Spooks

What SIS Files Tell Us About the SIS

- by Liz Gordon

It has been a fascinating year for those interested in how the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) works. Recently, Rosemary McLeod noted in a Sunday Star Times article (28/6/09) that having (and getting a copy of) one’s SIS file was the new chic – everybody must have one. But in general, it is not what the files reveal about you that it interesting, or even that you have a file (because anyone who rubbed shoulders with any Lefty organisation is likely to have one), but what it says about the SIS as an organisation.

Before the latest events, we already knew quite a lot about the SIS and surmised more. First, we were quite sure that it spied on Leftwing activist organisations from its inception in the mid 1950s, through the Muldoon years (1975-84) and beyond. All the jokes of the time about whether this or that new member was an SIS spy were, we now find, probably spot on. We have no information, to date, on whether the SIS had systematic spying operations on Rightwing organisations, but it seems unlikely that they would have seen the Business Roundtable, for example, as a source of national threat. Threat, in fact, was most likely synonymous with “Leftist”, because of potential links to the former Soviet Union.

The SIS Took Sides

It was probably already spying on Greenpeace in 1985 when it was the victim of a terrorist attack by the French government with the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour. Instead of protecting the security of New Zealanders, the SIS was nowhere to be found during or after the biggest terrorist attack this country has endured. We know that the SIS has continued to spy on Greenpeace since the Rainbow Warrior. What is it about that respectable environmental agency that attracts the spooks? All this raises, of course, the great question of “which side were they on”. Did the SIS even collude, directly or indirectly, in the French government’s actions? It is certainly possible that through the network of Western security agencies, information may have passed from the SIS to the French about anti-nuclear activity in New Zealand, which may have led to the decision to blow up the ship.

Second, we were pretty sure that the SIS was not a first rate espionage operation. What I mean by this is that it did not collect and use high quality information about real threats to the security of New Zealand, in any way that can be understood then or now. The failed 1974/75 prosecution of the late Bill Sutch under the former Official Secrets Act is a case in point. The SIS – despite spying on Sutch for 60 years and collecting six files on him – was unable to convince a jury that he had passed secrets to the Soviet Union (Murray Horton has written in depth on this issue. F or details, see “ Speaking Ill Of The Dead: The Vicious Smear Campaign Against Bill Sutch & Jack Lewin”, in Watchdog 113, December 2006, online at http://www.converge.org.nz/watchdog/13/12.htm. Ed.).

A string of events demonstrate the shortcomings of the SIS. In 1981 the organisation was heavily involved in spying on the Springbok Tour protesters, producing a list of “subversives” involved in the movement, and getting the list wrong. In the same year, an SIS agent left his briefcase containing lunch, a magazine and a few top secret papers on the Wellington fence of a property owned by a journalist. The SIS illegally searched Aziz Choudry’s home during the 1996 APEC protests and failed to show that Ahmed Zaoui was a security threat.

I am sure it could be argued that these high profile failures and shortcomings have been matched over the years with many great successes, which have had to remain secret for security reasons. This is where the recently released SIS files become interesting. What do they show about the intelligence of the Security Intelligence Service? Well, the picture emerges of a dusty little group of gossipmongers, avidly clipping and saving media stories, occasionally going along to meetings and painstakingly recording what happened (including official minutes), with a small amount of infiltration of certain groups. This group were obsessed with any scent of Communist Party involvement, or even inadvertent Communist sentiments. The SIS appeared not to have professional standards of assessment of material, but a blanket collection policy of any and all material that may be relevant to their anti-Communist goals.

Nowadays, I undertake a lot of professional evaluations of organisations. There are three key evaluative questions that underpin all such investigations:

What are the goals of the organisation and are they appropriate?

How does the organisation go about meeting those goals; and are these methods of high quality, professional and disinterested? And:

Are the goals met?

The secrecy surrounding the SIS has made it impossible to properly assess these matters in the past. From the CAFCA files, and what we know about the files of a number of high profile activists, we can now say some things about each of these evaluative questions.

The goals of the SIS are, officially, as follows:

  • to investigate threats to security and to work with other agencies within Government, so that the intelligence it collects is actioned and threats which have been identified are disrupted
  • to collect foreign intelligence, and
  • to provide a range of protective security advice and services to Government.

Narrow Focus On The Left

It seems clear now that during at least the 1970s and 1980s the organisation interpreted its brief very narrowly, focussing on Leftwing groups and individuals as potential threats, whether or not there was ever the slightest evidence of a threat to security from their activities. It does appear that, even after the Sutch debacle, there was little soul searching within the SIS about its role. By the 1980s, and the Springbok Tour, the SIS looked like an organisation that simply adopted the Government’s enemies as its own, whether or not these were active threats to security. This raises the interesting question of how the SIS adapted to a change from a National to a Labour government in 1984. While we know that a number of Green MPs had SIS files, as far as I know no Labour MPs have reported having had such files. But, starting with Helen Clark, many of them have been involved in various protests ( Vietnam and beyond), strikes, union activities and so on – things which got people an individual file in the old days.

So how did the SIS deal with those? Were the files of Government MPs closed automatically? After months of waiting, my husband got his letter from the SIS recently. It was quite intriguing. It said that his file had been destroyed in April 2000, and the act of destroying it meant that he was not considered a security threat. But many other people who were not considered security threats did not have their files destroyed. They had held a file on him since 1981, and destroyed it just a few months after his wife became a member of the 1999-2002 Labour-Alliance government (Liz Gordon was an Alliance MP from 1996-2002, the first term in Opposition, the second in Government. Ed.). Was it destroyed because I was an MP? The relationship between the SIS and successive governments needs further clarification.

Was the SIS disinterested and professional in its methods? Well, actually, no it wasn’t. Murray Horton’s account of the CAFCA file (“SIS Spied On CAFCA For A Quarter Of A Century”, Watchdog 120, May 2009, online at http://www.converge.org.nz/watchdog/20/06.htm Ed.) states that it is full of indiscreet notes, gossip and innuendo about the personal lives of individuals. Copies of Watchdog were annotated and analysed in depth, not apparently for security reasons but as a kind of oppositional account. CAFCA was spied on for a quarter of a century (in Murray Horton’s case, he has been told that his now “moribund” SIS Personal File, which has not yet been released to him, spans from 1969-2002. Ed.), and yet SIS Director Warren Tucker recently noted that Murray: “… (has) never encouraged unlawful activity such as sabotage, subversion or terrorism. We do not believe you would ever consciously act against the security of New Zealand and New Zealanders. You are therefore not a person of ‘security interest’ to the NZSIS” (letter from Warren Tucker to Murray Horton, 4/2/09 Ed.). How often were the targets of surveillance evaluated, policies made and changes implemented? Possibly never. Once under suspicion by the SIS, always suspect (at least until 2008). Unless one’s spouse becomes a Government MP, perhaps?

The Track Record Is Not Good

Finally, did the SIS meet its goals to disrupt threats to national security? By definition, we would not know if they had. But in terms of the time and energy they put in to spying on Christchurch organisations, probably multiplied by ten when the whole country is considered, the track record is not good. No one was ever successfully prosecuted under security laws, and that includes in the post-2001 era when the definition of terrorism, and the laws themselves, have been significantly expanded. The 2007 Ruatoki raids (which have still to come to trial. Ed.) appear to have been a complete botch-up, possibly the modern day Sutch case all over again.

In opening up its files, the SIS is opening up itself to scrutiny, in a way that would have been impossible a few years ago. The new approach is fairly brave, given that the agency, in releasing its information about people, is also releasing detailed information about itself. The partial picture that we have so far is not flattering, and the future of the SIS should be under active review by its oversight committee. Notwithstanding the refreshing openness of the current Director, Warren Tucker, the SIS needs to show the people of New Zealand that it is actively and effectively protecting us from real threats to our security.

HOW TO APPLY FOR YOUR SIS FILE

If you think that the SIS might have, or had, a file on you, than all you need to do is to write to: Director, NZ Security Intelligence Service, Box 900, Wellington and ask. They don’t do e-mail. As you’re applying for personal information under the Privacy Act, it is free. But be prepared for a very long wait for any response.


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