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‘THE PAERANGI LECTURES’
MĀORI HORIZONS 2020 AND BEYOND.

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PAE MANA

WAITANGI AND THE
EVOLVING STATE

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The Paerangi Lectures

Pae Mana: Waitangi and the Evolving State is the third and last of the Paerangi Lectures. It considers the position of Māori beyond 2020 and has a particular emphasis on the relevance and applicability of the Treaty of Waitangi to the future. Although economic, political and global uncertainties make it difficult to predict the years ahead, it is highly probable that Māori will be a proportionately stronger force within New Zealand, and at the same time will be exposed to greater internal competitiveness as well as competition from neighbouring states and economies. The status of the Treaty, and perhaps of greater relevance, the status of Māori will become part of a wide public debate, linked to New Zealand's own status as a democracy in the South Pacific with strong trade and diplomatic relationships with Asian economies.

In the first lecture, *Pae Matatū Sustaining the Māori Estate*, the rapid growth of the Māori asset base was seen as a positive development but one that would demand expert governance and management to ensure that future generations could enjoy the full benefits of their entitlements. Concerns about the transfer of assets from one generation to another were raised and the importance of 'future proofing' as a way of protecting the interests of future generations was explored. The major conclusion, however, was that the Māori estate will grow in both size and diversity; it will include customary resources such as land, tradable assets including real estate and shares in international companies, as well as cultural heritage typified by marae and te reo Māori.

The second lecture *Pae Ora: Māori Health Horizons* considered the broad approaches to Māori health over the past two decades and the resulting gains. But it was primarily positioned in the future and contemplated the consequences of global, local, environmental, and family determinants on Māori health. The impacts of technological innovation, demographic transitions, unexpected catastrophes and epidemics, indigenous aspirations and strengthened Māori capability were canvassed and a number of directional shifts were proposed so that the gains made in recent decades could be extended into the future. Environmental sustainability, quality social relationships, balanced lifestyles, wise leadership, and access to knowledge and technology would be important drivers of health and wellbeing and, as agents for the promotion of health, whānau could make the most significant difference to Māori health and wellbeing.

Meanwhile the third lecture explores consequences for Māori of a nation that will be more populous, more diverse and more globally connected. *Pae Mana* will address questions about the significance of the Treaty of Waitangi as a platform for forward development rather than as a vehicle for redress, and it will scope the implications for Māori if New Zealand were to become a republic.

The lecture has three main conclusions. First, the constitutional position of Māori in the future will depend as much on global forces as domestic agreements in Aotearoa. Second, the promise of the Treaty will not be realised by a schedule of property rights or legislative amendments, but by the ways in which Māori and the Crown can jointly advance New Zealand's economy and

standards of living. Third, as New Zealand's ties with the northern hemisphere weaken while its interests in Asia and the Pacific expand, notions of sovereignty will take on new meanings. The relationship of Māori with the Crown may not be the most important articulation of the constitutional position of Māori; instead alliances with other parties in New Zealand and beyond New Zealand may confer a significant level of dominion that does not depend solely on the Crown for validation.

1840 and Future Opportunities

In that respect the Treaty was an international agreement that offered the prospect of fresh opportunities for both parties. The stated intention of the British Crown was to use the Treaty to pave the way for annexation, the institution of British laws, and large-scale immigration from Britain without causing undue harm to Māori. Tribes were to benefit as much as the Crown. Lord Normanby's Instructions made it clear that colonisation in the past had wreaked havoc on indigenous peoples. Here was a chance to act with new honour by ensuring that indigenous rights would be respected, especially property rights, and individual Māori would profit from British understandings of citizenship. The principled approach inherent in the Treaty of Waitangi marked a shift in the Crown's earlier colonisation policies which had scant regard for native populations. However, the noble sentiment may also have been prompted by the earlier recognition of Māori sovereignty when the Declaration of Independence was endorsed by the British Parliament. Having acknowledged tribal leaders as the rightful sovereigns of Aotearoa in 1835, by 1840 Britain was faced with the challenge of acquiring sovereignty. The Treaty provided the necessary instrument of annexation. Regardless, it seemed that the Treaty would provide Māori and the Crown with joint resolve to embark on a journey that would take both into new territory.

It is unlikely that either Iwi or the settlers had any clear idea how their futures might be about to change. The settlers drew on their experiences in Britain though soon discovered that neither agriculture nor commerce could be conducted in exactly the same way as they had practiced at home. In order to flourish, adaptation to a different environment was necessary. Iwi also found that while the shift to a cash economy would substantially disrupt their ways of life, engagement with settlers would bring new technologies, education, and opportunities for trade on a larger scale than would have been possible in earlier years. A sense of urgency must have been keenly felt by Māori leaders as wave after wave of settlers arrived to take up land interests. Their concerns about the way the future was unfolding were soon galvanised into collective action. In 1856, at Pukawa on Lake Taupo, tribal leaders agreed on a two-part plan to curtail increasing encroachment and land alienation. The first part of the plan was to anoint a king as a symbol of collective Māori authority. The second part was to promote tribal accord. A united front would offer more effective opposition to land sales and avoid the 'divide and rule' tactics used by land purchasing agents. The Pukawa resolution was to set aside long standing Māori political divisions in favour of greater collective bargaining power with the colonial government and within the framework of the Treaty of Waitangi.

New Zealand was on the verge of a double transformation: a Māori nation within a nation was about to be born while pastoral farming was about to manifestly change the landscape. In the event, for reasons which are too complex for discussion in this paper, neither transformation planned out as well as expected. The important point, however, is not that that Māori ambitions

were aborted or that bargaining power was to prove less effective than the rule of might, but that Iwi had recognised both opportunity and threat in the new environment. They had embarked on a process of futures planning to strengthen their position and establish a secure foothold for future generations. If the Treaty of Waitangi had been an instrument of annexation, then it was also to be a pathway to the future.

Beyond Settlements

However, after a promising start, the Treaty was soon to become a marker of the past rather than a signpost to the future. Not only was the parchment itself allowed to fall into tatters, but the promise of a joint Māori-Crown approach to transformation gave way to a one-sided declaration of colonial rule. The establishment of a Māori electorate and four Māori seats in Parliament in 1867 was overshadowed a decade later by Justice Prendergast in a Supreme Court decision that declared the Treaty to be ‘a simple nullity;’ it could be virtually disregarded. By the mid 1950s the Treaty of Waitangi was being recognised as a significant but essentially historic document largely irrelevant to modern times.

Māori, however, saw it differently. As land holdings dwindled and Māori decision-making became marginalised, there was growing disquiet and a groundswell of indignation. Recourse to the Courts had failed to reverse the Prendergast decision and by the 1970s a new generation was ready to take to the streets to protest land loss, loss of language, and loss of authority. The 1975 Māori land march startled most New Zealanders who had little idea how deeply embedded the sense of injustice was. In the same year, and largely due to the efforts of Matiu Rata, the Waitangi Tribunal was established.

In the Tribunal’s first major publication, the 1983 *Motunui Report*, the relevance of the Treaty to contemporary New Zealand was articulated in terms that made sense to Māori, to jurists, and to local communities. Well before the emergence of a green philosophy, or warnings about global climate change, the Tribunal had highlighted the impact of industrial development on the environment, in particular on the Waitara River and the Taranaki reefs. A Treaty of Waitangi breach was levelled at the Government and, importantly, echoed by a wide section of the community. The Tribunal’s findings could not be ignored with the same indifference that Prendergast had used to dismiss the Treaty itself. Claims against the Crown for historic breaches of the principles of the Treaty dating back to 1840 followed, slowly at first and then by the score. Māori energies were now spent delving into Government policies and practices in the nineteenth century.

While the claims process was eventually to bring a sense of closure if not justice for many Iwi, it was also to locate the Treaty debate in the past. A focus on the settlement of claims has tended to mask the fact that the whole purpose of the Treaty was to plan ahead. Instead for many New Zealanders the Treaty had become synonymous with past grievances and the corollary was that once settlements were concluded then the Treaty would have exhausted itself. But while an investigation into historic breaches drew on the principles of the Treaty, the claims process was more closely attuned to the delivery of justice rather than the ratification of the Treaty.

Although many settlements have yet to be concluded, most of the major historic claims have been resolved, including the central north island ‘Tree Lords’ claim lodged by eight Iwi. A new

age is dawning: it is a post-settlement era where Māori relationships with the Crown and with each other will not be premised on past injustices but on future development. The question now is whether Treaty experiences over the past two or more decades will provide a basis for a new type of relationship between Māori and the Crown. Working together to construct an agenda for New Zealand's future will be a major Treaty task that will require new approaches both from Iwi and the Crown. Adversarial bargaining, a hallmark of direct negotiations for Treaty claims will not be a productive way of deciding how best to reduce carbon emissions or address world-wide food shortages, or develop a strategy for off-shore investments or ensure that all children have the best possible educational outcomes or whether New Zealand should become a republic or not. Adversarial bargaining perpetuates a colonial relationship, winners and losers, and discussions based on rights and wrongs. Nor will a reliance on party-political coalitions provide a consistent Treaty-based mechanism for ensuring Māori inclusion in strategic decision-making. Though useful mechanisms for dealing with today, political timeframes – three years or so – are too short for grounding longer term plans. Moreover they rely heavily on deals made to satisfy other agendas. And having discussions only when a crisis occurs will do nothing to establish a clear plan for the future. They will inevitably lead to solutions that are short-lived and pragmatic rather than sustainable and strategic. Other relationship models should be entertained including some aspects of the model constructed at Pukawa in 1856 when Iwi met to consider how best to face an uncertain future. Missing from Pukawa, however, was an avenue for dialogue with the Crown. A post-settlement model might well contain elements of Pukawa, especially the prospect of a collective Māori voice, as well as aspects of direct negotiation with opportunity for ongoing Māori-Crown dialogue, no longer about past injustices but about future possibilities.

This new type of relationship presupposes a shift away from claimant groups – their concerns will already have been resolved - towards groups that reflect wider Māori interests, sometimes Iwi, sometimes sectoral. The question then will be how best Māori should be represented in future oriented discussions with the Crown. The vision of Kotahitanga, unity, first articulated at Pukawa, has yet to be implemented in a sustainable way.

The bigger question, however, might not actually be about the nature of the relationship between Māori and the Crown in a post-settlement environment, but whether a relationship with the Crown will be the most relevant one for Māori.

New Zealand in a Spinning Globe

Considerations of future Māori standing in Aotearoa cannot ignore a fast changing world and the dynamic interactions that will impact on New Zealand and on Māori. Although technological and scientific change and the growing complexities of global living create a climate of unpredictability, some forecasts can nonetheless be made with a degree of certainty. New Zealand's future for example will be significantly shaped by a changing demography. The whole population will age; by 2026 the median age will be 41 years compared to 36 years in 2006. In addition within the total population there will be significant differences in age structures between ethnic groups. The median age of the European population in 2006 was oldest at 39 years while for Māori it was significantly younger, 23 years. By 2021, the European median age will have increased to 44 years, but Māori will still be a relatively youthful population with a median age of years. The lag for Māori reflects higher fertility rates, a younger population base, and lower life expectancy.

Apart from an aging population the other significant demographic transition will be an increase in New Zealand's ethnic diversity. English, Scottish, Welsh Irish, and Dutch backgrounds will be joined by larger numbers of Chinese, Indian, Korean, Malay, Philippine, Samoan, Tongan, Fijian, Rarotongan, Kiribati, and Niue Islander settlers, as well as comings and goings from Australia. The diversity will not only add to the country's skill mix but will bring new understandings of society, democracy, commerce and sovereignty. Importantly, New Zealand's colonial attachment to Europe and the northern hemisphere will give way to a southern hemisphere identity and greater pride in being part of the Asian Pacific region. Just as early settlers from Europe in the nineteenth century showed little regard for Māori systems of governance, new settlers in the twenty-first century will not necessarily carry a sense of loyalty to the monarchy or even to the Westminster system.

New Zealand's future, however, will also reflect world-wide trends. The USA economic recession for example has had sufficient impact in the southern hemisphere to seriously pressure New Zealand industries, generate new levels of unemployment, and freeze real estate. Moreover, the consequences of the recession will not necessarily be short term; the immediate crisis may pass in the short term but the consequences will linger for a decade or more.

Even more lasting, however, will be the perpetuation of inequalities between rich nations and poor nations. Already over 130 million people live in extreme poverty and as a result many children will never reach adulthood. A rapidly growing world population predicted to increase from 6.4 billion now to 9 billion by 2050, coupled with a world-wide food shortage will greatly exacerbate the extent of their plight. Though distant from the major continents of the world, New Zealand is no longer in a position to ignore the consequences of global inequalities. Coping with the health effects of too much food, a major health challenge in developed countries is in sharp contrast to the greater harm that will come to children who grow up with insufficient food to sustain life and healthy development. It is a global crisis, impacting directly on near neighbours in the Pacific; and it is a problem that will of necessity involve New Zealand.

In addition to global inequalities and widespread malnutrition, a further challenge will come from the effects of global warming and climate change. Already there is clear evidence that without nation-wide agreements to reduce carbon emissions and re-vegetate denuded landscapes the planet will be seriously compromised and so will humanity. Not only will previously controlled diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis reappear but global changes in climate will result in cataclysmic events including drought, cyclones, gales and floods leading to serious loss of life and property. The age of oil will come to an end and other forms of energy will need to be harnessed. Natural resources such as fresh water will become scarce commodities and their ownership will be a source of tension between Iwi, farmers, commercial interests, local authorities and government, all vying for control. As a developed nation New Zealand contributes disproportionately to global warming, but even greater impacts will come from those parts of the world where population densities are high. In any event unless there is collective agreement on strategies to reduce carbon emissions and attain carbon neutrality, the welfare, if not the existence of generations yet to come will be threatened and much of the planet will be destroyed in the process.

A fourth challenge has a double edge. Global colonisation, a process already in train, brings with it entry to world-wide markets, international educational prospects, access to unprecedented volumes of knowledge and information, and exposure to the world's music, art and literature. The opportunities for Māori at home and abroad, will be unlimited, though not without compromise. Increased globalisation may mean that te ao Māori is submerged by other customs and in the process a distinctive way of life may be transformed into a bland adaptation of a global norm. There is a risk that tikanga, kawa, te reo Māori and those other markers that characterise Māori in modern times will be lost to whatever global fashion holds dominance in the world at any particular time.

Māori in a Reconfigured World

It may not be immediately obvious how the impact of population changes within New Zealand and the more threatening global transitions will affect Māori standing in Aotearoa New Zealand or alter the promise of the Treaty of Waitangi. But it would be short-sighted to assume that New Zealand was sufficiently isolated from the rest of the world to have immunity from those wider transitions. The potential impact of national and international events on Māori can be illustrated through a set of three scenarios. Scenario development is a way of exploring the future. Scenarios can be constructed on the basis of already known existing trends such as demographic trends, previous patterns of development such as nineteenth century colonisation, horizon scanning to detect, for example, the emergence of new technologies, and vigorous imagining.

Scenario 1 The Republic of New Zealand (RNZ)

The first scenario is about New Zealand's constitutional future. By 2029 New Zealand was ready to declare itself a republic, still part of the Commonwealth but with a new head of state. The possibility had been canvassed at a national conference in 2000 but no firm conclusions had been reached and because it all seemed too hard, the possibility was shelved. But in the wake of developments in the European Union and the consequent impositions placed on royalty in Scandinavia as well as Great Britain, constitutional monarchies had become increasingly out of favour. In addition the large number of New Zealanders of Asian and South American descent had little or no interest in perpetuating a constitutional framework that emanated from the northern hemisphere.

In the event, transitioning towards a republic had been surprisingly uneventful except for three questions. First should the President of the new republic be appointed or elected? Second, should there be a written constitution or simply a continuation of the nation's reliance on a series of conventions, supported by pragmatic innovation as required? Third, with a final exodus from a colonial past, what would be the status of the Treaty of Waitangi? Of the three questions the third proved to be the least problematic. Despite a rearguard concern that the Treaty was an instrument of division and should be ignored, most Kiwis, including Pacific and Asian communities thought that the rights of indigenous peoples should be maintained and the Treaty seemed to be the least difficult way of doing that. Moreover, the Treasury had long since

reached the conclusion that New Zealand's distinctiveness was a function of a vibrant Māori economy and retaining the Treaty not only affirmed indigenous interests but also affirmed the brand necessary for NZ to be competitive in a global economy.

Once agreement had been reached that the benefits of a written constitution far outweighed the dangers of having no constitution at all, the Treaty of Waitangi was integrated into the constitution as an overriding statement about New Zealand's indigenous peoples and their resources. For the first time the Treaty now had explicit recognition as an entrenched constitutional element rather than existing solely as a part of a fuzzy national conscience. By 2035 the Republic of New Zealand had become a champion for social cohesion and indigenous participation as indigenous people.

Scenario 2 The Confederation of the States of Australasia (CSA)

In the second scenario, by 2035 New Zealand has become integrated into Australia and is part of the Confederation of the States of Australasia. Two factors had contributed to the formation of the Confederation. First, concerns about global warming and the high expenditure of carbon credits on long distance flying meant that northern hemisphere markets, including tourists, were less lucrative. Second, strong Asian economies were competing with both Australia and New Zealand and effectively playing one off against the other. Largely in response to the new economic circumstances evident by 2025, New Zealand, Australia and some small Pacific nations agreed to explore the possibility of a new set of alliances with a single currency, a single passport and a single government (but with some devolved authority for the previous nation states).

New Zealand was generally enthusiastic about the proposition but a stumbling block had been Crown commitments to the Treaty of Waitangi. Australia was reluctant to see any reference to indigenous peoples incorporated into the new arrangements for fear that it would unsettle the now 'settled' Aboriginal population. Despite having agreed to the 2006 Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Australian states had effectively 'bought out' aboriginal demands through a system of compensatory payments that expired in 2020. Any obligations had been met. New Zealand eventually complied with the majority view and reluctantly accepted that the Treaty status would be confined to cultural matters and would not impose obligations on the federal government. A constitutional encumbrance had been removed and in the process the Treaty had been consigned to history. By 2035 the State of New Zealand had taken its place as one of ten states making up the Confederation.

Scenario 3 Māori Integrated Economies Inc (MIE)

In contrast to scenario 2, Scenario 3 expects that Māori will be leaders in world-wide indigenous networks. One network, Global Indigenous Systems (GIS) was established in 2025 largely as an initiative of the Indigenous Peoples Forum at the United Nations. The global economic recession which started in 2008 and continued through to 2011 had unfortunate longer lasting repercussions for indigenous peoples in many countries. Further, although many nations had signed up to the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2006, few had encouraged indigenous economic development. The GIS goal was to advance indigenous economies through world-wide indigenous collaboration.

Meanwhile by 2020 it had become clear in New Zealand that Māori investments following Treaty settlements had led to new wealth, experience in economic development, and expertise in financial governance and management. The impact of the economic recession had not been as severe as it had for First Nations, Australian Aborigines, Saami people, Native Americans or Native Hawaiians. Nonetheless Māori were keen to maximise economic returns and build economies of scale. As a result Māori Integrated Economies Inc. was established in 2022. It represented an amalgam of Sealords, Treelords, Māori Providers Ltd., and the Ahuwhenua Trust - a consortium of Māori Land incorporations. MIE had provided a model for integrating economic and social capital and by bringing together a mix of resources had become a major player in the New Zealand economy and a leader in indigenous economic development. When the Global Indigenous Systems was established in 2025, MIE was invited to provide overall leadership and to extend their model across the GIS networks. By then, Māori had become world leaders in integrated solutions and MIE was the dominant economic force in New Zealand.

Tino Rangatiratanga

The three scenarios are all possible though clearly not all would be equally popular. Scenario 2 (CSA) would probably have least appeal to Māori while both scenario 1 (RNZ) and scenario 3 (MIS) would be more attractive options. However, the intention for sharing these scenarios was not to enter into a debate about which of the three would be more probable or even more desirable but to illustrate how the position of Māori in Aotearoa in the future cannot be contemplated without considering the global context and the inevitability of significant economic and political change.

Importantly, it cannot be assumed that current Māori perceptions of constitutional rights will necessarily apply in the future. Take for example the Treaty of Waitangi. While the Treaty has been both an enabling and a disabling instrument, it may also have inadvertently narrowed Māori horizons. The Treaty of Waitangi was essentially an understanding about the relationship of Māori and the Crown. Under the Treaty, sovereignty, or at least the right to govern, was

exchanged for guarantees about property and citizenship. The Treaty gave some protections but also positioned Māori alongside the Crown. In a sense Māori had been captured by the State at the expense of other potentially more profitable relationships. There was no good reason why the Treaty should be the single most important defining statement about the position of Māori in history, in Aotearoa, or for that matter in the world.

Debates about the relationship between Māori and the Crown, which have occupied great legal and academic minds - both Māori and Pakeha - have tended to argue Māori political legitimacy against the criterion of sovereignty, a concept that is culturally constrained, and likely to be increasingly modified. Not only will notions of sovereignty be subject to the permeation of global philosophies and global greed, as evidenced by multi-national companies, but the sovereign boundaries between states will become blurred as digital technologies shrink distance, and the mix between public and private interests become increasingly intertwined.

For more than two decades, in an attempt to draw a distinction between the sovereign powers of the state on the one hand, and Māori autonomy on the other, tino rangatiratanga has been used as an articulation of Māori authority. However, it is unlikely that the New Zealand state as it currently exists will remain unchanged over the next three to five decades or that the concept of sovereignty inherent in the Treaty when it was signed in 1840 will remain fixed in time. In that respect it could be unwise for Māori to measure tino rangatiratanga solely against the parameters of the Crown's sovereignty, whatever meaning sovereignty might have in the future.

In addition, in a post-settlement environment, it is likely that Māori engagement with the Crown will alter in both purpose and intensity. That does not mean there will be no relationship with Government but a two directional change in the nature of the relationship can be expected. First, Māori involvement with the Crown will be increasingly focussed on New Zealand's agenda for the future, rather than on compensation for the past. Second, Māori will predictably choose to spend more time and energy exploring relationships with the private sector and seeking investment opportunities with overseas companies, and less time engaging with the Crown. In the future, tino rangatiratanga may not be best measured by concessions won from the Government but on the strength of the Māori economy and the number of influential partners outside government.

A global role for Māori can also be identified, even in 2009. Two aspects of scenario 3 are not improbable. Already Māori are highly regarded among other indigenous peoples for their leadership in language revitalisation, innovative health care, reformed education at pre-school and tertiary levels, and Iwi enterprise. Extending the leadership to embrace economic growth investment strategies, and wise use of resources is within reach. There are already early indications that more realistic economies of scale will be achievable between Māori providers and between Iwi. If all Māori fishing interests, forestry interests, land interests, and provider interests were linked to the same company or incorporation, without losing individual identity, Māori would be in an unassailable economic position, both in New Zealand and in wider indigenous networks.

The point is that the practice of measuring tino rangatiratanga against the single yardstick of sovereignty may soon be outdated. Instead two other measures have the potential to be much

more defining in the future: the extent to which Māori have economic influence within New Zealand and the degree to which Māori play leadership roles in indigenous networks across the globe. These measures place less emphasis on jurisprudential arguments, the differences between law and lore, and the assumption that Māori as indigenous New Zealanders can be defined by somewhat outdated legal constructs. Rather than authenticating the Māori position in law, Māori authority is a product of economic might and acknowledgement by peers. Ironically, that position may not in fact be too far removed from the situation in 1840 when Britain became aware of Māori economic strength and the wealth of New Zealand, and recognised Māori as rightful proprietors of the country. Indeed they were the very reasons for the Treaty of Waitangi.

The Paerangi Lectures

The three Paerangi lectures have all attempted to project Māori interests into the future, beyond 2020 and towards 2035. They have explored the impacts of various scenarios on Māori and have identified a range of pathways that could be relevant in the decades ahead. Building on gains made over the past twenty-five years, retaining a Māori world view, being ready to shift direction, and taking on the role of future maker, rather than future taker have been seen as important ways of positioning Māori to take advantage of the future rather than being overwhelmed by its complexities.

There are three major conclusions. First, arising from the first lecture, it is clear that the Māori estate will grow. It will expand in volume and diversity enabling Māori to remain grounded in Aotearoa but with new freedoms to explore other domains. The Māori estate will be a composite of lands, waterways, fisheries, forests, marae, whakāiro, waiata and hakā; and it will grow to include greater shares in third and fourth generation radio frequency networks, a range of commercial enterprises, and access to technologies that will add value to customary resources and cultural heritage. The challenge will be to future proof the estate so that future generations can benefit and add their own contributions.

The second lecture explored the impacts of future demographic, technological, economic and global transformations on Māori health and wellbeing. Five outcome goals (the Matariki 2020 goals) were identified: to live in a healthy environment, participate fully in te ao Māori, enjoy balanced lifestyles, benefit from quality education, the wise use of technology and expert opinion, and belong to empowered whānau who are champions for health and wellbeing. While government, Iwi, agencies and Māori leaders will contribute to the attainment of those goals, the conclusion was that whānau will be the most sustainable and effective agents for change.

This lecture, *Pae Mana: Waitangi and the Evolving State*, has been about the constitutional and economic position of Māori in the future. It has considered the Treaty of Waitangi, its significance to the past and to the future and has concluded that the full impact of the Treaty relationship between Māori and the Crown will be the way in which both parties can work together to shape an agenda for the future.

Four goals about Māori standing in New Zealand and in the world can be distilled. The first goal is to establish a working relationship with the Crown in order to pursue an agenda that will benefit future generations of New Zealanders. The second is to establish closer working relationships between Iwi, between Māori sectoral interests and between Māori commercial

entities in order to consolidate Māori interests, achieve economies of scale, exercise economic strength within New Zealand, and contribute to the wellbeing of Māori and wider society. The third goal will be to engage with the private sector in New Zealand, building on the gains already made and forging new pathways that will add to the Māori economy and to the national wealth. A fourth goal will be to play a significantly expanded role within global indigenous networks especially in the Pacific so that expertise can be shared, joint ventures established and inequalities overcome. To meet those goals it may be opportune to enter into a new set of treaties geared to the 21st rather than the 19th century.

Finally, the standing of Māori in Aotearoa New Zealand will not be defined solely or even mainly by notions of legal sovereignty but by the range, strength and impact of national, global and Iwi alliances. Partnerships with the Crown, with the private sector, between Iwi, with overseas commercial interests, and with indigenous peoples across the globe will be the hallmarks of Māori in the future.