AT LONG BLOODY LAST - A Happy Ending To Ahmed Zaoui’s Ordeal

Peace Researcher 35 – December 2007

- Murray Horton

Ahmed Zaoui, an Algerian Islamic politician, was held in custody for slightly more than two years after he was arrested upon arrival, in Auckland, in December 2002. Nearly half of his time in prison was spent in solitary confinement in maximum security. He was never charged or tried for any offence. He arrived on false papers, and claimed refugee status, which was granted by the appropriate official body. The Government chose to override that decision, citing the woebegotten New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS) as its preferred authority on the case. Zaoui was wanted by Algeria (site of a particularly murderous recent civil war, one where the West backed the regime because it was fighting Islamic fundamentalists, blithely ignoring the fact that those same fundamentalists won a democratic election and were denied elected office by a military coup. Democracy is fine so long as it doesn’t produce the “wrong” results, apparently. This has been most recently demonstrated in the case of the electoral victory in Gaza by the Palestinian Islamic party, Hamas). For most of the 1990s Zaoui was shunted from exile to exile, in Europe and Africa. The Intelligence agencies of various European countries, principally France, plus the Algerians and NZ’s more usual Intelligence allies, all contributed to Zaoui remaining in prison in Auckland and, even after he was released on strictly conditional bail, in 2004, facing imminent deportation (with the very real prospect of death, should he be returned to Algeria, which had sentenced him to death in absentia).

Zaoui’s plight became a national cause celebre and there were any number of appalling aspects to it (such as the racist and shoddy Immigration laws and procedures exposed for all to see). The Anti-Bases Campaign has a longstanding interest in the SIS and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, so we decided to concentrate on that aspect. We considered it appalling that Zaoui was imprisoned, nearly half of it in solitary confinement and in maximum security, without charge or trial, and faced deportation and possible death, because of the cackhanded malice of New Zealand “Intelligence” (a contradiction in terms if ever there was one), and the gutlessness of a Government whose most senior Ministers put a higher premium on sucking up to our masters in the “War On Terror” and on a relationship with the Intelligence agencies from the likes of France (our “ally,” which, in 1985, sent its own Intelligence agents/State terrorists to bomb Greenpeace’s ship “Rainbow Warrior” in Auckland Harbour, killing a man in the process) than on the life and liberty of a Third World refugee. Shame on the lot of them.

Peace Researcher has covered this story extensively since the outset and most recently reported on it in PR 34 (July 2007). Zaoui was the first person to be the subject of a Security Risk Certificate issued by the SIS. This was set down for an August 2006 review hearing by Paul Neazor, the Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence. However, weeks beforehand, Neazor postponed the hearing indefinitely, saying that he needed more time to prepare. “However, sources close to the case said one of the reasons for the delay was a story in the Press on May 3 (2006) which quoted Zaoui’s lawyers saying they hoped to cross-examine SIS chief, Richard Woods, who has since retired” (Press, 2/1/07, “Zaoui claims unfair treatment”, Dan Eaton). So the SIS was not keen for its then boss to be questioned.

In June 2007 Neazor announced that the review process would start with a four week hearing in July and August, held in private, although it would be dealing with unclassified information only. The media duly covered (from the outside only) Zaoui and his legal team arriving on the first day and then it all retreated behind closed doors (Helen Clark, the Minister in Charge of the SIS, made clear that it was not a court hearing, and therefore not subject to any of the usual rules). For example, Zaoui’s legal team had no access to the classified material held by the SIS and therefore no way of knowing the accusations and allegations made against him. It was a travesty of justice, in every sense of the word.

Free To Go, But With Conditions

There was every expectation that this secret process would drag on for months. If the Inspector-General upheld the Security Risk Certificate, then the law allowed the Minister of Immigration a mere three days to order Zaoui’s deportation (where to was only one of the problems facing the Government in this self-created mess). Thus it was a great surprise when Warren Tucker, the SIS Director, summonsed a hastily convened press conference (the first ever held by the SIS) in September 2007 to announce that he had terminated the process, revoked the Certificate and that Zaoui was now free to live a normal life in New Zealand (having already been granted refugee status years ago). The Government suddenly declared itself interested in allowing him to be reunited with his wife and sons who have been living as illegal migrants in Malaysia for several years. They duly arrived, without any media fanfare, in October.

Tucker, who is showing himself to be a considerably more pragmatic SIS Director than his predecessor, Richard Woods, claimed that although Zaoui had been a security risk when he arrived in NZ in 2002 (that is a nonsense in itself), he isn’t now. Tucker attributed that to: Zaoui disclosing more information during the secret hearing than he previously had; the SIS having received fresh classified information about Zaoui’s past in Algeria; and the fact that the length of time he’s been in NZ, and his elevated public profile, has mitigated some of the “risks”. This is called covering your arse. Tucker was admitting that the “case” against Zaoui was non-existent and the fact that the relentless persecution has made him a high profile public hero in NZ is decidedly counter-productive for the SIS and its nominal political masters.

In a further unprecedented move (but then, everything about the Zaoui case is unprecedented), the SIS required that he sign (sworn on the Koran, no less) Undertakings To the Director of Security. The (heavily censored) unclassified version of this document was then posted on the SIS Website. Basically it consisted of Zaoui agreeing to “ongoing, regular contact” with the SIS so that it can be “comfortable with its assessment that I do not present a threat to security”; to not breach the Crimes Act and/or the Terrorism Suppression Act; to not publish anything inciting violence and, if in doubt, to consult the SIS about it; to not contact any other country’s Intelligence agency unless first consulting the SIS; to inform the SIS if any other country’s Intelligence agency contacts him; and to advise the SIS if he is contacted by people whose identities have been censored in the unclassified version. Tucker’s eight page decision (unclassified version) was also posted on the Web, and it contained a final twist of the knife – each page is subheaded: “Classified information has been deleted. Other information has been withheld at Mr Zaoui’s request”). What that implies, rightly or wrongly, is that Zaoui has got something to hide in relation to his dealings with the SIS, and by inference, its counterpart agencies overseas. If Zaoui had indeed been a “terrorist” in Algeria or in the global Algerian diaspora, that simple sentence alone could be the kiss of death for him as far as his former colleagues were concerned. This is the SIS saying “OK, we’ve let him go but he’s ours now, he has ‘cooperated’ with us”.

But I imagine, from Zaoui’s point of view, he was happy to sign this very strange “contract” with the SIS in order for the whole ghastly nightmare to end, for him to become a free man in the country which has taken him to its heart (something it has never done with the boofheads of the SIS – I don’t see any likelihood of any NZ TV series about heroic SIS agents, a la “Spooks”, anytime soon) and, most importantly, for him to be able to be reunited with his long suffering family and for them to be able to live a normal life in their new homeland. That’s perfectly understandable. Nobody would wish to be put into the situation that this man endured for nearly five years.

The whole State apparatus, covert and overt, comes out of the Zaoui case very shabbily indeed. The exceptionally harsh treatment meted out to him stood in stark contrast to the warmhearted welcome that the same Labour government simultaneously gave to the “Tampa” refugees, Muslim fugitives from “terrorist” countries who were ruthlessly rejected by the paranoid Australian government in 2001. Obviously, the Government and the SIS felt that they had to be seen to be doing their bit in the “War on Terror” and generating a good old fashioned scaremongering about “Islamic terrorists” trying to illegally get into little old NZ was good for political business and enabled the SIS to score brownie points with its Big Brothers abroad. The only problem for them was that they fucked it up from Day One. The tragedy is that Ahmed Zaoui paid for that fuckup with nearly five years of his life. But he knows not to judge New Zealand by our politicians or our spies, he has experienced the warmth and hospitality of the New Zealand that is this nation’s greatest asset. Welcome to New Zealand, mate, you’re one of us now. Make yourself at home and enjoy your stay.

SIS Tries To Make Itself Useful

As for the SIS, it is frantically trying to make itself useful and relevant. In September 2007 (just before he made his Zaoui announcement), Warren Tucker gave his first interview since becoming Director. In it he said that hackers from an unidentified foreign Government had gained access to New Zealand government computer systems. When asked who was the culprit, he referred the media to comments from Canada’s spy agency blaming China for similar activities there. So, by implication, we need the heroic SIS to save us from the evil Chinese. This was put into the proper context by Listener columnist Russell Brown who wrote: “On the other hand, New Zealand is a party to Echelon, a much larger and more sophisticated digital eavesdropping system controlled by the US (that’s what Waihopai is part of. Ed.). We presumably benefit from that form of snooping. So it would be surprising if foreign governments weren’t poking around in our stuff” (29/9/07, Wide Area News; “I spy: So, at least one foreign government has been poking around in our government’s IT systems. Is anyone surprised?”).

That same month – a very busy one for our normally very shy spies – the Government announced the demise of the Serious Fraud Office and its replacement by the Organised Crime Agency, which will be overseen by the high level Officials’ Committee on Domestic and External Security Coordination. That committee includes the Directors of both the SIS and the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB, which runs Waihopai). This means the spies will directly be doing Police work. When Tucker initially floated this idea, first reported in July (Press, 14/7/07; “SIS wants to tackle serious organised crime”), it was criticised by the Council for Civil Liberties on the basis of the SIS’ record, its lack of accountability and the fact that it is effectively answerable only to its Minister i.e. the Prime Minister. The most useful thing the SIS could do would be to dissolve itself and have its functions turned over to the Police, who are (theoretically, at least) accountable to the public and answerable for their actions in a court of law. The Zaoui case has only reinforced just how little use the SIS is. To all the politicians screaming blue murder about tax cuts: get rid of this nohoper outfit instead, and save us all tens of millions of dollars a year. That money could definitely be put to better use.

5 September 2007

SLEEPING WATCHDOG NO PROBLEM TO SPIES

Green Party MP Keith Locke has given the Intelligence and Security Committee the “asleep at the wheel” award for being the most slothful committee in the New Zealand Parliament. “Despite the Government acting to increase the Security Intelligence Service budget by almost 50% since 2005 in the name of the ‘war on terror,’ National and Labour politicians seem almost totally disinterested in whether the SIS or Government Communications Security Bureau do their job properly,” Mr Locke, the Greens’ Security Intelligence Spokesperson, says.

“The Committee’s track record is damning. Since the 2005 election the Committee has met only four times, for a grand total of 2 hours 38 minutes. According to replies from the Prime Minister to a Written Question, the committee met on March 27 (50 minutes) and June 14 (40 minutes) in 2006, and February 14 (38 minutes) and June 27 (30 minutes) in 2007. Another sign of the lack of oomph in the Committee was that it took five weeks for staff to assemble the above information – despite seven days being the deadline under Standing Orders, for the return of Written Questions.

“This shows the need for a real Select Committee on Intelligence in our Parliament. The present Committee is simply made up of the Prime Minister and the National Party Leader, and their appointees. New Zealand must have the least active intelligence oversight committee in the world, outside of dictatorships,” Mr Locke says. In countries like Britain, Australia and the US they have Parliamentary and Congressional committees that can and do conduct serious inquiries, that initiate their own subjects of inquiry and that have the power to require officials and Cabinet Ministers to testify before them. They are not content – as in New Zealand – to be supine, rubber stamp bodies.

“Since 2001, there has been legislation granting extra powers to the security services and increased reliance on classified security information at the expense of open judicial processes. Is it too much to ask that the public’s Parliamentary representatives should stir themselves to play a more active role in ensuring that these new, intrusive powers are necessary, and are not being abused?” Mr Locke says.

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