Corporatising
NZ Agriculture
The Growing
Costs At Home And Abroad
- by
Dennis Small
“Globalisation
of food markets is an instant strategy for creating hunger”
(Vandana Shiva).
The changing face of
NZ agriculture at the start of the second decade of the 21st Century
reflects deepening corporate consolidation. In Watchdog
124 (August 2010, “Corporate Agriculture/Free Trade Contradictions
Bite Home”, by Dennis Small, http://www.converge.org.nz/watchdog/24/08.htm),
I looked at certain issues illustrating current trends. Growing
foreign control over our still expanding dairy monoculture, our
rural services industry, and the continuing travails of the meat
industry got special attention. With the end of protection, Aotearoa/NZ
threw itself open to the processes of corporate concentration and
foreign usurpation. This article extends and elaborates the themes
developed so far, and examines the implications of the globalist
promotion of free trade in food in several cases involving NZ and
trading partners.
Meat Industry
Instability
The history of the
NZ meat industry has a record of chronic instability. This has been
evident both in changing domestic structures and changing international
markets. As outlined in my previous article, the history of meat
cooperatives seems to be going full circle. In the era following
World War II, home grown NZ cooperatives arose to contest foreign
control and win better returns for local farmers. But these days
what remains of the cooperative ideal and practice is under continuing
pressure, with capitalist concentration and even comprehensive foreign
control looming again.
In May 2010, when corporate mover and shaker Craig Norgate of Pyne
Gould Guinness Wrightson (PGGW) bowed out of any further attempts
at agricultural industry mergers, he proclaimed that meat industry
consolidation would now take a lot longer to achieve (Sunday
Star Times, 9/5/10). The big question, however, is whether
consolidation will actually benefit sheep and beef farmers in general
or not. While the Alliance Group (AG) and Silver Fern Farms (SFF)
still maintain farmer control and the former keeps its cooperative
structure, market forces are gathering to further undermine stability
with another major downturn in the sheepmeat industry in 2010. In
a past epoch, producer boards could coordinate and protect the interests
of a multitude of small family farmers. Today, capitalist globalisation
dictates the imperatives of growth and greater size – so-called
“economies of scale” as well as constant accumulation
- which happen at the expense of community, social justice, and
the environment. Economic gains are both increasingly inequitably
spread and siphoned offshore.
Conglomerate Privatisation Process
In Aotearoa/NZ, private meat companies have re-emerged to have a
very prominent place. For instance, in 2007, it was noted that:
“Affco also used to be a cooperative [originally the Auckland
Farmers Freezing Cooperative!], but now is a publicly listed company
with majority shareholding by the Talley family. And then there
is Anzco [Foods], majority Japanese- owned” (Sunday Star
Times, 8/7/07). Affco is now NZ’s fourth largest meat
processor and exporter, while Anzco was described in 2008 as a “billion
dollar vertically integrated export giant”, supplying the
Asian market (Press, 14/11/08). Anzco was also reported
to be “the second largest beef processor and a small niche
player in sheepmeat” (Press, 12/9/08). Chairperson
Graeme Harrison was cited as having “spent 25 years nurturing
Anzco from a small farmer-owned marketer” to the large company
it is today (Press, 14/11/08).
Originally – and again both paradoxically and symbolically
enough in light of what has happened since - “Anzco was set
up by the Meat Board in 1984” as the Asia NZ Meat Company
“to improve lamb sales to Japan” (Press, 22/3/94).
Significantly too, in 1994, when the Meat Board still had a majority
shareholding, Harrison predicted increased foreign ownership of
our meat industry (ibid.). He observed that: “there had been
significant changes in ownership of meat processing companies in
Australia as major Japanese and US meat companies made their operations
global” (ibid.). More recently, Harrison has predicted there
would be “more intensive competition for a smaller livestock
pool”, with commercial reality dictating more industry concentration
(Press, 12/9/08). There are still quite a number
of smaller players in the lamb business.
Some companies have been pursuing capital accumulation and diversifying
in order to increase profitability. For instance, it was reported
in late 2008 that Affco had a “shareholding in Dairy Trust,
which launched a successful takeover of Open Country Cheese Company
[OCC]. Singapore-based global agribusiness, commodities and dairy
trader Olam International (OI) separately bought a 25% stake in
Dairy Trust” (Press, 28/11/08). Affco owned about
35% of Dairy Trust. Earlier, in June 2007, Dairy Trust, as a subsidiary
of Affco, had also competed with OI in a takeover bid for OCC (Press,
23/6/07). At the time, OI bought up 17% of OCC (ibid.), and so later
came to spread its assets, as it were. OCC, the nation’s second
largest milk processor, has been rebranded Open Country Dairy (OCD).
By September 2010, OI had a one quarter stake in OCD. OI itself
was in “merger discussions with rival Louis Dreyfus Commodities”
(the huge rice, cotton, etc. trader) http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10676286.
Capitalist Gaming
Capitalist gaming in our meat industry has gone on with Affco being
taken over by the privately owned Talley’s Group, which already
has extensive fishing interests, and also produces vegetables and
ice cream. Moreover, Talleys now not only has a substantial shareholding
in OCD through Affco, but is itself the third biggest OCD shareholder
with a 17% slice of this dairy company. Talley family business leaders,
as investigative journalist Nicky Hager has shown, keenly support
and donate to the National Party (“The Hollow Men: A Study
In The Politics Of Deception”, Craig Potton Publishing, 2006,
pp220 & 243/4; reviewed by Jeremy Agar in Watchdog
114, May 2007, http://www.converge.org.nz/watchdog/14/03.htm).
Given the mounting impact of market forces on our meat cooperatives
- in line with long term market trends - and the global grab for
food producing resources, more foreign control is shaping up in
the wings, in conjunction with inroads into dairy, rural services,
etc. It was observed in mid 2009 that: “The Brazilians have
made some big moves into meat processing companies in Australia.
And that could happen here if a company ended up having trouble”
(Press, 23/5/09). Meat Industry Action Group (MIAG) Chairperson,
Waimate sheep farmer “John Gregan, says imagine if there was
eventually an industry merger and lamb profits took off like dairy,
yet all those profits were heading overseas because we were too
obsessed with settling old scores” (ibid.). As a result: “Rather
than doing a Fonterra, the sheepmeat industry might have a Fonterra
done to it” (ibid.). SFF in particular is seen as vulnerable
to foreign takeover, although it has managed to get more financial
support lately. Ironically, too, of course, Fonterra’s continual
efforts at capital restructuring are paving the way to eventual
foreign control over our major dairy company as it ever strives
for greater growth. Converging transnational and local comprador*
economic interests are tightening the coils of NZ’s political
economy in a number of major sectors. *Comprador – local
collaborators of colonisers, in this case the transnational corporations.
Ed.
Beefing Up Cooperation Versus Lambasting Competition
A couple of years earlier, Gregan had remarked that: “NZ needs
a cooperative, global approach to get better returns for farmers”
(South Island Farmer [Press], August 2007). Aotearoa/NZ
was failing in the marketplace despite supplying “about 75%
of all of the world’s lamb” (ibid.). Multiple NZ marketers
were being picked off by the big international buyers. It was especially
evident how “the European supermarkets play the NZ meat companies
off against each other” (Sunday Star Times, 8/7/07).
Too many companies of varying size and product price offset any
country bargaining power. Such bargaining power, it can be argued,
could be effectively channelled via a national producer board.
According to Simon Gatenby, Chief Executive of the Wellington meat
processing company Taylor Preston, farmers are pursuing an empty
dream if they think that a big meat industry merger could extract
“better lamb returns by screwing down giant overseas supermarket
chains” (Press, 27/6/08). For example, the United
Kingdom market was very tough. Instead, he called for removing more
chains from the processing operation and increasing the efficiency
of processing (ibid.). Whatever the assessment of Gatenby’s
opinion, the lack of a strong, central marketing agency, as might
have been served by an updated and modified producer board working
in Aotearoa/NZ’s interest as a whole, remains a yawning gap
for our country. NZ farmers are left open to the power and manipulations
of supermarket chains and transnational corporations (TNCs).
For many years some sort of marketing coordination in the US has
been provided by the NZ Lamb Company (Sunday Star Times,
8/7/07). Using this arrangement, “Alliance, Anzco and Richmond
worked together”, with SFF (then PPCS) joining in 2007 (ibid.).
But a visit to the US had demonstrated to MIAG’s Gregan the
extent of supermarket buying power there (South Island Farmer, August,
2007). The supermarkets had “increased their margins by playing
NZ companies off against each other. The situation is similar to
that faced by NZ’s post-deregulated pip fruit industry where
a swath of marketers undercut each other resulting in record low
returns to growers” (ibid.). And in 2010 such marketing disarray
applies across the board for a range of key agricultural products.
Procurement Problems
Besides the difficulties of overseas marketing, the lack of producer
coordination has been continually eroding profitability at the domestic
end with destructive “procurement competition” among
the meat companies (ibid.). As well, small and medium farmers have
been “highly critical of secret bonuses paid to large scale
suppliers” (e.g. Sunday Star Times, 8/7/07). An example
of procurement problems as highlighted by Press occurred
when SFF voiced strong criticism of the South Island’s CRT,
“a large rural retail farmer cooperative, for its foray into
livestock trading” (19/8/09). SFF attacked CRT’s move
as “a classic example of more fragmentation of the industry”
and “destructive” disruption of “the supply chain”
(ibid.). What really upset SFF was that CRT had “similar members”
to SFF, or even the same farmer-owners (ibid.). In reply, CRT claimed
that it was only “facilitating” trading of livestock
for farmers in response to demand. It “had bought independent
livestock trading business Alpine Livestock and so was owner of
an existing player which would not have much influence over industry
reform or consolidation” (ibid.).
CRT posted a tough commercial year but continued to expand its services
and supply operations. It got “the licence for the Challenge
fuel brand”, and took over “national distribution for
its retail fuel station network”, besides buying the South
Canterbury-based company of Annett Grain and Seed (Press,
16/710). Meanwhile, problems at both the overseas marketing end
and the farm gate end help drive further attempts at meat industry
consolidation.
Beyond The Meat Industry Muddle?
In July 2010, it was announced that: “A blueprint to improve
sheep and beef profits will be drawn up by farmers and meat companies”,
on the basis of a general consensus that the industry is “broken”
(Press, 23/7/10). A meat industry strategy is being developed
by Beef +Lamb NZ (formerly Meat & Wool NZ). “Phase One
[of the strategy] is set to be completed in early 2011” (ibid.).
While “changes to commercial structures” have been ruled
out, market dynamics could still bring them about anyway. One Wairarapa
sheep and beef farmer, Janette Walker, said farmers like herself
have “got used to being peasants, just eking out a living”
(Press, 9/7/10). She called for much more consolidation
(ibid.). Echoing MIAG: “She would like to see 80% of meat
processing done by one group and the marketing of all meat in the
hands of one organisation, a marketing board that sets the price
and who deals with overseas buyers” (ibid.).
So, joint efforts are now under way towards better coordination
of the meat industry. SFF, NZ’s biggest meat processor, has
“partnered with the largest rural services firm PGGW and State-owned
farmer Landcorp” in order to try and turn round the fortunes
of the red meat sector (Press, 18/8/10). Part funding of
$59.5m will come from the Government’s Primary Growth Partnership
fund while the three big agricultural firms will contribute $92m.
A challenge for the new seven year, meat “plate-to-pasture”
programme will be to effectively involve farmers in an integrated
supply chain plan. Among the programme’s aims is the goal
of encouraging farmers to commit to specific contracts, supplying
“SFF’s key customers such as supermarket chains in Britain”
(ibid.). The Government has also launched a $170m project “in
the dairy industry led by DairyNZ and Fonterra in which the Government
will contribute $84.6m” (ibid.). This new project is intended
to raise farm productivity, improve livestock genetics, help create
new products, and get “improved environmental performance
from the dairy industry” (ibid; Press, 20/8/10).
Ravaging The Rural Sector
During the transition to the neo-liberal, free market regime, a
combination of TNC power and influence channelled in Aotearoa/NZ
through such locally connected agencies as the Business Roundtable
and Infometrics was very significant in eroding support for producer
board protection. Subsequently, market competition has had some
very destructive effects on the NZ agricultural industry. The absence
of effective producer boards has relentlessly sapped efficient direction,
coordination, resources, and energies from NZ agriculture. As a
consequence, in rural sector after sector, industry participants
and even the Government at times, have had to try and reinvent the
wheel as it were, struggling to get better results from fragmented,
even infighting participants.
Free trade ironies run rampant as usual. In 1997, economist John
Pryde, once named by the Press as the original ideas man
behind the genesis of the free trader Cairns Group of which NZ was
a founder member (10/11/92), warned that: “Reducing the status
of our producer boards by thinning their powers threatens to make
them less influential in world trade forums” (Rural News,
18/8/97). At the time, Pryde was making a submission to Parliament’s
Primary Production Select Committee on the Producer Board Acts Reform
Bill. He was concerned about weakening the boards’ role given
that “agricultural protection and restrictive trade practices
are as prevalent as ever despite the Uruguay Round” (ibid.).
A case in point was the diminished powers and accountability of
the Meat Board in both monitoring the activities of our trading
partners and in adequately representing the interests of our own
producers. But the Government proceeded to carry out what Pryde
saw as objectives dictated by “pressures from producer interests
in importing countries and some business lobbyists” (ibid.).
The US, of course, spearheaded these “importing countries”.
It should be registered here again that the Press version
of the origins of the Cairns Group is largely euphemistic spin in
line with its usual foreign policy propaganda.
Woolly Workings
Wool is a natural fibre. In an age when we need to “green”
the economy as much as possible, it would surely seem to have plenty
of potential. In the past, non-government organisations (NGOs) like
Trade Aid and Corso even tried to encourage NZ farmers to use jute
woolsacks from Bangladesh rather than oil-derived plastic woolsacks.
For various reasons this project unfortunately lapsed but the inspiring
idea of a NZ-Bangladeshi bond knit by wool and jute points to more
environmentally sustainable possibilities for the future. An NZ
firm, The Formary, has designed a furniture fabric “WoJo”,
using a combination of wool and jute (from recycled coffee bags)
for Starbucks (TVNZ, 6pm One News, 12/10/10; Press,
15/10/10). The International Wool Textile Organisation is working
hard to try and counter the influence of synthetics.
Wool has ended up in 2010 as another, indeed the most problematic,
rural industry. In June, Agriculture Minister David Carter announced
that a new body would be set up to “represent the now fragmented
sector, across the board, bringing together commercial and industry
participants, delivering a united voice and providing a forum for
members to work together constructively” (Sunday Star
Times, 27/6/10). The newly formed Wool Group was launched at
Parliament on 1st July 2010. Earlier, in February 2010, a Wool Taskforce
had recommended the establishment of the new body, given all the
problems and infighting in the industry.
Following the General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade (GATT)/World
Trade Organisation (WTO) settlement in the mid-1990s during the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the wool industry divested itself
of its previous capacities for proper coordination. The Wool Board
gave up the “woolgrower market support schemes of the past”
(Press, 1/10/93). It withdrew from any “involvement
in selling wool” (ibid.). This diminution of producer board
powers led to a plethora of competing and conflicting interests
and agencies operating in the wool industry. Eventually, Meat &
Wool NZ (now Beef + Lamb NZ) “shed its wool responsibilities
when farmers voted against a levy last year” (Press,
30/7/10). This gave impetus for the Government to step in and facilitate
the establishment of the new Wool Group.
Division And Disorder
One of the many ironies of the marketing turmoil in the wool industry,
and another example of the turning wheel, was that in 2008 sheep
farmers bought back the Wools of NZ group of companies lost with
the demise of the Wool Board earlier in 2003 (Press, 10/11/08).
Wool Partners International (WPI) bought back the group from the
Wool Research Organisation of NZ (ibid.). More recently, a new “farmer-controlled”
Wool Partners’ Cooperative has taken over “the marketing
assets of WPI”, with the role of PGGW, the other half owner
of WPI, still to be clarified (Press, 15/10/10).
A central recommendation of the Wool Taskforce’s report in
February 2010 was for the establishment of a marketing board to
try and pull things together better (Press, 5/3/10). The
main focus for the new wool marketing strategy is to try and improve
returns from strong crossbred wools, by far the majority of NZ’s
wool production. Sales of this type of wool have declined markedly
since 1989. The new “farmer-controlled” venture cited
above aims “to establish a completely farmer-owned cooperative”
(ibid.). Good luck to it!
International Forays Against Food Security: Thailand And
South Korea
The flip side of free trade/foreign investment here, and resulting
exploitative corporate domination of Aotearoa/NZ’s agricultural
sector, is the NZ government’s drive to help impose the same
syndrome on poorer countries. Among several important cases relevant
to NZ’s policy position are those of Thailand and South Korea.
NZ formally joined the free trade/foreign investment regime, which
so dramatically divided Thailand in 2010, with the institution of
the NZ-Thailand Closer Economic Partnership (NZTCEP) that entered
into force in July 2005. Dairy products rule NZ’s exports
to this country. Even more pertinent with regard to NZ’s active
role in pushing free trade is the case of South Korea where farmers
have long been confronting unfair rural returns and threats to food
security. Indeed, in these times NZ is said to be leading the charge
against them. This NZ free trade incursion into South Korea’s
agriculture has now quite a history of power politics behind it.
South Korean farmers and their supporters have mounted many protests
since the American-led “transnationalisation” drive
for free trade cranked up in the late 1980s. The most dramatic single
incident highlighting the problems that small farmers face was the
tragic suicide of Lee Kyung Hae during the WTO’s conference
in Cancun, Mexico, during September 2003. Lee, who headed South
Korea’s Federation of Farmers and Fishermen, stabbed himself
to death in ritualistic despair at the policies being forced on
Korea to the detriment of its economy and agriculture, especially
its rural population (www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0911-06.htm).
Many of Korea’s farmers have been swamped by debt. Indeed,
Korean farmers have suffered enormous attrition in number over the
last decade. Lee was also making a symbolic, sacrificial stand for
hundreds of millions of small farmers and other people around the
globe adversely affected by free trade on their livelihoods and
food security. In general, the NZ government, its industry drivers,
media minders, and academia have proved to be very callous and indifferent
to the plight of such small farmers in Korea and elsewhere.
Big Trouble In Thailand
During the first half of 2010 there were dramatic scenes of open
rebellion in Bangkok, Thailand’s capital, when some of the
country’s poorest inhabitants assembled in mass protest against
the ruling urban aristocratic and corporate class. But the military-backed
Government brutally crushed the protest with Western connivance
as has happened so often in the past. With the retreat of the Red
Shirt protesters, foreign investors and their comprador collaborators
could then get on with the job of exploiting the country. Yet, ironically,
Thailand’s implosion has also surprised and disappointed many
such people regarding the future prospects there for foreign investment.
Another free trade Asian “tiger” has bitten the dust
with deepening political, socio-economic, and even cultural divisions.
Even though the Thai regime is quite repressively undemocratic,
the Western media were again scrupulous in screening the underlying
issues at stake from public scrutiny. In the context of the 2008
global food crisis, what is happening in Thailand, given its key
exporting function, is of immense significance – both in itself,
and as a warning of the dangerous trends impacting on the world’s
food supply. As Jonathan Pincus, the United Nations’ Chief
Economist in Vietnam, so pertinently commented at the time of the
2008 crisis: “The rice market is a good indicator for the
political stability of Asia” (Press, 29/4/08). US
efforts to further prise free the management of the rice market
from the Thai government has been a sticking point in US-Thai trade
negotiations,
Protesting Peasantry
The fact is that the
protests expressed the despair and frustration of a suffering peasantry,
especially in the north of the country; and much of their suffering
directly stems from foreign-backed exploitation. At the start of
the new millennium, it was observed that: “Thailand is Asia’s
only net food exporter”; and yet that also almost a third
of the country’s “population are chronically undernourished”
(Focus on Trade, no. 57, Dec. 2000, p32). “Small
peasant rice farmers are integrated into the world economy”
with Thailand being indeed the biggest rice exporter (ibid.). But
these Thai producers, some 30 million small farmers, “are
caught in a cycle of vicious debt – between the borrowing
from the Government banks and the loan sharks” (ibid.). Networks
of middlemen take their cut. At the same time, imported costs as
for fertilizer, pesticides and fuel continued to rise. A decade
later, conditions for small farmers have worsened as free trade
and foreign investment have grown the urban-rural divide, and further
destabilised the Thai agrarian sector. Protesting farmers throughout
this decade continually complained and agitated about unfair agricultural
prices. As well, many of the urban poor joined the peasant-based
Red Shirt movement.
Free Trade-Induced Agrarian Crisis In Thailand
Northern Thailand, and the northeast in particular, has been the
source areas for most of the peasant activists. Free trade has had
a lot of negative impacts on the farmer and rural communities in
this whole region, as well as elsewhere to some extent throughout
Thailand). Millions of vulnerable farmers have experienced lower
incomes from agricultural trade liberalisation. At the same time,
big agribusiness and TNCs have gained huge benefits from this economic
approach. For instance, peasants in the poor northeast region were
evicted from their communal forest lands in the 1980s “by
companies intent on planting industrial tree plantations of the
fast growing eucalyptus trees to meet Japan’s and Taiwan’s
seemingly insatiable appetite for wood chips and paper pulp”
(“Rekindling The Development Debate” – Robin Broad,
Walden Bello & John Cavanagh, draft, 7/5/1990, pp16/17). In
turn, this drew a vigorous local response in the form of “an
explosion of rural activism”, reviving that of the mid-1970s
(ibid.).
Since 1995 with the advent of the WTO, Third World farmers and rural
communities have struggled to combat a range of challenges, and
often strenuously agitated, as in South Korea and Thailand, to defend
their rights. In Thailand, farmers have worked to stop the patenting
of jasmine rice by US TNCs; resisted genetically modified (GM) plants;
protected biodiversity; and promoted more sustainable agriculture.
Yet in areas such as the upper Mekong River valley, food security
has been significantly reduced despite such efforts. For sure, the
ramifications run deep. Chinese dams on the upper Mekong and general
interference with the natural pulse of the river are even affecting
Tonle Sap fisheries in Cambodia (“When The Rivers Run Dry:
Water – The Defining Crisis Of The 21st Century”, Fred
Pearce, Beacon Press, 2006, ch.12). An egregious example
of human and environmental damage is that caused by the World Bank-sponsored
Pak Mun Dam (www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pak_Mun_Dam).
The current Thai regime,
like past regimes, promotes the privatisation of natural resources
and the market commoditisation of everything possible. In an angry
response, some of the Bangkok protesters in 2010 set fire to the
Stock Exchange. If the north of Thailand is now nursing bitter resentment
against the ruling oligarchy, southern Thailand is already home
to a deep-rooted Muslim insurgency, with militant sentiments also
simmering away in Malaysia (e.g. Press, 7/4/10 & 12/1/10).
Capitalist Contradictions
While the protesters in Bangkok and various towns rallied in the
name of ousted, multi-millionaire, former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra, and indeed were evidently funded by him to a very considerable
extent, the red shirted demonstrations reflected deep-rooted socio-economic
grievances beyond the factional politics of the Thai ruling class.
When in power, Thaksin had directed development funds into rural
areas for health, welfare, and cheap loans to farmers, even though
he too pushed free trade policies. There are also some huge buried
ironies here. Back in the 1960s, Communist activity was brewing
in northeast Thailand, building on peasant grievances. Ralph McGehee,
a US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer there at the time,
carried out surveys showing a lot more Communist support than official
estimates indicated. When CIA chief William Colby heard the news
from McGehee, he commented bitterly that: “We always seem
to be losing” (“Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars Of CIA
Director William Colby”, by John Prados, Oxford University
Press, 2003, p174). The community survey project that McGehee was
heading soon got terminated (for more detail see McGehee’s
chapter on Thailand in his “Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years In
The CIA”, Sheridan Square Publishers, 1983; McGehee was hosted
to Aotearoa/NZ in 1986 by the NZ Nuclear Free Zone Committee and
proved to be most enlightening and invaluable on CIA strategy, techniques
and tactics).
By the late 1990s, however, Thailand was singled out by a major
World Bank study as a glowing example of free market success. This
study noted that maize and cassava were competing “with rice
as leading exports”, along with the rapidly increasing production
of chicken broilers, prawns, and processed fruit and vegetables
(“The World Food Outlook” by D Mitchell, et al, Cambridge
University Press, 1997, p105). As in so many countries and places
around the globe, in parts of Thailand poor, debt ridden, and malnourished
farmers and fishers produce high quality foods for affluent consumers,
both nationally and overseas. Heinz-Wattie in NZ has even been getting
tomatoes from Thailand (Press, 21/7/00).
Although the World Bank - in its exemplar case of Thailand - actually
celebrated “little direct Government intervention”,
and the lack of “significant protection” for peasant
farmers (ibid.), the purported free market success is very different
on the ground to what the Bank has portrayed. A parade of Thai regimes
have in fact sponsored and backed large scale agro-industry controlled
by TNCs, foreign banks, and local capital. The forest evictions
mentioned above comprise just one example. Sometimes the State’s
role has even been commercially very “direct” and interventionist
for certain capitalist interests. For example, some large tobacco
and livestock “outgrower contracting schemes” were actually
“public sector enterprises” in which the State was the
dominant partner (“The Food Question: Profits Versus People?”,
ed. H Bernstein et al, Earthscan Publishers, 1990, p151).
Protecting Agriculture In South Korea
As already indicated, NZ has a long history of battering away at
protectionism on South Korea’s domestic food market and food
sovereignty. During the concluding phase of the GATT Uruguay Round,
one of the key benefits for NZ of the new deal formulated by the
end of 1993 was seen as the: “removal of barriers on sheepmeat
exports to Korea, and new beef opportunities there” (NZ
Herald, 17/12/93). It is sadly ironic these days to also note
that around the same time journalist John Draper remarked of Aotearoa/NZ:
“Producer boards will be under increased pressure to give
up their export monopolies as a result of GATT. But strong resistance
will come from farmers fearful they will become serfs to international
corporations” (Sunday Star, 26/12/93).
Later on, NZ Trade
Minister Lockwood Smith observed that: “The US agreed with
the Cairns Group’s objectives for the elimination of export
subsidies, major progress on market access, and major reductions
in domestic support for agriculture” (NZ Herald,
4/5/98). While South Korea, despite debilitating free trade attacks,
has been oriented to protectionism in agriculture, the 19 member
free trader Cairns Group comprises a significant number of other
American client (or closely associated) states like Thailand, Indonesia,
Uruguay, Colombia, Pakistan and the Philippines that are committed
to exporting food products. Australia, Canada, and NZ have been
the Western nations in charge of the Cairns Group agenda –
at least until the breakdown of the Doha WTO Round, principally
over these very issues of agricultural protectionism and free trade.
Cairns Group/WTO commitments have often proven to be at the expense
of food security. Even in Aotearoa/NZ, consumers have experienced
the growing burden of higher basic food prices, especially for dairy
products, due to international “free trade” priorities
and requirements in tandem with the prevailing supermarket duopoly.
Back in the early days of the GATT Uruguay Round, South Korea was
identified as incisively illustrating the problems of “developing”
countries subject to American bullying to reduce their food security
and independence. In particular, at the time, it was noted that:
“The country’s beef producers are for the most part
highly marginal, low income smallholders who have been steadily
squeezed out of the domestic market and from the land by price pressures”
(Food Matters Worldwide, no. 5, March 1990, p19). These
farmers had largely “been victims rather than beneficiaries”
of Korean economic development (ibid.). Obviously, they were also
then being targeted as future victims of global market efficiency!
In December 1993 on the signing of the new world trade agreement,
the Korean Prime Minister was toppled due to “public discontent”
and protests “for failing to stop the opening of the sensitive
rice market” (Press, 17/12/93). Ever since, the South
Korean government has struggled to reconcile the glaring contradiction
of fulfilling free trade requirements to reduce “domestic
support for farming”, and its domestic duty to “develop
rural communities” positively and sustainably (e.g. “A
Handbook of Korea”, Korean Overseas Culture & Information
Service, 10th ed, 1998, p278).
Fighting Free Trade Hypocrisy
The US has long been the big gun set on busting wide open the South
Korean market while on the other hand assiduously protecting its
own farmers and corporate interests. In addition, the broader American
aim has entailed enforcing the demolition of any State support outside
its own borders, including NZ’s producer boards, in order
to enable TNC control, called the “free market”. Over
the years, a carrot dangled for NZ has been the prospect of greater
food sales to South Korea by latching onto Uncle Sam’s coat
tails in trade negotiations.
In fact, even well before the institution of the WTO, heavy US-led
inroads on Korea’s food sovereignty were rolling back the
gains made from earlier progressive land reform and other family
farmer-friendly policies. As the editors of The Ecologist
once aptly commented, countries like South Korea may come to rue
the day that they opted for “food security through trade”,
with Korean self-sufficiency in crops like wheat and beans already
having plummeted markedly by 1993 (no. 6, Nov/Dec. 1993, p221).
Korea was then “the third highest importer of agricultural
products from the US”, so placing “itself in a highly
vulnerable bargaining position” (ibid.).
NZ’s recent initiative in 2010 on pressing for increased food
exports into South Korea is thus yet another stage in this long,
ongoing assault. The NZ government is currently negotiating a bilateral
free trade deal with Korea. A TVNZ report on Prime Minister John
Key’s visit to South Korea in July 2010 mentioned the concerns
of farmers there about free trade (6pm One News, 5/7/10).
However, the same report stressed that it was vital for us to try
and get in first with our latest sally before the big exporting
nations were able to get their act together (ibid.). In the last
couple of years or so, the momentum of the US exporting push has
stalled somewhat. American beef exports to South Korea were stopped
in 2003 due to Korean concerns about the risk of importing “Mad
Cow Disease”. While these exports resumed again in 2008, there
were strong mass street protests against what was seen as the Korean
government’s capitulation to US bullying. Such issues are
still sensitive. It is widely acknowledged that agricultural protectionism
reflects certain deep cultural values in South Korea.
Food Sovereignty, Agrarian Values, And Rural Life
A second TVNZ report in July 2010 again remarked on the threat seen
to South Korean agriculture from NZ (6pm One News, 6/7/10).
Whereas agriculture had formerly been off the table in negotiations
between NZ and South Korea, NZ has succeeded in pushing it forward.
For NZ, the barrier is “breaking down the 40% tariffs which
Korea places on imported beef” (Press, 6/3/09). John
Key is pushing “a top-down approach” with a
hard line on agricultural access, “a bottom line for NZ”
in the face of Korean resistance (Press, 5/7/10).
An elitist “Establishment” link seems to have developed
to some extent between Korea and NZ, with the interests of Korean
farmers and peasants being seen as expendable to larger political
and economic aims. Food imports are being promoted as “important”
for forging closer cooperation between the two countries and as
actually enhancing food security (“NZ And South Korea: A 60-Year
Link” by Paul Bellamy, NZ International Review, Jan-Feb,
2009). Korea seems to be in danger of swallowing the export myth
still being pushed by NZ, the US, Australia, Canada, and co. This
would be a very retrograde step. In a paper presented to the WTO
Committee on Agriculture in 1998 in the Analysis & Exchange
(AIE) series, the Korean government made “the case that relying
on global supplies is risky since world demand is projected to increase
by 40% by 2020 and arable land to decrease. Also weather anomalies
threaten food security”.
For certain, in a world subject to unpredictable climate change,
it would be very stupid to foster import dependence on food. This
does not mean of course that trade cannot play a vital role –
but only within an international system (and regional networks)
committed to genuine food security, small farmer livelihoods, and
sustainability. Moreover, an earlier financial crisis had already
clearly shown the value of precautionary policy on food security.
In late 1997 when Korea’s banks lost credit, “agricultural
imports completely stalled” (Focus on Trade, no.33,
Part 3, Jan. 1999, p8). The Government only succeeded in preventing
“severe social unrest” due to its “assiduous pursuit
of self-sufficiency in rice”, a lesson that the 2008 world
food crisis should have again strongly reinforced. Such self-sufficiency
is still borderline given that South Korea’s grain land area
peaked back in the mid-1960s.
Korean Example
In January 2009, Christine Ahn of Korean Americans for Fair Trade
observed that even only about ten years ago South Korea was still
a largely agrarian economy with some ten million farmers compared
with the current 3.5 million (www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/2424).
She noted how urban migration has contributed to unemployment; how
wages have been driven down; and how rural areas have suffered deprivation
and reduced viability (ibid.). Korean rice farmers make up the largest
number of peasants in the country but WTO regulations are lowering
the tariffs on rice, fostering more food imports. Yet research has
even shown that “the monetary value of flood control by rice
paddy in Korea” can far exceed the monetary value of the total
rice output (Focus on Trade, no. 33, op. cit.).
Christine Ahn has incisively emphasised the international influence
that Koreans have had in developing the principles of food sovereignty
and self-sufficiency: “Korean peasants have really galvanised
a strong opposition to neo-liberal economic and trade policies within
peasant movements in the country, but also throughout the Third
World” (op. cit.). A county official in Korea remarked on
Lee Kyung Hae’s suicide to the effect that: “Lee knew
the Korean countryside is slowly dying, that farmers are living
lonely, miserable lives. He wanted to tell the world. That is why
he sacrificed himself and that is why we call him a hero”
(NZ Herald, 20/9/03 – quoted in an unusually insightful newspaper
article).
Undermining Rural Systems
The mechanisation of agriculture implemented by South Korea, coupled
with the increasing liberalisation of food imports, is subverting
a way of life vital for future sustainable development. Meantime,
NZ pushes the advantages of our grass-fed beef against Korean import
dependent grain-fed beef. Although the US is “pouring money
into trying to re-enter the market” on a large scale, in mid-2010
NZ was said to be “holding onto its share of beef exports”
(Press, 4/6/10). Indeed, “Korea is NZ’s third
largest market for beef exports” (ibid.). But the US was making
a comeback.
What former NZ Foreign Minister Winston Peters once dismissed as
a vocal minority viewpoint in South Korea against our food exports
should be respected for the agrarian values it represents. Today,
many Koreans feel that their whole agriculture system – or
at least what is left of it - is being undermined. NZ supposedly
is to take such sensitivity into account in the ongoing negotiations
on a free trade deal. More generally, the case of South Korea illustrates
the impact of worldwide urban, industrial and corporate growth trends
eating relentlessly into the global food supply, and the environmental
basis for its sustainability. This consideration once more signals
the importance of the struggle for food sovereignty in Korea.
It speaks volumes that: “Korean investors are looking at buying
forestry plantations in NZ as natural forests become increasingly
protected overseas and log prices rise” (Press, 4/6/10;
see “Clearcut: Forestry in NZ” by Murray Horton, CAFCA,
1995, for the neo-liberal, TNC-driven background in this sector).
Many countries in the Asia/Pacific region have been logged out,
or have implemented protection of remaining forests. Consequently,
Korea, China, India and other nations are looking to increasing
wood imports. “There is a resource grab going on with these
countries with burgeoning populations” (Press, ibid.).
Certain nations like Korea “were adopting renewable energy
policies”, including wood-based fuels that draw on overseas-sourced
wood (ibid.).
Usurping Uruguayan Agriculture
As a member of the Cairns Group, Uruguay has been a big exporter
of beef and rice. Yet by 2002 concerns were rising among Uruguayan
farmers and peasants. At the June 2002 meeting of the Getting out
of the Cairns Group campaign in Bali, it was noted that whereas:
“Farmers used to support Uruguay being in the Cairns Group”,
their attitudes had changed with increasing bankruptcies. Now they
were instead “asking the Government to establish more protection
of their local market”. Sectors that were adversely affected
by debt included horticulture, potatoes and yams. Uruguay had become
a net importing country.
PGGW spun off the Craig Norgate-initiated NZ Farming Systems Uruguay
(NZFSU) venture in 2006 in a period of rapid globalisation of the
dairy industry. A couple of years later, economics commentator Rod
Oram recorded how this NZ-initiated enterprise had grown fast to
become the largest dairy farmer in Latin America. Oram observed
that: “NZ diplomats have worked hard to get to know Uruguayan
politicians and Government officials”, and that a number have
been official guests here (“Milking Greener Pastures”,
Sunday Star Times, 7/12/08). The NZ government, PGGW, Gallagher
and Livestock Improvement Corporation were working together on cultivating
the political ground in Uruguay. Significantly again, Oram stressed
that: “This relationship building will be critically important
in 2009 when Uruguayans go to the polls. Two goals by some on the
political Left are reforms to help landless peasants and restrictions
on foreign land investment along the country’s border”
(ibid.). Evidently, PGGW was grateful for the help from NZ diplomats
in helping offset such local concerns. NZ government officials and
corporates have had lots of experience and practice at screwing
poor Third World farmers and facilitating TNC takeover!
The not so hidden hand of politico-economic players can certainly
shape “free trade” outcomes. Shaping public perceptions
and relations here is of course a critical dimension of this. Oram
traveled to South America in September 2008 with help from NZ’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade (MFAT). In its propaganda
back in 1994, MFAT proclaimed that those developing countries, “which
organise their economies to take advantage of the new opportunities”,
would gain most from free trade (“Trading Ahead: The GATT
Uruguay Round: Results For NZ”, MFAT, April 1994, p16). In
Uruguay, the NZ government has been helping to steer market forces
to organise the economy there for our supposed comparative/competitive
advantage, now usurped by OI, which has taken over the bulk of NZFSU’s
shareholding (78%). Obviously, OI’s subsidiary NZFSU needs
rebranding!
Facilitating Foreign Financial Takeovers
In recent years, NZFSU, like its parent company PGGW, got into financial
difficulty and consequently sought overseas-based funding. Like
PGGW, it grossly overreached itself in its process of capital accumulation.
According to a deal between OI and PGGW, “the purchase of
PGGW’s 11.5% stake [in NZFSU] . . . was “conditional
on Olam gaining more than 50% of NZFSU” (Press, 25/8/10).
Another bidder for NZFSU shares, Uruguay’s Union Agriculture
Group (UAG), withdrew its offer when OI raised the stakes. The Norgate-led
PGGW had driven NZFSU into a financial hole. NZFSU’s Chairperson,
John Parker, has acknowledged that PGGW had “grossly overestimated
the time it takes for dairy conversions”, with management
badly failing its role (Press, 24/8/10). Parker still “maintained
the business concept of converting Uruguayan land to the NZ dairy
model was right, just poorly executed” (ibid.). OI agrees.
NZFSU has bought itself out of its management contract with PGGW.
A Grant Samuel appraisal “shows NZFSU, managed by PGGW, went
on a land buying spree rather than sticking to the prospectus plan.
As a result, NZFSU ran out of cash and could not develop the farms
to the level set out in the prospectus and has fallen far short
of production targets” (Press, 26/8/10); for earlier
reports on this buying spree, which included local businesses, see
e.g. Press, 5/7/07 & 13/6/08). NZFSU has also grossly
overspent on stock (Press, 26/810). Furthermore, it is
now intending to irrigate half of the land it wants to convert to
dairying (ibid.). Importantly and revealingly enough, NZFSU did
not originally intend to use irrigation at all. While the pastoral
livestock industry has traditionally been dominant in Uruguay and
water has been abundant, the country has suffered from drought in
recent years, even adversely affecting NZFSU’s own operations
and profits. OI considers that NZFSU has too much of its land in
the eastern part of the country where soils are less suitable for
dairying (Press, 11/8/10).
Climate change could be impacting the country’s long term
capacity for agricultural productivity. In 2008, Uruguay’s
rainfall was about half the historic average, and rainfall was “at
a three decade low in places” by the start of 2009 (Press,
14/1/09). This makes allocation of water to a foreign firm producing
dairy products for higher income consumers - domestically and externally
- both socially and environmentally a highly flawed project. Furthermore,
the NZ pastoral experience cannot be directly replicated with “a
significant amount of supplementary feed” needed in Uruguay
(Press, 28/7/10). As well, even on its own narrowly construed
criteria and goals, the venture is obviously struggling. According
to the Grant Samuel appraisal, NZFSU is “unlikely” to
produce any positive cash flow for several years (Press,
24/8/10).
Funding Follies
Keith Woodford, Professor of Farm Management & Agribusiness
at Lincoln University, has been one of the pundits promoting NZFSU’s
venture in Uruguay, as well as similar ventures elsewhere in Latin
America (Sunday Star Times, 14/1/07). By 2007, New Zealanders
had “been making significant land purchases in Uruguay, Chile
and Brazil”, and a group was also involved in Paraguay (ibid.).
On one of his South American trips, Professor Woodford accompanied
“prospective NZ investors” to Uruguay in the early days
of the PGGW-initiated dairy project (ibid.). He looked forward to
the venture benefiting from Uruguay’s business-friendly, free
market environment. Yet another NZ investment group was developing
4,000 hectares for dairy farms in eastern Uruguay. In Woodford’s
opinion: “What we saw in NZ was that once the Government got
out of the way”, commercial banks [and finance companies!]
entered the market to the benefit of our farmers (ibid.). Uruguay
“is much like NZ before the mid-1980s, when only the Rural
Bank and its predecessor the State Advances Corporation lent to
farmers” (ibid.). For Woodford, the change of financing for
farming in NZ to private institutions has given our farmers a comparative
advantage in the bankrolling of NZ farm ventures like NZFSU. In
fact, NZFSU has “obtained debt funding” via Uruguayan
banks as well as NZ investment (Press, 17/3/09). In addition, NZFSU
has managed to get “tax benefits worth US$20m ($NZ28m) to
US$25m under Uruguayan tax law” (Press, 13/8/10). Tellingly
enough, in light of NZFSU’s drought woes, Professor Woodford,
who has got public attention for his advocacy of the alleged health
benefits of A2 milk, also pours cold water on the scientific consensus
on global warming.
To be sure, too, the chickens - or rather the finance vultures -
are now coming home to roost thick and fast in Aotearoa/NZ itself
as the crushing debt burden piles up. Even in the most profitable
farming sector, i.e. dairy, there is “a big debt issue”
with the “bottom 10% of dairy farmers” needing a good
payout this season to keep them farming (Press, 20/8/10). Meanwhile,
finance company woes go on with South Canterbury Finance investors,
substantially linked to dairy farming, having to be rescued by the
taxpayer. Again, the ironies multiply. A salutary case in point
is the fate of Allied Farmers. “The firm that tried, and failed,
to convert itself into a big financier with the Hanover deal more
than doubled its loss to $77.6 million in the year ended June 30
[2010], with even its rural services business falling into the red”
(Press, 11/9/10). More generally, it is painfully evident –
as so evident too today in Aotearoa/NZ - that the control of the
planet’s food producing resources is steadily accumulating
in relatively fewer and fewer hands.
Food Crisis In Niger And Beyond
It has been notorious for many years that people in the Sahel can
starve while food and other agricultural commodities like cotton
and peanuts are exported. In August 2010, Niger appealed for aid
after “two years of drought and failed crops” (Press,
3/8/10). These dire conditions were forcing millions of villagers
to eat weeds to survive (ibid.).Tragically, ironically, Niger later
suffered from flooding too. Niger is one of the world’s very
poorest countries, yet obscenely exploited by France for its uranium.
Lately, China has joined in this exploitation. Only a tiny minority
in Niger really benefits from this mineral wealth, and this is much
the same for the livestock industry there. Traditional nomadic pastoralists
have often got trapped in crippling debt (e.g. “Africa In
Crisis: The Causes, The Cures Of Environmental Bankruptcy”,
Lloyd Timberlake, Earthscan, 1988, p84). Well managed pastoralism
can be successful, but as the fluctuating fortunes of the Maradi
district in southern Niger indicate: “The desert margins remain
perilous places” (“Confessions Of An Eco-Sinner: Travels
To Find Where My Stuff Comes From”, Fred Pearce, Eden Project
Books, 2008, p337).
Yet Christchurch construction company Apollo Projects is building
a meat processing plant in Niger’s capital, Niamey, backed
by NZ Trade & Enterprise (Press, 6/5/10).The plant
will “service Niger’s local and export markets”
(ibid.). Niger needs more sustainable food crop production and fairer
distribution, not increased meat production with all its predictable
deleterious social and environmental effects, including likely desertification.
Western exploitation of Niger has provided fertile ground for al
Qaeda-inspired activities. In September 2010, French special forces
were deployed to hunt hostage-taking “terrorists” in
Niger (Press, 22/9/10). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) had captured seven hostages, five of them French, “from
a French mining colony [at Arlit] in northern Niger where they worked”
(ibid.). These days, French President Sarkozy’s racist war
on the world’s poor includes the expulsion of Roma from France.
The Arlit uranium mine is vital “for the French power system
and ultimately its [terrorist] nuclear arsenal” (ibid.). France
itself is again under the potential threat of terrorist attack.
Meanwhile, the volatile impact of global warming radiates out from
heat waves and grass fires in Russia to massive flooding in Pakistan,
even sparking food riots in Mozambique and problems elsewhere in
conjunction with underlying and growing inequities (Press,
4/9/10 & 14/8/10; www.foodfirst.org/en/node/3081).
Safeguarding Food Security And Social Health
In the years to come, the issue of food security will inevitably
demand far greater attention, commitment and action. Certainly,
achieving sustainable food security is vital to any human
future worth living. And keeping a close scrutiny of NZ government
and corporate policies and activities abroad on this issue will
be up to us. As well, the question of the sustainability and socio-economic
benefits of agriculture in Aotearoa/NZ itself will demand perpetual
vigilance and action.
Non-Members:
It takes a lot of work to compile and write the material presented
on these pages - if you value the information, please send a donation
to the address below to help us continue the work.
Foreign Control Watchdog,
P O Box 2258, Christchurch, New Zealand/Aotearoa. August 2008.
Email cafca@chch.planet.org.nz |