routes,"
and "surveilling supporting villages and key personnel".
In an
apparent rebuff to the Supreme Court, Maxwell also pointed out that — contrary
to the Justices' reading — the Philippine Constitution "does not prohibit
combat operations". According to Maxwell, the "correct reading"
of the charter would show that it proscribes only the stationing of forces, not
combat operations. Reappointed as JSOTF-P Commander in October 2006, Maxwell
described the operations he led as being conducted "under the guise of an
exercise".
Maxwell's
description is shared by members of the 1st Special Forces group who wrote a
history of their unit's engagements in the Philippines for Special Warfare, the
bulletin of the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.
According to their own account, their unit took part in "the ongoing
unconventional warfare operations…". Dr CH Briscoe, the Command Historian
of the US Army Special Operations Command, interviewed soldiers "who
participated at all levels of operations". In 2004, he wrote how their
mission "transformed from unconventional warfare to foreign internal
defence and development". The ensuing ground campaign, said Briscoe, was
best described by referring to the "counterinsurgency model". Eric
Wendt, also writing for the same publication, cited the Joint Task Force's
actions as "a superior example of successful counterinsurgency".
Similarly, Cherilyn Walley, another US military historian, noted how the
Special Forces in the country turned "from performing tactical missions to
implementing the counterinsurgency model that had been practiced by the
American military in Vietnam" (in the 1960s & 70s’ war. Ed). An analyst writing for the National Bureau of
Asian Research meanwhile observed, "[A]lthough US training of Philippine
forces in both Luzon and Mindanao is labelled counter-terror, in fact, the
effort seems to be more counterinsurgency against the paramilitary forces of
the Abu Sayyaf and the MILF [Moro Islamic Liberation Front]".
The terms
"unconventional warfare," "foreign internal defence," and
"counterinsurgency" are rarely, if at all used, by US and Filipino
officials in publicly describing the JSOTF-P's work. But they are the words of
choice of members of the US military writing on their own mission in the
Philippines. In US military jargon, "unconventional warfare" and
"foreign internal defence" are among the key missions of SOFs.
Considered their raison d'etre, "unconventional warfare" refers to
all those operations that SOFs conduct "through, with, or by indigenous or
surrogate forces which are organised, trained, equipped, supported, and
directed in varying degrees by an external source". This covers
"guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and
unconventional assisted recovery".
The operations
under "foreign internal defence" refer to those activities conducted
"to organise, train, advise, and assist host-nation military and
paramilitary forces". According to the US Army Field Manual, this
mission's goal is to ensure that the kind of assistance the United States gives
to its host's troops "support US national interests".
"Counter-insurgency" covers all those "military, paramilitary,
political, economic, psychological, and civic actions" performed by a
government to defeat internal enemies.
“In The Thick Of It”
US and
Philippine officials portray the US troops role as passive "advisers"
indirectly engaged in the operations from a distance. But reports indicate that
their role has been more active and direct.
From the beginning, the US troops were authorised under the terms of
reference between the US and Philippine governments to fire back if shot at.
Under this arrangement, US Special Forces have "intentionally ventured
into known Abu Sayyaf territory in an attempt to reassure locals while also
dissuading the rebels from operating openly, as well as possibly tempting them
to confront the Americans militarily," noted an analyst with the
Washington DC-based Center for Defense Information.
Even as
"advisers," Briscoe observed that the "guys were in thick of
it" and were anxious to "get in the fight." He said the US
troops "expected to shoot or to be shot". Such an expectation would
not seem misplaced for, as one writer for a war veterans' publication pointed
out: "Though the Philippines’ Constitution prohibits foreign soldiers from
fighting within the island nation, US troops are exposed to the same risks they
would see in combat". In fact, in a June 2002 incident reported by the Los
Angeles Times and confirmed in the Army magazine, US Marines exchanged gunfire
with alleged ASG members. Another incident reportedly had at least one US
soldier "killed in action," though not during a patrol. In March
2006, a Huey helicopter carrying US troops to Sulu was attacked by unidentified
assailants.
US officials
describe the Special Forces' role as "training, advising, and
assisting" Filipino troops. During the on the job training against hostile
forces, giving advice, helping, and actually being part of the action may well
have overlapped. As Walley explained in her 2004 Special Warfare article:
"Security assistance missions preclude the trainers from being combatants
or from performing duties in which they are likely to become combatants. But
the trainers' credibility and effectiveness as teachers mandated that they
accompany the AFP troops on their graduation exercise, of which combat was an
integral part". Briscoe, for his part, pointed out that while their
primary role was to train, their "unspoken" mission later changed to
include "facilitating the rescue" of ASG hostages. He said this
entailed assuming a more assertive and central role in the planning,
decision-making, and execution of the operations.
At first,
the US troops were allowed to operate only at the battalion level, which left
them frustrated. At one point, several US media reports said, former US Pacific
Command Chief, Admiral Dennis Blair, "tried to get too aggressive"
while others in the military pressed for a "longer and more intense
mission". JSOTF-P Commander Maxwell also argued that confining the troops
at the battalion was a "strategic error." But the then US Defense
Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, later authorised US troops to operate at the
company level and join patrols "as often as possible." This set up is
similar to the US war in Afghanistan, where Special Forces troops joined and
commanded 120-member companies of the Northern Alliance (the Afghan rebel army
which was the Americans’ ally in defeating the Taliban government. Ed.).
And so in
June 2005, local residents told journalists that US forces had joined the
Philippine military in their operations against Abu Sayyaf members in
Maguindanao province in mainland Mindanao —even when no training exercises or
civil projects had been announced. A P3-Orion plane was seen flying over the area.
In November of that year, the AFP launched operations allegedly against the Abu
Sayyaf, even as those who were fighting back claimed to belong to the Moro
National Liberation Front, a group whose 1996 peace agreement with the
Government had frayed but which was not tagged a "terrorist group" by
either Manila or Washington.
Eyewitnesses
said US troops joined the Filipino soldiers in operations at the immediate
vicinity of the fighting. US soldiers were seen aboard military trucks with
their Filipino counterparts and in rubber boats, mounting heavy artillery,
operating military equipment, removing landmines, or evacuating casualties.
Throughout the clashes, a spy plane — which locals said had been flying over
the skies for months — hovered above the area where fighting was ongoing.
“Special Reconnaissance”
US
officials dismissed these reports as "absolutely not true". Asserted
JSOTF-P Public Affairs Officer Lieutenant Colonel Mark Zimmer: "We are not
in any way involved in military operations conducted by the Philippine Armed
Forces". Other military officials and reports, however, support the claims
of the witnesses. The Filipino commander during the November 2005 operations,
General Nehemias Pajarito confirmed that US troops were indeed at the vicinity
of the fighting, but that they were just repairing water pipes while
hostilities were ongoing. Another Filipino colonel attested that he had
requested the US troops' help in clearing landmines.
The US
troops' role in evacuating troop casualties had previously been reported and
confirmed by the US military itself. In 2002, a US Air Force magazine reported
that US soldiers "helped infiltrate and extract ground forces" in the
Philippines. In subsequent operations in September 2006, a Filipino military
spokesperson also confirmed that US troops assisted in evacuating soldiers.
As for
their role in spying, in February 2006 local residents in the south recovered
an unmanned US aerial vehicle that had crashed. A US military spokesperson then
said the spy planes were used for "humanitarian" projects, but other
US officials, including a general, have since stated that these have been used
to hunt down targets. A report to the US Congress also said P-3 aircraft
provide "intelligence and communications support" to the AFP. In
September 2006, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita himself acknowledged that US
troops were using surveillance equipment to track down the ASG. That the
surveillance was meant for combat had been confirmed as early as 2002 by then
National Security Council adviser Golez, who was quoted as saying US pilots on
surveillance flights could "call in air strikes" if they spot ASG
fighters.
In at least
two reports, the Philippine Star has noted the US troops' use of "unmanned
planes, electronic tracking devices, eavesdropping mechanisms, experimental
laser beacons, and a full range of US intelligence gadgets". Such use
attests to the "special reconnaissance" mission that is a forte of
Special Forces troops. According to the Army Field Manual, the mission's
objective is "to confirm, refute, or obtain — by visual observation or
other collection methods — information on the capabilities, intentions, and
activities of an actual or potential enemy".
In these
operations, the Special Forces were aided by the US Central Intelligence
Agency, which has admitted in one of its annual reports that it supported the
Joint Task Forces by using "human intelligence" and through other
technical operations. The former Philippine Ambassador to Washington, Albert
del Rosario, also confirmed the establishment of an "intelligence fusion
centre" staffed by both US and Filipino troops and the setting up of
satellite equipment.
Moreover,
US soldiers have apparently enjoyed a special vantage point inside Philippine
military headquarters during operations (during the rescue of Abu Sayyaf
hostages, for instance, some US soldiers were reportedly stationed in the
Philippine military command post). What their role in decision-making is
exactly and how they relate with Filipino officials they supposedly
"advise" is not known. US soldiers, however, are legally barred from
being put under the command of foreign officers. And in at least one incident,
Briscoe said, the US commanders "steer(ed) the AFP leadership" into
supporting a particular plan of action. To describe what is going on as
"unconventional warfare" may not be farfetched, since the US military
itself defines such missions as those in which US troops "direct"
indigenous forces.
The
In denying
that US troops are engaged in "actual combat" in the Philippines, US
and Philippine officials have sought to reduce the coverage of the definition
of the phrase to only those actions that involve the direct application of
force. This implies that US troops could be considered as engaging in combat
only when they themselves personally pull the trigger and fire guns at their
enemies. Yet while US troops have actually found themselves in this position,
US public information officers continue to stress that their actions are
confined to performing "non-combat" roles, such as training or
undertaking humanitarian missions.
But even as
US and Filipino officials take pains to publicly draw distinctions between US
troops' missions, the US military apparently does not. As its own Army Field
Manual states: "Military power is not limited to acts of violence and
overt hostilities to achieve strategic objectives". This view, says the
Manual, is particularly valid for US Special Operations Forces. It adds:
"The principles of war apply to the full range of operations, specifically
where the use of force is more selective and where restraint and non-lethal
aspects of power are dominant".
The US
military also defines "civil-military operations" or CMOs, including
the construction of deep wells, roads, and school buildings, as well as medical
and dental missions as a "group of planned activities in support of
military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces
and civilian authorities and population and which promote the development of
favorable emotions, attitudes, or behaviour in neutral, friendly, or hostile
grounds". Testifying about their CMOs in Basilan, former US Pacific
Command Chief, Admiral Thomas Fargo, said these "acted as force multipliers
for US and AFP operations because the programs separated the citizens of
Basilan from supporting the terrorist threat".
The goal is
not just to earn the locals' sympathy, but also to extract information
necessary for combat. As one military writer pointed out, the humanitarian
projects' underlying aim is "not simply to provide feel good projects that
achieve positive perceptions among the local populace". He added,
"The purpose is to utilise the correct… carrots… that will yield actionable
intelligence that can be used to target and destroy the insurgent
infrastructure…".
After the
carrots come the sticks. Or as Wendt put it: "After the infrastructure has
been identified and exposed by the local population, its members can be killed
or captured”. Even infrastructure projects — the extension of airport runways,
construction of piers and jetties, road paving, and so on — which have won over
many local authorities have larger military goals. Pointing out how they
enabled troops to move around more quickly, Walley says these projects
"benefited US trainers and advisers and contributed to force
protection". They are also useful for meeting the troops' supply and
logistics needs. Likewise, training AFP troops serves US combat-related goals.
In US military terminology, indigenous troops act as "force
multipliers" in projecting power and in achieving US military objectives
but — as the Army Field Manual says — "with minimum visibility, risk, and
cost". To put it another way, AFP members are trained so they can be put
out front and first in line when the enemies start firing.
“Long-Term Low-Visibility Presence”
Rather than
just lone-standing missions, the US troops' actions in the Philippines are part
of a comprehensive and wide-ranging transformation of the US military
organisation and its global posture. In fact, their interrelated missions
conform to the overall US military strategy, as articulated in various official
documents, including the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the National
Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NDS), the National
Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism (NSCT),
among others.
At one
level, the deployment of troops in the Philippines is in keeping with
Washington's determination to "focus decisive military power and
specialised intelligence resources to defeat terrorist networks globally".
This is because the challenge to US interests, as seen by US strategists, no
longer comes just from state but also non-state actors, especially those taking
shelter in states incapable of controlling their own territory. Says the NSS:
"America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by
failing ones".
This
"failing state" label has been increasingly pinned on the
Philippines, with former US Embassy officials describing Mindanao as "a
doormat for terrorism in the region" or as the "next
Afghanistan". Faced with these kinds of threats, the NSS asserts:
"The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run". In
this fight, the lines between a defensive war and what the Supreme Court terms
"offensive war" are blurred, if not indeterminate. For as the NSCT
points out: "[T]he best defence is a good offence".
As a
result, the QDR calls for a shift in emphasis "from conducting war against
nations — to conducting war in countries we are not at war with" — a
category that fits the Philippines.
A New Form Of Entrenching US Bases In The
Beyond
pursuing "terrorists," however, the SOF's stationing in the
While
discussing the current realignment of
In these
plans, Special Forces hold a special place. More than other units, SOFs have
usually been the contingent to count on to "gain or maintain
These small
and inconspicuous units fulfil the stated need of "maintaining a
long-term, low visibility presence in many areas of the world where
Herbert Docena is with the Focus on the Global
South, a policy research institute. This article is based on a 40 page special
report published by the Institute. It can be downloaded from www.focusweb.org/pdf/unconventionalwarfare.pdf
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