“AXIS OF DECEIT”

Andrew Wilkie. Black Inc. Agenda, Melbourne, 2004.

- Bob Leonard

The Axis of Deceit of the title, in case you hadn’t already guessed is America, Britain and Australia. If you haven’t made up your mind yet about whether the invasion of Iraq was a good idea, Andrew Wilkie’s book might help you decide. Until March 2003 Wilkie was an intelligence officer with Australia’s Office of National Assessments (ONA) handling sensitive documents and writing secret reports on a wide variety of topics related to Iraq. By late 2002 his conscience had got the better of him and he made the decision, as he puts it, to “betray my Government”. How he prepared for the big day of “betrayal” is a fascinating account in the first chapter, “Taking A Stand”. Very few spies have the guts to blow the whistle and this chapter makes it clear just why that is. Expecting immediate and severe consequences, Wilkie prepared well for his final day with ONA in Canberra. Perhaps most important was making as big a media splash as possible with his resignation. He insists that his motivation was not politically based, but of course the political impact on the Howard government was big.

A very tense and nervous Wilkie walked out on the intelligence business just nine days before the invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003. The gathering media in front of the ONA building, which it shares with the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), caused sirens to go off throughout the building and a total shutdown to prevent identification of ASIO agents entering and leaving. Wilkie had to call his media contacts and get them to retreat so he could leave the building (without incident as it happened). The evening news bulletins informed Australia of what he had done and why. His phone rang non-stop for days thereafter.

In a totally predictable attempt to discredit Wilkie and diminish his impact, the Director-General of ONA, Australia’s top intelligence officer, quickly issued a statement that played down Wilkie’s access to intelligence materials on Iraq. He was able to counter that statement effectively in his first national TV interview only a couple of hours after he left ONA. He was in fact privy to a vast array of top secret documents relevant to Iraq and the build-up to war and had recently written an important internal ONA report on the humanitarian implications of a war on Iraq. His careful analysis for that assignment had played a key role in his decision to quit. He was convinced that an invasion would be a disaster for all concerned, not least the Iraqis themselves.

There was no way his resignation was going to allow him to stay politically neutral. The first political party to contact him was the Greens who wanted him to speak at a rally in front of Parliament about the reasons for his principled actions. He reluctantly agreed. The rally was timed to coincide with a major speech to the Press Club, inside Parliament, by Prime Minister John Howard. Howard was making a desperate attempt to convince the media and the nation that Australia’s participation in the imminent invasion was righteous. He was less than convincing and critical media reports followed along with primetime coverage of the protest outside Parliament. “On balance it wasn’t a good day for the Government”, concluded Wilkie.

A Very Readable Book

Andrew Wilkie is a good writer and this is a very readable book. Following on the riveting opening chapter he devotes a chapter (“Life On The Inside”) to details of his background, which included service as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Australian Army and brief secondment to ONA, a year with Raytheon Corporation, and finally a permanent position with ONA as a senior analyst working on a broad range of issues including Kosovo (in the former Yugoslavia), terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, Afghanistan and Iraq. He also describes what it is like to work inside Australia’s lead intelligence agency, involving extensive international travel and dealings with officers in the intelligence agencies of the US (Central Intelligence Agency) and Britain (MI6) and Australia’s Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) (1). The following chapter (“The World Of Intelligence”) is a revealing description of the intelligence community within which the ONA and other agencies in the brotherhood operate. Big Brother is of course the US with its Central Intelligence Agency. The other major players are Britain and Canada (2) with NZ doing its part via signals intelligence (i.e., the Waihopai and Tangimoana spybases).

The chapter “An Unnecessary War” gets down to brass tacks and lays out the story of deceit that is the primary theme of the book. This and the next chapter, “The Big Lie”, should convince any doubter that attacking Iraq was certain to lead to disaster, but was bound to happen, given a US government motivated by oil and “the US’s determination to safeguard and enhance its global ideological, economic and military hegemony” (p64). Most of the stories of deceit will be very familiar to an informed reader; some important examples: “…that Iraq still has chemical and biological weapons and that Iraq wants to develop nuclear weapons” (John Howard, February 4, 2003); the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell’s “avalanche of allegations against Iraq” (address to United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003); Bush, Blair and Howard “playing up the risk of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) terrorism but neglecting to point out that the likelihood of such an attack was low” (p85); assertions that Iraq was trying to buy thousands of aluminium tubes for use in uranium-enrichment for nuclear weapons (p91); and the Joe Wilson/Valerie Plame* saga surrounding fictionalised reports and a litany of lies about Iraq’s alleged attempts to buy uranium from Niger in Africa (p96). *Joe Wilson was sent by the Bush Administration to check out reports that Saddam Hussein, was trying to buy uranium from the West African state of Niger. Wilson concluded that the reports were baseless, which is not what Bush and co wanted to hear. In revenge, Administration officials leaked to journalists that Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, was a covert Central Intelligence Agency agent (thus ending her career as a spy). This is illegal and caused a major scandal, with one of Vice President Dick Cheney’s top aides currently facing criminal charges. Ed.

Deliberately Skewed Truth

As an ONA senior analyst with access to masses of documentation from all the countries involved, Wilkie was well-placed to conclude that: “Most often the deceit lay in the way Washington, London and Canberra deliberately skewed the truth by taking the ambiguity out of the issue. Key intelligence assessment qualifications were frequently dropped and much more definite words put in their place, even though such embellishments had not been offered to the governments by their intelligence agencies” (p81).

Of course the deceit continued after the invasion and it had become obvious even to Bush and his cronies that events were going terribly wrong (“The Blame Game”). Wilkie pulls no punches: “By late 2003, however, there was no possibility that Bush, Blair and Howard were unaware of the true situation in Iraq or that they were in some form of understandable denial. No, they were well aware of the fix they were in, but decided to deal with it with more prevarications, fabrications, distortions and exaggerations. Lies beget lies, as they say” (p111). He lays it all out in detail in this chapter on “blame”, moving to a lengthy discussion of what he rather gently titles “Public Disservice”, in part an account of the important role that public protest played, and continues to play, in affecting the actions of governments. He expresses a surprising degree of optimism: “But at least the protesters forced their governments into the position where they were exposed for what they really are – arrogant, unaccountable and imperious. This is a vital achievement and a wake-up call to all of us that we must work even harder to mend our ailing democracies and punish at the polls those who betray our trust” (p149).

What About “Intelligence Failures”?

Make no mistake. Wilkie was in the thick of the intelligence business and he’s not about to blame the war on Iraq on intelligence failures. This chapter starts with the statement: “The US, UK and Australian intelligence communities are not responsible for the Iraq fiasco”. Knowing what I do from reading this book and many other sources, I would have to agree with Wilkie. The blame for the invasion lies squarely with the political leaders. But what does this say about the spy business in general? The vast array of intelligence agencies across the globe is funded by billions of dollars of taxpayer money, to spy on literally everything and everybody, whether friend or foe. But to what end if their political “masters” ultimately pursue their own agendas, and use intelligence data and analysis selectively simply to further those agendas? This reviewer can’t think of a more compelling argument that spying is useless, counterproductive, dangerous, and a mind-boggling waste of money. Andrew Wilkie may not have intended to make this argument, but he does a good job of it.

Wilkie has certainly had a change of heart since leaving ONA. He has been a Green Party candidate for the Bennelong seat in the Australian Parliament, the seat occupied by John Howard. Our own Greens invited him to come to New Zealand on a speaking tour in August 2005. He spoke in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch to large and receptive audiences. Members of the Anti-Bases Campaign had the opportunity to meet Andrew and to discuss his book and New Zealand’s involvement in the spy business at Waihopai and Tangimoana, and the US military/intelligence support base at Christchurch Airport.

Andrew Wilkie is to be commended for his courageous rejection of a promising career in the ONA because of the duplicity of the Howard government in joining Bush’s Coalition of the Willing. But he didn’t just resign. He stepped into the political arena and challenged Howard on his own electoral territory. And he wrote this excellent book. Read it – it will heighten your sense of outrage over the tragedy in Iraq. And that’s good.

1. Not to be confused with ASIO, which is Australia’s equivalent of New Zealand’s Security Intelligence Service. In theory these spies do not work outside their own countries.

2. See Peace Researchers 12 (March 1997), 16 (August 1998), 23 (June 2001) and 24 (December 2001) for articles on Canada’s Communications Security Establishment. 23 and 24 can be read online at the Peace Researcher Back Issues page at http://www.converge.org.nz/abc/prbacki.html.

This review was published in Peace Researcher 32, March 2006. PR is the journal of the Anti-Bases Campaign. Annual membership of ABC costs $20 (or $NZ25 for Australia and $NZ30 for the rest of the world), payable to ABC, Box 2258, Christchurch, cafca@chch.planet.org.nz; www.converge.org.nz/abc. PR can be read online at the ABC Website. Ed.

“TO BUILD A NATION:

Collected Writings Of Bruce Jesson 1975-1999”

Edited by Andrew Sharp. Penguin (NZ), 2005.

- Joe Hendren

As Roger Douglas and Ruth Richardson attempted to ram through their neo-liberal agenda in the face of wide opposition during the 1980s and 1990s, most of the media jumped aboard for the ride. Bruce Jesson was one of the key exceptions. During this time Jesson became one of the most prominent and informed critics of the “New Right’’ in a New Zealand context. Jesson did not get to see the publication of his last book as he succumbed to cancer in April 1999*, only a few months before “Only Their Purpose Is Mad” (1999) appeared in the bookshops. On the back cover his friend Chris Trotter includes the following tribute “The US has Noam Chomsky. New Zealand has Bruce Jesson. If you don’t read Jesson, you don’t know what is going on”. * Murray Horton’s obituary of Bruce Jesson is in Watchdog 91, August 1999. Bruce was actively associated with CAFCA from the early 1970s until his death. Ed.

“To Build A Nation”, edited by Auckland University Professor of Political Studies, Andrew Sharp, is designed to make available some of Jesson’s shorter writings he wrote during his life as a journalist. Jesson edited and largely wrote The Republican, a magazine founded by Jesson in the in the early to mid-1970s to further the republican cause. The Republican largely attracted a Leftwing audience. Jesson became more widely known as the political columnist for Metro magazine from March 1982 to November 1997. In the mid-1990s TheRepublican joined forces with Chris Trotter’s Political Review, to which Jesson also contributed. While Jesson called himself a journalist, his approach to underlying theoretical issues made him more like a self-taught academic, yet, unlike most academics, his writing always remained immediately accessible to a general audience. Jesson’s vivid description of a central Auckland bar in “Too Much To Ask” (1993) demonstrated that he could be a capable adherent of the “make me see” school of journalism. Blessed with one of the most original and critical minds of his generation, Jesson offers New Zealanders unique insight into ourselves.

The collection includes material from The Republican, Metro and NZ Political Review, dating from September 1975 to April 1999, and is arranged in a chronological order. The book is divided into six broad sections, each with a short introduction by Sharp where he highlights key political changes and summarises Jesson’s reaction to these changes. It begins with a short foreword written by David Lange in his capacity as a founding Chair of the Bruce Jesson Foundation, and this is most notable for when it is dated – June 2005. As Lange died in August, this foreword is likely to be one of the last things Lange ever wrote for publication (his memoir “My Life”, published days before his death, is probably the very last). Murray Horton’s obituary of David Lange is in Watchdog 110, December 2005, which can be read online at http://www.converge.org.nz/watchdog/10/09.htm. Ed.

On the whole Sharp has done a good job in selecting the material. While they cover a wide range of subjects a recurring theme is evident – how to establish an independent New Zealand. Few articles appear to repeat material covered in others, and any repetition that does occur acts as a useful reminder to the reader. Some articles cover similar ground to Jesson’s 1987 book “Behind The Mirror Glass” (BMG). While articles such as “The New Elite” and “Condition Terminal” are fantastic records of how the New Right consolidated its power in financial, business and political circles, they cover much of the ground of “Only Their Purpose Is Mad”. While these articles certainly possess historic value, as both journalistic time capsules and as a record of the development of Jesson’s thought, most are likely to look to the other published books as his ultimate word on these topics. If space was indeed at a premium, perhaps some of this material could have been left out in favour of strengthening the coverage of broader topics. For example, it would have been good to see more of the sharp political analysis Jesson wrote for NZ Political Review in the last half of the 1990s. In this review I will concentrate on some of the topics not given significant coverage in Jesson’s earlier books. If the reader will grant me some speculation, I will attempt to demonstrate how much of the material included in “To Build A Nation” is directly relevant to political, economic and social debates that continue to this day. Unless otherwise stated, page references are for “To Build A Nation”.

The Making Of A Patriot

Sharp introduces Jesson’s work and his times in an extended introduction “Bruce Jesson: The Making Of A Patriot”. Sharp gives a brief account of Jesson’s early life in the suburbs of Christchurch of the 1950’s and early 1960s. Around this firth form year in 1960 Jesson began to read the Communist Party of NZ paper, People’s Voice, and the Leftwing Monthly Review*. From his days at school to his university years in the mid 1960s Jesson was “schooled” in a Marxism that was materialist and activist. Yet Sharp’s attempt to explain how Jesson came to reject this “vulgar” Marxism lacks clarity, leaving the reader unsure of exactly what aspects of his earlier beliefs Jesson had rejected by the mid-1970s. * Murray Horton’s obituary of Monthly Review can be read in Watchdog 84, May 1997. Ed.

It would have been helpful if Sharp had made reference to articles included in the book as he introduced key themes of Jesson’s thought. In many cases it is not clear where Sharp is discussing articles he has included, or is explaining the content of pieces he left out to keep the book a manageable size. For example, in his extended introduction Sharp reminds us of Marx’s famous quote from “The Communist Manifesto”: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is to change it”. At this point it would have been useful to link this to Jesson’s 1983 article (which is in the book) where he clearly rejects the use of this quote by vulgar Marxists to excuse anti-intellectual prejudices, and as a slogan for political effect.

“Action and theory are commonly regarded as opposites or at least as alternatives. Action is preferred for being practical and showing commitment; whereas theory is disparaged as indulgent, elitist and removed from reality. (p120). That said, Sharp offers a good summary of Jesson’s call for the Left to reject anti-intellectualism. “Socialists should become intellectuals, who critically examine the history of their societies fully engaging with the social, cultural and political and economic life of the times”.

It might also have been worthwhile to include some of Jesson’s writing prior to 1975. As part of his discussion Sharp includes some quotes from a 1965 pamphlet, “Traitors To Class And Country”, written by Jesson and Jack Sturt, used by both men to renounce their previous links with Communists in New Zealand, particularly the New Zealand Communist Party. An “Afterword” by Peter Lee, “Thoughts Among The Ruins”, included at the end of the book is a useful bridge over this gap, helpfully explaining how Bruce melded some “wellsprings” in Marxist thought, through Hegel*, to illuminate his criticisms of the New Right. I found it useful to read Peter Lee’s piece immediately after reading the “The Making of a Patriot”. * George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1770-1831, immensely influential German philosopher. Ed.

For Country Not Queen

Jesson believed the radical movements had “absorbed the anti-intellectualism of New Zealand’s pioneering, colonial heritage.” (p120). In 1965, one of Jesson’s and Sturt’s key criticisms of the NZ Communist movement centred on its failure to properly consider the “concrete conditions” created by the British domination of New Zealand. They saw a practical contradiction between New Zealand’s dependence on Britain and the possibility of a workers’ revolution. As one could not have both at once, they argued that real independence from Britain must be the first goal. This defined a great deal of Jesson’s work for the rest of his life – to provide a New Zealand centred criticism of the status quo, and to advocate strongly for a New Zealand as an independent republic, free of both the monarchy and foreign economic and political domination.

The State in New Zealand was never designed to be a servant of the people. Instead, the relationship is defined as being between the Crown and its subjects, where the Crown remains above the law, free from the threat of criminal prosecution. The effect of this relationship between ruler and ruled is felt through the wide and arbitrary powers possessed by the Cabinet. Such powers are open to abuse, as Roger Douglas and Ruth Richardson demonstrated - in the ease at which they were able to pursue their radical Rightwing agenda in the face of majority public opposition. While Jesson, as a socialist, would be expected to oppose such an agenda, the New Right’s contempt for democracy probably offended Jesson more fundamentally as an ardent republican. So long as New Zealand remained a “constitutional monarchy” Jesson believed the country would continue to be governed on monarchic, rather than democratic lines.

Rob Revised

The book begins with one of its most fascinating slices of history, “The Demolition Of Rob Muldoon*”. Dating from September 1975, a few months before Muldoon became Prime Minister, Jesson gives expression to the fears of the Left as National looked more and more likely to win the 1975 election. At first it is surprising to see Jesson demonise Muldoon as a way-out Rightwinger who supports “unregulated capitalism” as the “best guarantee of freedom and individualism” (p40). Yet this surprise is largely due to the desperate efforts of the New Right to create a caricature of Muldoon as the last monarch of “Fortress New Zealand”. While Jesson overstated his case against Muldoon in 1975, failing to predict how disenchanted Muldoon would later become with the failed promises of the free marketers, it is possible to see why Jesson wrote about the Muldoon of 1975 in the way that he did. Robert Jones, the man who would campaign against Muldoon at the 1984 election was “refreshingly obvious” about his support for Muldoon in 1975. The Kirk Labour Government had introduced some “feeble restrictions” on the speculative property market, and Jones stood to “make an enormous killing if Muldoon is elected and lifts the restrictions” (p41). Jesson also criticised Muldoon for offering to write a foreword for a booklet, “Rape For Profit” by law student and ex-journalist Jon Bowie. The booklet also included a chapter on property investment written by Robert Jones. We would now recognise Bowie’s prescription for the economy as the radical neo-liberalism forced upon New Zealand by Douglas and Richardson – but in 1975 such views were only found, in Jesson’s words, among the “lunatic fringe”. “If Muldoon does not want to be identified as a way-out Rightwinger he should not write forewords for way-out Rightwing booklets” (p43). * Murray Horton’s obituary of Robert Muldoon is in Watchdog 71, November 1992. Ed.

It is interesting to see Jesson revisit some of this material in “Behind The Mirror Glass”, where he explains that Muldoon’s politics were widely misunderstood at the time of his election in 1975, especially among radical and liberal circles. While Jesson is usually one of the first to admit his mistakes, it is interesting that he does not include himself among the “radicals” who interpreted Muldoon’s victory as a “profound shift” to the Right. The Bowie booklet is mentioned again, but now only as one of the “odder” incidents in the careers of Robert Jones and Robert Muldoon. Jesson now characterises Muldoon as “not that Rightwing” in New Zealand terms. While Muldoon supported the Welfare State and a regulated economy, he did so as a traditionalist, aiming to maintain New Zealand as he had always known it. But with an economic policy that was both interventionist and conservative, Jesson regarded Muldoon as unable to cope with the economic volatility of the 1970s. “It has recently become fashionable to deride Muldoon for his interventionism, but that wasn’t his mistake. The trouble was that he intervened in exactly the wrong direction, in favour of farming”, at the expense of continuing to widen New Zealand’s export base (p57). Jesson characterised many of the decisions of the 1975-84 Muldoon government as arbitrary, erratic and prone to improvisation. He saw this as yet another symptom of the constitutional problem, where the autocratic character of a constitutional monarchy created the conditions for a one man Government of New Zealand. For nine long years, many identified Muldoon as that man.

Rather than allowing the free marketers to anoint Muldoon as representing the last reign of the Keynesian economic dynasty, perhaps it would be more accurate to follow Wolfgang Rosenberg and characterise Muldoon stewardship of the New Zealand economy as “inconsistent liberalisation”. In “New Zealand Can Be Different And Better”* (1993) Rosenberg characterised the policies of Muldoon from 1975 to 1984 as “gradual liberalisation of imports and foreign exchange, combined with monetary tightness as under Rogernomics and its successors” (p33). In 1976 Muldoon followed the call of the free marketers to abolish controls on interest rates, only to reinstate these controls in 1981 after interest rates had risen to usurious levels, and they were extended as part of the wage and price freeze of 1982 (BMG, p126). Rosenberg also criticised the refusal of Muldoon to tighten import and exchange controls as increasing imports caused larger balance of payment deficits. This meant that from 1975, New Zealand continually borrowed abroad to make up the shortfall. So it could be argued that Muldoon’s much criticised policy of “borrow and hope” to some extent represented a departure from Keynes’** principles, and represents a poor example of Keynesian economics in a New Zealand context. It would not be the first time the princes of the New Right excelled themselves in utilising ‘straw man’ arguments. When seen in this context, the wage and price freeze can be seen as the final act of a desperate conservative who wished for things to stay the same. *Murray Horton’s review of “New Zealand Can Be Different And Better” is in Watchdog 74, December 1993. ** John Maynard Keynes, 1993-1946, one of the giants of 20 th Century economics and the father of Keynesianism which was, and is, politically influential on a global basis. It is anathema to the New Right. Ed.

I first read “The Demolition Of Rob Muldoon” a few months after the 2005 election. I found it very interesting that many of Jesson’s characterisations of Muldoon would also apply to many other National Party leaders, including Don Brash. “Muldoon expresses transparently the feelings of the business community in a belligerent mood” (p41). “People argue about what they think he is: opponents get hysterical (liberals always get hysterical) and accuse him of fascism and racism; supporters think he is a strong man, destined to deliver us from economic depression and industrial lawlessness. The more controversy there is about him, the more his politics are obscured”(p39).

Perhaps this says more about the typical response of the Left, faced with the prospect of a National victory. As Jesson himself says in “The Lost Causes” - the candidate for Fuhrer keeps changing. Yet it does seem to be a common tactic of the Right to storm up a controversy in order to obscure some of their political goals. To give one example, no one doubts that Brash is strongly committed to continuing the New Right economic agenda, yet he gained more attention through a 2004 speech on “race relations” made to the Orewa Rotary Club. Brash does make an appearance in “To Build A Nation”, but only as the free market fundamentalist, ostracised by Muldoon and soundly beaten twice by Social Credit’s Gary Knapp in the East Coast Bays by-election of 1980 and the general election of 1981. Ironically, the Orewa Rotary Club was Muldoon’s choice for his annual “State of the Nation” speech.

Brash And That Speech

It was during the aftermath of National leader Don Brash’s “Nationhood” speech at Orewa that I found myself wishing Bruce Jesson was still with us. Brash looked back to the false security of the race relations of a generation ago, repeating Governor Hobson’s assimilationist mantra of “we are one people” and called for the abolition of the Maori seats in Parliament. He also conveniently ignored the existence of the Maori version of the Treaty, despite the fact the Maori version takes precedence in international law. During the so called “debate” that followed I believe Jesson would have been in a unique position to offer insight. In the early 1980s he closely followed the race relations debate following the 1981 Springbok Tour and the publication of Donna Awatere’s articles on “Maori Sovereignty”. In this way Bruce documented the formation of the liberal consensus that lead to the greater recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi, and the start of the historical claims process from 1985. Broadly speaking – it was this “consensus” that Brash challenged at Orewa. Perhaps Jesson’s article from Metro in June 1986 “‘Race And Identity: Looking The Other Way” gives us an idea what he might have said.

“For more than a century we smugly believed that this country was a model of racial harmony, that we were one people. Maori radicalism has put an end to that particular delusion, and we are now putting down new layers of hypocrisy. The trick is to make the minimum adjustment possible, while talking of a bi- or multi-cultural society. Many Pakeha New Zealanders resent even making the minimum adjustments. Overt racism is still quite common, as in letters to the editor that attack, not Maoris, but Maori Affairs and Maori seats in Parliament – but these things don’t have to be spelt out”.

Bruce had a huge amount of respect and empathy with Maori, whom he regarded as the original republicans in New Zealand. He recognised that the passions inflamed by the race relations debate were usually Pakeha ones, and suggested this had more to do with the Pakeha psyche than anything to do with Maori. The feelings of Pakeha New Zealand towards the relationship between Maori and Pakeha swung between guilt and resentment – Jesson saw both of these reactions as “unbalanced”. In an article published in 1995 Jesson related this directly to the lack of New Zealand sovereignty - as overseas capital pours in, we are left with less control over our own affairs, the essence of sovereignty. “It is not for us to resent Maori assertiveness. It is for us to explain why we are so pathetic about our own independence” (p298). Jesson could also see some of the weaknesses of the “liberal consensus” that emerged during the 1980s.

“There are threads of continuity running through the history of changing attitudes and the one that concerns us here is the tradition of humanitarian concern that has accompanied the history of colonial and racial oppression in New Zealand. Essentially this tradition is religious….Although it requires political involvement, the motivation this tradition is not political but moral, and has never coped adequately with political reality. Its concerns are sin and atonement. Its function has been that of the guilty conscience of Pakeha society. And it has been used retrospectively as an apology for imperialism (pp115, 116). “There was always a feeling of unreality about the Maori Sovereignty debate, because of the educated-liberal milieu that it occurred in. One of the problems of working in this milieu is its lack of seriousness. The faddism of a consumer society extends to its political causes” (p131).

One wonders if Jesson would have also returned to these themes in responding to Brash, in an attempt to place the relationship between Maori and Pakeha on a firmer grounding. This is both an intellectual and a political challenge. If even a small part of the “reaction” to Brash was generated by a feeling of some New Zealanders of being disconnected from the debate over the Treaty, it would be worth identifying if this was so. This may signal to the progressive movement that not only do we need to work to place the relationship between Maori and Pakeha on a healthier footing; we also need to improve the quality of political communication on Treaty issues.

Looking For Our National Identity

Jesson was also critical of the focus of the “protest movement” on “overseas issues” such as Vietnam and South Africa, issues he saw as only appealing to an educated minority with a liberal and Christian conscience. He warned that the Left could find itself distracted away from the big questions by “liberal” causes such as conservation and nuclear ship visits. He also remarked on the tendency of these issues to build the Labour Party instead of strengthening the Left. This may be an expression of Jesson’s disappointment of the failure of the New Zealand Left to take up the issues he saw as more important – republicanism and forming a challenge to the dominant Rightwing vision of New Zealand’s future. While he is right to warn the Left not to get distracted from its larger aims, I think Jesson underestimates the degree to which some of these issues have contributed to a more independent identity for New Zealand. The ban on nuclear ship visits led to New Zealand being freed of the neo-colonial trappings of the 1950s’ vintage ANZUS Treaty (a military alliance with the US and Australia), and the nuclear policy is now a cornerstone of a more independent foreign policy. For a country unsure of its own identity, perhaps it is appropriate for us to begin by looking for our reflection in offshore seas.

While Jesson recognised that New Zealanders are not a belligerently nationalist people, he believed low-key support existed for the development of a distinct New Zealand identity (p236). In December 1991 he wrote that: “Neither the (National) government nor the Labour opposition has any commitment to an independent New Zealand. Their free market policies forbid it. The Government would need to intervene in and regulate the economy to some degree if it wanted an independent role for New Zealand” (ibid.). Perhaps the notional discussion of national identity surrounding the 2006 Budget would have interested Jesson. While such talk was of little substance, it did demonstrate how Labour is now attempting to harness the desire for a low-key national identity to hide the fact that it is not prepared to challenge the free market economy inherited from Roger Douglas. While civil unions and the decriminalisation of prostitution represent vital and important social progress - assisted by a great deal of activism among the Left – these are safe issues for sections of the Labour Party precisely because they do not represent a challenge to Labour’s closet neo-liberals. While I feel I must restate that these issues are important, did they serve to distract the Left from challenging Labour’s economic agenda? The nuclear issue certainly served this function for the 1984-90 fourth Labour government.

In his “Afterword” Peter Lee makes some interesting links between the double-edged nature of progress, as expressed by the Frankfurt School Marxist Walter Benjamin *, and the Maori concept of time. He reminds us of Jesson’s explanation that: “The Maori people have a different attitude to the past and their tenacity in constantly reminding us of the Treaty of Waitangi has taught us that the past is a political issue”. For Lee, nowhere is this made clearer than in “the formation of the Maori Party in response to the foreshore and seabed debate initiated by the shifty moves of the Labour Party” (p363). He recalls a day out fishing with Bruce, where Jesson identified the Maori as the first republicans in this country, as they had fought wars of independence against the British. Lee believes the Maori Party has a chance to lead the debate on republicanism in Parliament. There are already some encouraging signs of this. In response to the last Budget, the Maori Party Co-Leader, Pita Sharples, questioned the substance of Labour’s talk of national identity. “If we are truly to develop a rich and sustainable national identity we need to understand the meaning of Treaty justice. Every New Zealander has the right to understand the history that shapes our present. A history which talks about colonisation, assimilation, and self-determination as well” ( http://www.maoriparty.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=298&Itemid=28) * Walter Benjamin, 1892-1940, a leading member of the Frankfurt School, a group of researchers associated with the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt am Main, Gemany, who applied Marxism to a radical interdisciplinary social theory. Ed.

It is likely Jesson would have welcomed such discussion of national identity, as well as the Maori Party’s opposition to the Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership (otherwise known as the P4)* on the grounds the trade treaty effectively signed away a managed approach to economic development. However, it also would have been interesting to see what Jesson would have made of the decision of three of the four Maori Party MPs, in March 2006, to support the Bill of National MP, Wayne Mapp, that aims to remove legislative protection for workers in the first 90 days of employment ( Hone Harawira MP was the honourable exception). Following the election in 2005, the Maori Party Co-Leader, Tariana Turia, openly considered a post- election deal with National, and spoke at the Act National Conference where she stressed the similarities between her party and Act on issues such as the seabed and foreshore and welfare “reform”, calling on welfare to be decentralised and all those receiving a benefit being required to work (Dominion Post, 27/3/06, “Maori Party gets in on the Act”, Vernon Small). There are clear contradictions between the recent decisions of the Maori Party leadership and the position of those whom they claim to represent. For example, the 90 day bill will lead to greater casualisation in the employment of low-skilled Maori. If a job does not require a great deal of training many bosses will find it more convenient easier to “fire” someone after 89 days, and offer someone else the opportunity to have no employment rights for three months. * Jane Kelsey’s submission on the P4 Treaty is in Watchdog 111, April 2006, which can be read online at http://www.converge.org.nz/watchdog/11/09.htm. Ed.

Building An Independent Left

Jesson spoke of himself as a part of the “independent Left”, made up of those critical of capitalism but not a member of the Labour Party or involved in the sectarian Communist scene. He regularly called for this group to develop the capacity to intervene in the political debates shaping New Zealand’s future. “It can probably be taken for granted that the Communist groups are too out of touch, too insensitive to the feelings of their fellow New Zealanders, to break out of their isolation. If there is to be a political initiative from the Left, it will have to come from those of us who are demoralised, unorganised – and independent” (p86).

According to Jesson this does not require more political organisation or activism, but a political-intellectual effort to create a counterweight to Rightwing “think tanks” such as the Business Roundtable. A Leftwing think tank, in other words. It does seem remarkable that the Left is currently in a similar position to that described by Jesson in 1981, particularly following the exit of the Alliance from Parliament in 2002. Perhaps there is some consolation in this. The Left are still asking many of the same questions, particularly regarding the leftness (or not) of the Labour Party. On this question Jesson’s views remain remarkably consistent, whether he is talking of the last days of the 1972-75 Kirk government or Labour’s time in opposition following its defeat in 1990. In “Looking At The Labour Party: Where Have All The Workers Gone?”. in September 1983, Jesson looked at some of the choices facing those who wished to be politically active among the Left.

“Many radicals find substitutes for effective political involvement in the unions, and in the Communist sects where they aggregate their impotence. Others drift towards the Labour Party, either as individuals or groups (the former Socialist Action League), in search of a realistic political vehicle for their liberal and humanitarian aims. Then they find themselves in a project that is doubly reformist – reforming the Labour Party in the hope it will become a reformist party. This blurring between Labour and radicalism in New Zealand means there is an immediate need for an uncompromising Leftwing critique of the Labour Party” (p119).

Jesson wrote the following in December 1991: “Some gullible people in union and liberal circles still believe that Labour is reformable and that it might shift back to the Left. However this would be a bad thing in itself as would again demonstrate once again Labour is a party of expediency with no firm principles of either Left or Right” (p240). One would imagine that Jesson would say similar things about the Labour Party of today, particularly after it formed a coalition with NZ First and United Future after the 2005 election. Given the Cabinet posts gifted to Winston Peters and Peter Dunne, it would be difficult to find an independent constitutional lawyer who did not quietly maintain that a “coalition” is what we have got.

In the same article from September 1983, nearly a year before the pivotal 1984 election, Jesson predicted Labour would lurch to the right in Government. Yet like many he did not predict the extent. “Under Lange, Labour has sharpened its economic act considerably but at the cost of a definite move to the Right. Labour’s economic criticisms of Muldoon come right from the textbook….Labour is committed to a Rightwing course when it gains power, simply by having accepted the terms of the economic debate that dominates New Zealand politics” (p128).

While “To Build A Nation” includes a lot of material about the fourth Labour government from 1984-1990 and some discussion of Labour’s difficulties in its first two terms in Opposition from 1990, but later articles only mention Labour in passing. I would have liked to have seen Jesson’s “Labour In Waiting: Third Ways On Limited Means” from the December 1998 edition of NZ Political Review included in the book, especially as it is now an engaging read after two and a bit terms of a so called “Third Way” government.

Jesson Predicts The Employment Contracts Act

One of the most fascinating aspects of “To Build A Nation” is Jesson’s uncanny ability to make predictions that turn out to be remarkably accurate. Few similar journalistic endeavours would hold up so well to the harsh glare of hindsight. That said, he gets a few things wrong too. Encouraged by Winston Peters’ efforts in the mid-1990s to expose the fraudulent corporate tax scams at the heart of the Winebox Inquiry, Jesson became very enamoured with New Zealand First in the early half of 1996, and failed to predict that Peters would spurn Labour to form a coalition with National in that year’s election. In “The Jester Steals The Crown” (February 1997) Jesson freely admits his mistake, and predicts the National-NZ First government will end in tears. That prediction turns out to be accurate.

“To Build A Nation” also includes some fascinating assessments of the character and possible motivations of key political actors. In an article published in Metro, in February 1984, Jesson assesses the character and the prejudices of National’s Minister of Labour, Jim Bolger, then in the process of pushing through voluntary unionism under the Industrial Law Reform Bill. “When voluntary unionism was being publicly debated last year, National MPs dismissed any suggestion it was an exercise in union bashing. Of course it is. In the redneck strongholds of the National Party, in the hinterland of Taranaki where Bolger grew up and in the King Country where he has spent his adult life, there is a fierce – and quite understandable – antipathy to unions. Farmers are conscious of their status as men of property, they are suspicious of any hint of urban militancy or radicalism, and they have an obvious interest in keeping wages and costs as low as possible. Bolger wouldn’t be representing his constituents properly if he didn’t express their anti-union prejudices” (p137).

Jesson picks up a similar theme in July 1985 while examining the briefing provided by Treasury to the incoming Labour government in 1984. He recognised that the unfolding logic of the free market approach advocated by Treasury would also have to apply to the most basic market of all; for labour. “This is one issue a Labour government will have problems dealing to, but it mightn’t matter because there is a political logic operating here. A one-term Labour government deals with the sectors such as farming, that National can’t touch. And then National returns as the natural governing party, and completes the process by devastating the union movement” (p160).

In the scope of these two articles in 1984 and 1985, Jesson predicted the philosophical thrust of the union busting Employment Contracts Act of 1991, a piece of legislation strongly supported by Jim Bolger as Prime Minister. In his 1998 memoirs, “A View From The Top”, Bolger reveals that National drafted key parts of the Employment Contracts Act long before the 1990 victory. To enact the legislation Bolger turned to “someone in whose skill and determination I had absolute faith. Bill Birch was that person” (p53). For Bolger, the Employment Contracts Act was a personal crusade.

Jesson On The Alliance

Jesson wrote enthusiastically at the formation of the Alliance in the early 1990s, but at the same time he sounded warnings that now, in retrospect, have a lot of resonance. While the Alliance benefited in the early years from the desperation and disillusionment with the Labour party, Jesson saw a problem if the Alliance failed to define itself by more than just a mood. He called on people to join one of the Alliance parties in order to provide it with the basis to state its political beliefs more strongly.

Personally I think it would be more accurate to say that there were people in the Alliance at the time capable of articulating such a vision, but conservative elements within the party prevented it from being expressed. The structure of the five constituent parties* made it easier to agree on what the Alliance ought to oppose, rather than clear statements of what the party ought to stand for. It was unfortunate that this flaw was not remedied earlier, as this stance became particularly difficult to maintain as a minority coalition partner between 1999 and 2002, a graveyard of many a political brand that failed to state itself clearly. * The Alliance’s five constituent parties were: New Labour, Greens, Democrats, Mana Motuhake and the Liberals. Ed.

In his introduction to the section “Making A Future” Sharp refers to the impact of an article by Jesson in the March-April 1996 edition of NZ Political Review, where he raised alarm over the lack of internal democracy in the Alliance. As long as the power of the constituent parties remained, Jesson recognised that New Labour Party (NLP) would be at a disadvantage. The leaders of the other small parties would enter Parliament on the backs of the New Labour activists, and Jesson doubted the Alliance would be stable once the “careerists” became MPs. He also criticised the leadership of the NLP for attempting to dominate the Alliance. At the time, the Alliance leadership regarded “United We Fall” as “treasonous”. Their mood probably was not helped by Jesson’s more sympathetic treatment of New Zealand First in a couple of pieces published in the first half of 1996. Yet despite the introduction by Sharp, “United We Fall” is missing from “To Build A Nation”. I think this is a pity, especially as “United We Fall” includes the sort of discussion regularly withheld from public view.

Perhaps it was a little idealistic for Jesson to later claim that the critique was just a dispassionate exercise in journalism, given that he was a former Alliance local body politician (maybe that applies to former Alliance Parliamentary researchers like me as well!). While Jesson was probably overly unkind to some of the key Alliance players, particularly those among the NLP who were aiming to democratise the Alliance, it is obvious the article was motivated by love of the game and the desperate thought of one of his favourite teams going down. While Jesson freely admitted in the article to some exaggeration, his overall message of the need to maintain internal party democracy and structures that engineer trust remains relevant and worthwhile. As it turned out the Alliance was one of the least stable parties during the first MMP parliament, with MPs Frank Grover and Alamein Kopu and the Greens leaving to start their own parties (the Greens with more honour). Jesson makes one particular observation in “United We Fall”’ that now seems very relevant to Jim Anderton’s own party-hopping escapade in 2002 (when he quit the Alliance and founded the Progressives, of which he is currently the Leader and sole MP): “Jim Anderton’s toughness created a political force to the Left of Labour, but his personal limitations crippled it”.

Perhaps Jesson’s caution to the Alliance in 1992, where he warned that a “mood is an insubstantial basis for a political movement” (p240), now applies to the Maori Party, as the foreshore and seabed issue moves from a raging fire to a long burning ember. In many ways the Maori Party has got it worse. Despite being in existence for over two years the Party has few concrete policies, making it very difficult for anyone, let alone its supporters, to predict which way the MPs will vote as issues come up in Parliament.

A Notable NZ Philosopher

Given the high degree of focus Jesson gave to philosophical concerns that underlay the issues that he discussed, I think it would be fair to recognise him also as a notable New Zealand philosopher. It is possible to see Jesson as part of a broader intellectual tradition of critical rationalism that derives from Immanuel Kant* and Karl Marx’s use of the term “critique”. Hegel followed Kant, and introduced a historical turn later developed by Marx. The work of the Hungarian Marxist George Lukács and the Frankfurt school of Western Marxists also acted as important influences on Jesson coming to describe himself as a “Hegelian”. While Trotter’s comparison of Jesson with Chomsky may at first seem a touching tribute to a friend, it is worth noting that Noam Chomsky has also been described as a critical rationalist. * Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804, one of the giants of philosophy. Ed.

The Bruce Jesson Foundation ought to be congratulated for making more of Jesson’s work available – let us hope there is yet more to come. If you are looking for something more substantial than a newspaper to read while on public transport, the short yet always thoughtful articles of “To Build A Nation” are a perfect fit for those early morning journeys.