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Issue Number 29/30, May 2008
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Kapatiran Issue
No. 29/30, May 2008
“AN ACCEPTABLE PRESENCE”: The New US
Basing Structure In The Philippines
- Herbert Docena
This article came complete with 64 footnotes, which
filled several pages by themselves. If you would like a
copy of the complete article contact PSNA at
cafca@chch.planet.org.nz and we will send it to you as a
Word attachment.
Herbert Docena (herbert@focusweb.org) is a researcher
with Focus on the Global South, a policy research
institute.
In 1991 the Philippine Senate made the historic vote to
shut down what American analysts once described as
“probably the most important ba-sing complex in the
world” -- the US military bases in Subic and Clark,
along with other smaller support and communications
facilities in the country. Taken after long and
emo-tional debates, the Senate vote shook the
Philippines’ relations with its most important ally.
That one small and weak country could say no to what by
then had become the world’s only remaining
superpower reverberated across the globe.
Since then, every move by the US military in the
Philippines has provoked controversy. For the most part,
however, the question has ten-ded to be framed in terms
of whether the US is seeking to re-establish the kind of
bases it had in the past. Such framing has consequently
allowed the US and Philippine governments to
categorically deny any such plans. But what has since
emerged is not a return to the past but a new and
dif-ferent kind of basing.
Global Posture
Since the end of the Cold War, but in a process that has
accelerated since the Bush Administration came to office,
the United States has em-barked on what American
officials tout as the most radical reconfiguration since
World War II of its “global defence posture”.
This term no longer refers simply to the over 850
physical bases and installations that the US now
maintains in around 46 countries around the world. As US
Defense Undersecretary for Policy, Douglas J Feith,
explained: “We are not talking only about basing,
we’re talking about the ability of our forces to
operate when and where they are needed”.
Billed as the “Integrated Global Presence and Basing
Strategy,” the plan seeks to comprehensively
transform the US overseas military presence –
largely unchanged since the 1950s – in light of
perceived new threats and the US’ self-avowed
“grand strategy” of perpetuating its status as
the world’s only military superpower. “The [US]
military,” declared President Bush, “must be
ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark
corner of the world”. To do this, the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), an official do-cument
required by the US Congress of the Pentagon to articulate
US military strategy, states that the US is seeking to
move away from “obsolete Cold War garrisons” to
“mobile, expeditionary operations”.
Reduced Footprint
The plan is simple: Instead of concentrating its troops
and equipment in only a few locations, the United States
will decrease the number of large well-equipped bases and
increase the number of smaller, simpler bases in more
locations. Marine General James Jones, Commander of US
forces in Europe, des-cribed the aim as developing a
“family of bases” that could go “from cold
to warm to hot if you need them” but without having
the “small town USA”-feel, complete with
schools and families that have typically come with such
bases.
Recognition of the rising opposition to the US military
presence around the world is also driving these changes.
As early as in 1988, a US Government commission created
during the Reagan Administration concluded that: “We
have found it increasingly difficult, and politically
costly to maintain bases”. Apart from those in the
Philippines, US bases have been closed or terminated in
recent years in Puerto Rico, Panama, and recently
Ecuador, as a result of public mobilisations. Turkey
refused to allow the US to use its bases for the 2003
invasion in Iraq. Even in Japan and South Korea,
hostility to bases has been growing.
Hence, the US has been trying to restructure its overseas
presence in a way that aims to undermine this growing
opposition. As US Navy Rear Admiral Richard Hunt, the
Joint Staff’s Deputy Director for Strategy and
Policy, said: “We don’t want to be stepping all
over our host nations … We want to exist in a very
non-intrusive way”. The aim, according to the
Pentagon, is to “reduce the forward footprint”
of the military while increasing its agility and
flexibility.
Mission Presence
As part of this over-all reconfiguration, the Pentagon
now categorises its overseas structures into three: Main
Operating Bases (MOBs), Forward Operating Sites (FOSs),
and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs - see sidebar).
FOSs and CSLs are also called “lily pads”
intended to allow the US to hop from MOBs to their
destinations rapidly when needed but without requiring a
lot of resources to keep them running when not needed.
Referring to this kind of base, Gene-ral Jones said:
“We could use it for six months, turn off the
lights, and go to another base if we need to”.
But, as mentioned earlier, the US definition of
“global posture” goes way beyond physical
structures. In an effort to maximise its forward presence
while minimising op-position, the US has also been
seeking to increase what US Air Force-sponsored analysts
call “mission presence” and “limited
access”. “Mission presence” is what the US
has in countries where there are ongoing military
missions which “lack the breadth and capability to
qualify as true forward presence but nonetheless
contribute to the overall US posture abroad”.
“Limited access” is the kind the United States
gets through exercises, visits, and other operations.
Hence, the US’ global posture encompasses, by
definition, not just those who are
“forward-based,” or those units that are
stationed in foreign countries on a long-term basis such
as troops in South Korea and Japan, but also those who
are “forward-deployed,” or those who are sent
overseas to conduct various kinds of deployments,
exercises, or operations.
The Greatest Potential To Compete
If, in the Cold War, the US’ overseas presence
targeted the former Soviet Union and other Communist and
nationalist forces in the Third World, today, the
US’ current “global posture” is aimed at
any state or non-state forces perceived to be threatening
the interests of the United States.
“Terrorists” stand in the line of fire.
Regional powers hostile to the United States, such as
Iran and North Korea, have also been singled out. But, in
light of the United States’ self-declared grand
strategy of preventing the rise of rivals who could
threaten its pre-eminent status, one rising power is now
clearly in its sights – China.
For years, American officials have been divided between
those who believe that China could be a “strategic
partner” to be engaged and those who believe that it
is a “strategic competitor” to be confronted
militarily before it grows more po-werful. Since the end
of the Cold War, indications are that the latter view has
prevailed. As early as 1997, the Pentagon’s QDR had
al-ready identified China, along with Russia, as possible
“global peer competitors”. In 1999, a pivotal
Pentagon think tank conducted a seminar to lay down all
the likely scenarios involving China. Its con-clusion: no
matter what happens, China’s rise will not be
“peaceful” for the US.
In 2000, a US Air Force-funded study argued explicitly in
favour of pre-venting China’s rise. Also in the same
year, Robert Kagan and William Kristol, two influential
com-mentators whose ideas have evidently moulded US
policy, pro-posed that Beijing – along with Baghdad
– should be targeted for “regime-change”.
The Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a
grouping whose members and proposals have since staffed
and shaped the Bush Administration and its policies,
supported the same aims and made similar recommendations.
During the 2000 US Presidential election campaign George
Bush distinguished himself from other candidates by
singling out China as a “strategic competitor”.
Since then, various officials have successively warned
that China’s military modernisation constitutes a
direct threat to the United States.
The Pentagon’s 2006 official report to Congress on
China stated: “China’s military expansion is
already such as to alter regional military
balances”. If in 2001 the QDR was still vaguely
worded, by 2006, when the next QDR was released, the
assessment became more explicit: “Of the major and
emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to
compete militarily with the United States…”.
Moving To Southeast Asia
The problem for the US is its relatively weak presence in
Asia. As a Pentagon report on China, whose conclusions
have been widely echoed, warned: “Lack of forward
operating bases or cooperative allies greatly limits the
range of US military responses…”. What the US
does have in terms of presence is now believed to be
concentrated in the wrong place. Since the 1950s, the
bulk of the US forward presence in Asia has been in South
Korea and Japan, directed towards the former Soviet Union
and North Korea. To address this, the US has been seeking
expand south-wards – to South-east Asia.
By early 2002, the US began negotiating with va-rious
governments in Southeast Asia for use of bases in the
region. In 2003, the then US Pacific Command (PACOM)
Chief, Admiral Thomas B Fargo, stated: “Power
projection and contingency response in Southeast Asia in
the future will depend on this network of US access in
areas with little or no permanent American basing
structure”. Along with the plans for East Asia and
Southeast Asia, the US had also established bases to the
west of China, in Central Asia, with new installations in
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. While it had none before the
2001 invasion of Afghanistan, by 2002 it had access to
over a dozen bases in the region.
With the US forward presence northeast of China (in Japan
and South Korea), the deepening cooperation with Mongolia
to China’s north, and its deepening alliance with
India, to China’s southwest, the United States is
slowly encircling China from all sides. It is in light of
these large, sweeping changes in US strategy, its
perception of threats, and its tactics, that US military
objectives regarding the Philippines can be best
understood.
In The Dragon’s Lair
Since the late 1990s, a chorus of American defence
analysts, military officials, civilian leaders, and
influential commentators have identified the Philippines
as playing a critical role in the US’ global posture
and a succession of studies sponsored for different US
military services have singled it out for its strategic
location. The PNAC, for example, had proposed that the US
Navy should establish a homeport while the US Air Force
(USAF) should station a wing in the Philippines. Another
study for the USAF noted the Philippines is located
firmly within what US strategists have called the
“dragon’s lair” or those areas of the
Western Pacific where China could potentially seek to
prevent the US from deploying. Another USAF-funded study
to develop a “global access strategy” for the
USAF proposed renting an island from the Philippines for
use as a military base.
A 2006 USAF-funded study evaluating basing options for
storing and prepositioning US’ war material included
the Philippines as among the most desirable sites.
Exploring different alternatives, a US Army-sponsored
research identified the Philip-pines as one of the
suitable locations for a new unit of the Army. Although
proposals made by military analysts do not necessarily
translate into action, it is clear that a consensus has
been building that “[A]ccess to Phi-lippine
facilities is much more important than most judged 12
years ago”.
The Appearance Of Bases
One obstacle however remains: domestic opposition to US
military presence in the Philippines. As yet another
USAF-funded study ack-nowledges: “On the matter of
US access to military facilities in the Philippines, the
general view of Philippine security experts is that for
domestic political reasons it would be difficult to give
the appearance that the United States is re-establishing
its bases in the Philippines”. Hence, the aim has
been to avoid giving this appearance. As Admiral Dennis
Blair, former Commander of the US Pacific Command,
explained: “[W]e are adapting our plans and
cooperation of the past to the future. Those plans do not
include any request by the United States for bases in the
Philippines of the kind that we have had in the
past” [italics added].
“Our basic interest,” explained for-mer US
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, “is to have
the ability to go into a country and have a rela-tionship
and have understandings about our ability to land or
overfly and to do things that are of mutual benefit to
each of us. But we don't have any particular plans for
permanent bases if that's the kind of thing you
mean…”.. Thus, instead of “the kind of
bases we had in the past”, the US is trying
something new.
Training For Access
First, the US has stepped up deploying troops, ships, and
equipment to the country ostensibly for training
exercises, humanitarian and engineering projects, and
other missions. Though the Visiting Forces Agreement was
approved in 1998, it was only in 2001 that the number and
the size of troops involved in training exercises jumped
significantly. In 2006 alone, up to 37 exercises were
scheduled; up from around 24 in the preceding years. As
many as 5,000 US troops are in-volved, depending on the
exercise. As a result of these continuing deployments,
former US Ambassador to the Philippines, Francis
Ricciardone, has described the US presence in the country
as “semi-continuous”.
Apart from training allied troops, the holding of joint
exercises allows the US to gain temporary – but
repeated and regular – access to the ter-ritories of
countries in which the exercises are held. As former US
PACOM head Admiral Thomas Fargo noted in March 2003:
“The habitual relationships built through exercises
and training… is our biggest guarantor of access in
time of need”. He said: “Access over time can
develop into habitual use of certain facilities by
deployed US for-ces with the eventual goal of being
guaranteed use in a crisis, or per-mission to
pre-position logistics stocks and other critical material
in strategic forward locations”.
As US troops come and go in rotation for frequent and
regular exercises, their presence – when taken
together – makes up a formi-dable forward presence
that brings them closer to areas of possible action
without need for huge infrastructure to support them and
without inciting a lot of public attention and
opposition. As analyst Eric Peltz has told the US House
Armed Services Committee: “Other methods of
positioning, such as training rotations, can provide a
temporary ‘forward position’ or sus-tain a
long-term position without permanent forward unit
basing”.
And as US troops depart, they leave behind the
infrastructure that they had built and used ostensibly
for the exercises and which could still be of use to the
US military in the future for missions different from
those for which they were initially built. In General
Santos City, on the major southern island of Mindanao,
for example, the US constructed a deepwater port and one
of the most modern domestic airports in the country,
connected to each other by one of the country’s best
roads. In Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, on the main
island of Luzon, where US troops routinely go for
exercises, the airport has been renovated and its runway
strengthened to carry the weight of C-130 planes. On the
far south Muslim islands of Basilan and Sulu, venues of
Balikatan (“Shoulder To Shoulder”) exercises
with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the US, through
USAID, has also built roads and ports that can berth huge
ships.
This is consistent with a USAF-funded study which
recommended having more deployments to have more
infrastructure. By increasing deployments, notes the
study, the US can get into arrangements that
“include measures to tailor local infrastructure to
USAF operations by extending runways, improving air
traffic control facilities, repairing parking aprons and
the like”. Along with troops, an increasing number
of ships have also been entering the country with growing
frequency ostensibly for exercises and huma-nitarian
missions. “[T]he Navy counts those ships as
providing overseas presence full time, even when they are
training or simply tied up at the pier,” said the US
Congressional Budget Office.
As has been discussed earlier, the US sees these regular
and frequent “temporary” deployments as part of
its global “posture.” As the US National
Defense Strategy states: “Our posture also includes
the many mili-tary activities in which we engage around
the world. This means not only our physical presence in
key re-gions, but also our training, exercises, and
operations”.
Base Services Without Permanent Basing
Second, the US has obliged the Philippines to provide it
with a broad range of locally-provided services that
would enable it to launch and sustain operations from the
Philippines when necessary. In Sep-tember 2001, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo granted the US free access to its
ports and offered it overflight rights. In November 2002,
the US and Philippine governments signed the Mutual
Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) which has been
described by researchers with the US Congressional
Research Service as “allowing the United States to
use the Philippines as a supply base for military
operations throughout the region”.
The MLSA obliges the Philippine government to exert
“best efforts” to provide the US logistics
supplies, support and services during exer-cises,
training, operations, and other US military deployments.
The Agreement defines these to include food, water,
petroleum, oils, clothing, ammunition, spare parts and
components, billeting, transportation, communication,
medical services, operation support, training services,
repair and maintenance, storage services, and port
services. “Construction and use of temporary
structures” is also covered.
In other words, the MLSA gives the US access to the full
range of services that the US military would require to
operate in and from the country. Through the MLSA, the US
has secured for itself the services that it would
normally be able to provide itself inside a large
permanent base but without constructing and retaining
large permanent bases – and without incurring the
costs and the political problems that such bases pose.
Cooperative Security Locations
Third, the US has established in the Philippines a new
category of military installations it calls
“Cooperative Security Locations” (CSLs). In
August 2005, the Overseas Basing Commission, the official
commission tasked to review US basing, categorically
identified the Philippines as one of the countries where
CSLs are being developed by the United States in the
region. As mentioned earlier, CSLs is a new category of
bases that refers to facilities owned by host-governments
but are to be made available for use by the US military
as needed.
The Philippine government has not disclosed the locations
and other details about these CSLs. But the description
by Robert Kaplan, a prominent American journalist and
best-selling author who has visited such facilities
around the world, is quoted here in full because of the
dearth of information about them and because parts of it
could be describing the Philippines:
“A cooperative security location can be a tucked
away corner of a host country's civilian airport, or a
dirt runway somewhere with fuel and mechanical help
nearby, or a military airport in a friendly country with
which we have no formal basing agreement but, rather, an
informal arrangement with private contractors acting as
go-betweens… The United States provides aid to
upgrade maintenance facilities, thereby helping the host
country to better project its own air and naval power in
the region. At the same time, we hold periodic exercises
with the host country's military, in which the base is a
focus. We also offer humanitarian help to the surrounding
area. Such civil affairs projects garner positive
publicity for our military in the local media…The
result is a positive diplomatic context for getting the
host country's approval for use of the base when and if
we need it”.
The terms of the MLSA and the establishment of CSLs
reflect the US’ increasing emphasis on just-in-time
logistics support and pre-positioning of equipment to
ensure that US forces – dispersed as they are to be
around the world, often far away from main bases where
they store equipment and use all kinds of services –
are always ready and on the go. Therefore, it is not so
much the size of the base that matters but whether it can
provide the US military with what it needs, when
it’s needed.
As the Council on Foreign Relations points out:
“While host nation support often carries the
connotation of basing, its role of staging and access is
perhaps more critical. Sup-port for port visits, ship
repairs, over-flight rights, training areas, and
op-portunities, and areas to marshal, stage, repair, and
resupply are no less important for both daily US presence
in the region and for rapid and flexible crisis
response”.
Forward Operating Base
Fourth, the US has succeeded in indefinitely stationing a
US military unit in the country. Since 2002, a unit now
called the Joint Special Operations Task
Force-Philippines (JSOTFP) has been deployed to the
southern Philippines. While initially presented as being
part of on-again off-again temporary training exer-cises,
it has since been revealed that this unit has maintained
its presence in the country continuously since 2002.
With the Philippine government not giving a definite exit
date, and with US officials stating that this unit will
stay on as long as they are allowed by the Government, it
is presumed that it will continue to be based in the
Philippines for the long haul. The unit is headquartered
in the Philippine military’s Camp Navarro in
Zamboanga City, southern Mindanao but its “area of
operations,” according to a US military
publiccation, spans 8,000 square miles, covering the
entire island of Mindanao and its surrounding islands and
seas.
According to a comprehensive compilation of various media
reports, the number of troops belonging to the unit has
ranged between 100 and 450 but it is not clear what the
actual total is for a specific period. It varies
“depending on the season and the mission,” said
US Lieutenant Colonel Mark Zimmer, JSOTF-P Public Affairs
Officer. When it was publicly revealed in August 2007
that the US Department of Defense, via a US military
construction unit, had granted a contract to a company
providing “base operations support” for the
JSOTF-P, the US Embassy admitted that US was setting up
allegedly “temporary” structures for
“medical, logistical, administrative services”
and facilities for “for them to eat, sleep and
work”. The Philippines’ own Visiting Forces
Commission also confirmed that the US maintains
“living quarters” and stocks supplies inside
Philippine mili-tary camps.
For The Containment Of China
Referring to their bases in Mindanao as “forward
operating base-11” and “advanced operating
base-921,” the JSOTF-P corresponds to what a US Air
Force-sponsored study described as the ongoing
“redefinition of what forward presence means”.
In terms of profile and mission, the JSOTF-P is similar
to the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa
(CJTF-Horn of Africa) which was established in Djibouti
in eastern Africa in 2003, also composed mostly of
Special Forces, and which has been des-cribed as a sample
of the US austere basing template and the “model for
future US military ope-rations”.
Indeed, more deployments similar to that of the JSOTF-P
and CJTF-Horn of Africa are planned in other loca-tions
around the world in the future. In 2004, the former PACOM
Commander, Thomas Fargo, talked about expanding Special
Operations Forces in the Pacific. Apparently referring to
the JSOTF-P, the former Defense Secretary, Donald
Rumsfeld, had also announced that the Pentagon would
establish more “nodes for special operations
forces”.
“In place of traditional overseas bases with
extensive infrastructure,” Rumsfeld said, “we
intend to use smaller forward operating bases with
pre-positioned equipment and rotational presence of
personnel… We will maintain a smaller forward
presence force in the Pacific while also stationing
agile, expeditionary forces capable of rapid responses at
our power projection bases”.
The JSOFT-P’s characteristics fit this description.
Modest and austere, the JSOTF-P has none of the
exten-sive infrastructure and facilities of the former US
bases in Subic and Clark. But with the availability of
local logistics and other services as-sured, the free
entry of ships and planes and the pre-positioning of
equipment allowed, and with the new roads, ports, and
other infrastructure the US has been building in the
area, the US Special Forces will be ready and able at a
moment’s notice to launch and sustain its operations
in the region.
As evidenced by the fact that most Filipinos are not even
aware of their presence and their actions, “the
JSOTF had succeeded,” notes Kap-lan, “as a
political mechanism for getting an American base-of-sorts
up and running…”. CH Briscoe, Com-mand
Historian of the US Army Special Operations Command,
under which the units of the JSOTF-P belong, concurs:
“After more than ten years, PACOM has reestablished
an acceptable presence in the Philippines…”
[italics added]. Strategically positioned between two
routes at the entrance of a major sea lane, the Makassar
Strait, at the southwestern rim of the South China Sea
and closer to Malaysia and Indonesia than most of the
rest of the Philippines, the JSOTF-P, according to
Briscoe, is “now better able to monitor the pulse of
the region”.
Having secured this presence, the US has become closer to
the country with “the greatest potential to compete
militarily” with it. By getting the US
“semi-permanently” based south of Luzon for the
first time since World War II, Kaplan notes that
“the larger-than-necessary base complex” in
Zamboanga has delivered more than tactical benefits. In
the minds of the US Army strategists, Kaplan notes:
“Combating Islamic terrorism in this region
[Southeast Asia] carried a secondary benefit for the
United States: it posi-tioned the US for the future
contain-ment of nearby China”.
Qualitatively Transformed
All of the steps discussed above have paved the way for
the gradual and incremental reentry of the US military to
the Philippines. At no time, since 1991, has the US
military presence been more entrenched. At the same time,
this presence is no longer the same; it has been
qualitatively transformed. No longer are US troops
permanently stationed and confined inside large bases in
two locations in the country. Drawn instead from
rotational forces, the troops have been deploying in
various locations all over the country for exercises and
other missions. Instead of being massed in the thousands
inside huge fortifications flying the US flag, they are
in the hundreds, dispersed and housed in-side camps that
technically belong to the Philippine military.
In the past, US troops could, despite the occasional
deployment, expect to stay for long periods of time,
stationed in the same base for years. Now, they are to be
always ready and on the move, prepared to take part in
shorter but more frequent deployments overseas. Before,
they stored their equipment, weapons, and supplies in
huge storerooms and warehouses inside their base complex
at all times, ready to lift and carry them wherever they
went; now, they are scattering and storing their
equipment and supplies in various locations, guarded and
maintained by host nation governments or pri-vate
companies, and ready to be picked up on the way to the
fighting. All these changes in the Philippines are driven
by the overlapping goals of building up support for and
countering domestic opposition to US presence while
improving the agility and efficiency of the US military.
Trial Balloons
But this too could change: for while large bases have
their disadvantages, they also provide the guaranteed
access, capacities, and other advantages that smaller
more austere bases cannot. Also, while the kind of basing
that the US is developing now can be useful for certain
scenarios, they may not be appropriate and sufficient for
others. In case of a long drawn-out standoff, for
instance, it would take more than 500 Special Forces
stationed in relatively simple bases to sustain US
military operations.
Hence, given the right moment and given the need, if
plans are not in fact afoot, the US may still want to
re-establish larger bases in the Philippines. Given US
strategy and the Philippines’ location, the
possibility cannot be ruled out. Indeed, the frequent
reports that the US is trying to reestablish bases in the
country have been characterised by an analyst with the
Brookings Institute as “trial balloons” to test
the atmosphere.
For the moment, however, it cannot be said that just
because the US does not have large bases of the kind it
used to have, the US has not been securing its military
objectives in the country. Through the back door and
largely out of sight, the US has gradually but
incrementally reintegrated the Philippines firmly within
its “global posture”. All these may have
effectively reversed that historic decision, taken in
1991, to end nearly a century of US military presence in
the country.
CATEGORIES OF US OVERSEAS MILITARY STRUCTURES
Main Operating Bases (MOB) are those relatively larger
installations and facilities located in the territory of
reliable allies, with vast infrastructure and family
support facilities that will serve as the hub of
operations in support of smaller, more austere bases;
examples are the Ramstein Air Base in Germany, the Kadena
Air Base in Okinawa, Japan and Camp Humphreys in South
Korea
Forward Operating Sites (FOS) are smaller, more spare
bases that could be expanded and then scaled down as
needed; they will store pre-positioned equipment but will
only normally host a small number of troops on a
rotational, as opposed to permanent, basis; while
smaller, they must still be able to quickly support a
range of operations with back-up from MOBs
Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) are facilities owned
by host governments that would only be used by the US in
case of actual operations; though they could be visited
and inspected by the US, they would most likely be run
and maintained by host nation personnel or even private
contractors; useful for pre-positioning logistics support
or as venues for joint operations with host militaries,
they may also be expanded to become FOSs if necessary.
Source: US Department of Defense, “Strengthening US
Global Defense Posture,” September 2004
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