Tommy Suharto, the most flamboyant of the monumentally corrupt offspring of the overthrown dictator and mass murderer, has been a regular feature of Watchdog for the past decade. We last reported, in 2001, that Tommy was on the run from his 2000 graft conviction, for which he was sentenced to 18 months prison. He was the first and only member of Indonesia’s former ruling family to be convicted of anything, let alone sentenced to prison. The inability of the authorities to capture the country’s most famous fugitive was a major scandal, both domestically and internationally.

Whilst he was still underground, he was acquitted on appeal, a decision that shocked the country (his business partner wasn’t so fortunate, he served more than ten months of his sentence). But Tommy’s year of freedom came to an end in November 2001, when police stormed a house near Jakarta and found him having an afternoon sleep. He was arrested without resistance and taken to Police headquarters, where he was warmly greeted by the highest ranking officers. Although he had been acquitted on the graft charges, he remains in custody. In March 2002 he was charged with the mid-2001 murder of the Supreme Court judge who sentenced him to prison. Two alleged hitmen have been charged with the actual murder, on Tommy’s orders, and all three face the death sentence. The hitmen have said that they were promised $US10,000 for the murder. At the time of writing, Tommy is on trial. He has also been charged for possession of weapons and explosives but, although former President Wahid had named Tommy as the prime suspect in a series of deadly bombings that have rocked Jakarta and other centres in the past couple of years, the Police said that they have no evidence to prove those allegations. Of course, the Suhartos and their cronies in the old regime have got everything to gain by destabilising their successor governments.

Recently, Lilybank was listed for sale on a Website called Escape From America, for rather more than $1. The asking price was $7.2 million + GST, for what was described as a "5,000 acre paradise" (most of which is Crown pastoral lease; only eight hectares are freehold). The price had come down from the original $9 million (by February 2002 it had vanished from the site).

We were interested in having a look through this file to see what light it sheds on the most recent publicly known events in relation to Lilybank. Not surprisingly perhaps, the answer is "Not much". The most recent material in it is dated 2001, when there were two major developments. Firstly, representatives of Indonesia’s Attorney-General came to New Zealand to meet with various Ministers and Government bodies (including the OIC), in the course of investigating Suharto assets here (and we have it in writing, from a New Zealand Minister, that Indonesia’s keenest interest was in Lilybank). This followed the offer of the New Zealand government to cooperate with any such investigation. However this whole subject is represented only by one single, solitary Press clipping. But what is interesting is what has been handwritten on it, by somebody in the OIC: "MFAT (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade) says an official coming on fact finding mission (on offer of cooperation). Indonesia AG interested, will let us know when interested, Lilybank beyond reach b/c bought 92 and convicted for 97 actions. Indonesian actions more political than real". So that’s what the OIC thinks on that subject.

Nor does the file shed any light on possibly the most mysterious recent development. In late 2000 the media reported that Lilybank had been sold to unidentified North American buyers (it was revealed, in 2001, that the offer had been subject to various conditions, which had not been fulfilled and that the sale had fallen through. Hence the marketing of it on the Internet). In early 2001 CAFCA wrote to the OIC asking for the details, and we received the unprecedented reply that the OIC would neither confirm nor deny the existence or non-existence of any such information. We pressed the OIC on this and, after the collapse of the sale was made public, it changed its’ position to simply refusing our request on the grounds that the information sought did not exist.

All that the file has about it is an Evening Post clipping announcing the "sale" and a letter from the OIC to Lilybank’s Christchurch lawyer asking if the report was true, and reminding him that the OIC’s 1999 permission for Alan Poh to buy Lilybank included the condition that the OIC be notified in writing within 28 days of the sale of any land at Lilybank. The lawyer replied, confirming that the sale had fallen through – he didn’t identify the would be buyers, by name or nationality. So we are none the wiser about why the OIC was so obviously thinskinned about our routine inquiry. We wrote to it asking for a specific explanation of this. The reply (18/2/02) only serves to muddy the waters further, although it does contain this gem: "As you may appreciate in certain circumstances even confirming the existence of an application would be likely unreasonably to prejudice the commercial position of the parties, or some of the parties…".

Tommy bought Lilybank in 1992. It is fascinating to read documents relating to that original purchase. A letter (29/9/92) from Charles Levin, of lawyers Buddle Findlay, to the Office of Crown Lands, Department of Survey and Land Information, concludes: "There is one final matter that we wish to comment on, and that is Mr Hutomo’s (i.e. Tommy’s correct name, Hutomo Mandala Putra. Ed.) position in Indonesian society. With respect, it seems to us that inadequate attention has been given to this factor to date. We consider this relevant for the reason that it is the stated intention of the New Zealand government that a closer relationship be forged between New Zealand and our Asian neighbours. Crucial to the forging of a closer relationship between New Zealand and its Asian neighbours is the establishment of links with governing institutions in those countries…". Other correspondence from this period stresses the fact that Tommy is the son of the President. So that’s how we should forge relationships with our Asian neighbours – by allowing the spectacularly corrupt son of a dictator to buy up prime high country farms to turn into luxury hunting resorts.

By the time of the 1999 $1 sale, Tommy had gone from asset to liability. A letter (31/8/99) from the OIC to the Treasurer and the Associate Minister of Food, Fibre, Boarder (sic) Control and Biosecurity has a heading: "Potential Sensitivity. The ownership and possible sale of Lilybank Station could be sensitive given that: (a) it is currently owned by a member of the Suharto family. Mr Hutomo is the third son of (former) President Suharto of Indonesia; (b) the current ownership of the Station and the purported difficulties related to that ownership have received widespread media coverage and, in many instances, public criticism…". There is a (c) but it has been mainly withheld.

Undoubtedly the 1999 sale, whereby Tommy unloaded Lilybank to his partner, Alan Poh, for $1, attracted the most attention in recent years. The reason stated was: "The current shareholding by Mr Hutomo is not significant enough to warant his personal attention and the company has suffered as a consequence" (letter from Charles Levin to the OIC, 29/6/99). When CAFCA broke the story, interest was very high indeed from the media, politicians and the public. A fax from the OIC to the Private Secretary of the Minister of Food, Fibre, Biosecurity and Border Control (23/9/99) says: "Would you please ensure that both your Minister and David Carter are made aware that this matter is likely to get some media attention…The Commission does not propose to make any further comment on the decision should it receive any further enquiries other than to explain that consideration was $1 because of debt assumed by applicant…".

An earlier (31/8/99) letter from the OIC, to the above Minister and the Treasurer, says: "The application (to sell) was submitted with less information than is normally received from applicants in support of their applications. The lack of information and subsequent reticence to provide specific details and supporting documentation in response to further information requests caused concern as to the authenticity of the application, particularly given that the consideration payable was $1...". Interestingly this letter states that the OIC received a submission from a third party (all details of both the third party and the submission have been withheld, which CAFCA has appealed to the Ombudsman). The OIC advised the Ministers that this submission was "not relevant" nor were the other matters raised under the heading "Potential Sensitivity" (see above). "The Commission is of the view that such sensitivity is also not relevant to the legislative criteria and cannot be taken into account when considering the application…".

But the OIC was far from happy about the level of detail submitted in support of the application and kept having to badger Charles Levin (the former Buddle Findlay partner mentioned above; now acting on behalf of Poh). For example, a letter from the OIC (28/7/99) to Levin, says: "The Commission has received a number of comments, from various sources, suggesting that the proposed acquisition by Mr Poh is a ‘sham’ and is nothing more than a paper transaction in an endeavour to disguise Mr Hutomo’s ongoing interest in Lilybank Station. The Commission has also received comments claiming that the financial position of Lilybank New Zealand Limited has also been misrepresented in the financial accounts. The Commission, while it has not come to any view about the validity of these allegations, is concerned about these comments and your reluctance to provide detailed information requested…"

Levin did not take kindly to this, e-mailing the OIC with a reply (28/7/99) that mentions "unsubstantiated claims" and "a rather large red herring…". The OIC was unmoved and repeated its demand for the requested information to be produced by a specific date and time. Levin responded in a terse e-mail (29/7/99) reading, in its entirety: "Fine, will get it for you by the 9^th, but I think I do have a point"! He had previously tried obfuscation, stating in a fax (19/7/99): "I understand the transaction from my own knowledge of the parties in particular and Asian business practices in general, but have perhaps failed to clearly convey that understanding to the Commission…". Ah, Asian business practices, they can explain everything, apparently.

The actual sale of Lilybank from Tommy to Poh involved a transfer of shares in the venture’s holding company, Buckcorp Holdings No 68 Ltd. Of the 100 shares, Tommy held 95 and Poh the remaining five. The application for the sale was in mid 1999, but the OIC was less than happy that Tommy’s shares were recorded as having been transferred to Poh several months earlier, without the necessary consent of the relevant Ministers, as required under the 1995 Overseas Investment Regulations. "…Mr Levin advised that the discrepancy occurred due to ‘sloppy office practice and somebody jumping the gun’ (OIC italics). He did not elaborate as to who. Mr Levin seemed surprised to learn that the Commission accessed third party sources, like Company (sic) Office records to verify information provided as part of/in support of an application…" (File Note – Re Telephone Conversation With Charles Levin On 6 August 1999 At Approximately 3.20 PM). Levin faxed the OIC (6/8/99): "…The annual return is therefore clearly incorrect and I have asked the accountant to file an amended return…".

The OIC insisted that the Timaru accountants acknowledge the mistake, which they duly did to both the Companies Office, and to Levin. "We have found that the Company’s (i.e. Buckcorp. Ed.) 1999 Annual Return was incorrect…" (McFarlane Hornsey Simpson, letter to Companies Office, 10/8/99). With that, Levin faxed the OIC (10/8/99) to confirm: "…In the meantime Mr Hutomo continues to own the shares".

There is one other area touched upon in the OIC file. One of the very few legal conditions that foreign investors have to meet is that they be persons of "good character". We’ve tackled the OIC on this one on several occasions (never on Lilybank) and at the end of one lengthy process which took more than a year, it finally advised us that good character is nowhere defined in New Zealand law. That’s very useful then, isn’t it? Obviously Tommy would appear to be a perfect candidate to be declared "not of good character", but we never pursued it because his 1992 purchase of Lilybank predated the requirement and also his conviction in Indonesia (as spelled out in the OIC’s handwritten note on the Press clipping about the Indonesian Attorney-General’s representatives coming to New Zealand to investigate Suharto assets here. See above). Once it was announced that he was selling out of Lilybank, we saw no point in pursuing that angle either.

There is absolutely no mention of Tommy’s (absolutely not good) character in the file. There are a couple of references to the OIC making inquiries as to Alan Poh’s character but most of those have been blacked out. But there are a couple of documents relating to good character. One is a September 2000 letter from Grant Cameron, the Christchurch lawyer most recently acting for Lilybank. In its entirety it reads: "Lilybank New Zealand Limited. I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, every person with 25% or more interest in the overseas investment, or the individuals exervcising control over the applicant, are of good character and no such person is a person of the kind referred to in section 7(1) of the Immigration Act 1987". One other 1999 document, from another lawyer, states: "Poh Lye Yee Alan is of good character and is not a person of the kind referred to in Section 7 (1) of the Immigration Act 1987".

Basically that sums up this entire file (or, at least, the parts of it that have been released to us). It does show the OIC doing some checking and post-approval follow up, even a bit of badgering in the case of the reluctant Levin. But it’s all for one purpose alone, namely to expedite the approval, to get it through. Not to refuse it, in the national interest, or even to attach other than the most minimal conditions to the consent. We stand by our long stated view that the OIC’s work could be just as effectively done by a monkey with a rubber stamp.