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Issue Number 27/28, April 2007
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Kapatiran Issue
No. 27/28, April 2007
THE US TROOPS’
“UNCONVENTIONAL” PRESENCE:
Are US Special Operations Forces Engaged In An
“Offensive War” In The Philippines?
- Herbert Docena, Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism
As soon as the US Marine convicted of raping a Filipina*
was in the custody of US Embassy officials, the United
States announced that it would push through with the
Balikatan training exercises involving US and Filipino
troops scheduled for February 2007. It had earlier
cancelled the exercises to protest the Philippine courts'
refusal to release Lance Corporal Daniel Smith to US
authorities while his case is on appeal.
* In late 2005 several US soldiers, in the country for
one of the permanent series of “exercises” that
provides the flimsy justification for the renewed US
military presence, went out for some “rest and
recreation” in the Americans’ old stamping
ground of Olongapo (home to the former Subic Bay US Navy
Base). They ended up being arrested and charged with
raping a Filipina, identified only as “Nicole”.
So, an unprecedented situation arose with American
soldiers charged with a very serious, non-bailable crime.
The US immediately invoked the Visiting Forces Agreement
(passed in 1999, during Joseph Estrada’s Presidency)
and demanded custody of the accused. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo’s government acquiesced, and they
awaited trial in the comfortable surrounds of the US
Embassy. The judge-only trial - there are no jury trials
in the Philippines - was eventually held in late 2006
and, despite the obstructive approach of the Philippine
government (which was supposedly “prosecuting”
the GIs but made it very clear that it greatly preferred
the whole thing to go away) one of the defendants, Lance
Corporal Daniel Smith, was convicted and sentenced to 40
years in prison. The US immediately whisked the other,
acquitted, defendants out of the country, back to their
bases on the Japanese island of Okinawa. US agents also
tried to snatch Smith in the actual courtroom, following
his conviction, but Philippine cops got him locked up in
a local prison. There he sat for all of a fortnight,
while a huge row raged about where he should be held.
This was a historic situation – Smith is the first
American GI to have ever been convicted of anything in
the Philippines. The US government demanded him back in
its custody and the Philippine government agreed, both
citing the Visiting Forces Agreement. But Philippine
courts showed a stubborn independence and ruled that
Smith must be detained in a Philippine prison. The US
then upped the ante and cancelled the high profile
Balikatan joint military exercise in the Philippines
until they got their soldier/rapist back. Gloria
didn’t take much convincing – she issued an
Executive Order transferring Smith to US custody (back to
the Embassy) while his appeal is heard and he was
clandestinely removed from prison in the dead of night in
the holiday period between Christmas and New Year 2006.
The US promptly uncancelled Balikatan. This whole squalid
business greatly inflamed nationalist fervour across the
whole Filipino population and the case of Daniel Smith
and the broader issue of the Philippine/American
relationship still has a long way yet to run. Ed.
Yet unknown to many, a contingent of US Special
Operations Forces that had been stationed in the southern
Philippines since January 2002 was clearly staying on
despite the Balikatan exercises' cancellation. While the
US and Philippine governments maintain that these troops
are not doing anything beyond training Filipino soldiers
and conducting humanitarian projects, questions persist
regarding their actual mission here. In 2002, a petition
was lodged before the Philippine Supreme Court claiming
the US troops about to be deployed here were going to war
"under the guise of an exercise". But while the
Court agreed with the petitioners that US troops are
indeed constitutionally banned from engaging in an
"offensive war" in the Philippines, it held
that whether they are actually going to do so was "a
question of fact" that had to be proven first. Five
years after the deployment and in the midst of the uproar
over Smith, new and accumulated information on the
actions of US troops in the Philippine south provide
grounds for revisiting this question.
Distinguishing “Exercises" From
"Special Operations"
It is important, however, to first draw a distinction
between US soldiers who join the regular joint training
exercises in various parts of the country and those who
are part of the Joint Special Operations Task
Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). Media coverage and public
discussion on the presence of US troops in the country
have tended to lump those who take part in the JSOTF-P
with those who take part in the exercises, but there are
important differences.
For instance, while participants of the regular training
exercises come from different branches and services of
the US military, those under the JSOTF-P are drawn
specifically from the Special Operations Forces (SOFs),
or those units that, as their name implies, conduct
"special operations". According to the SOF's
own definition, "special operations" are those
"conducted in hostile, denied, or politically
sensitive environments" and that require
"covert, clandestine, or discreet
capabilities". The US Army Field Manual — a
guide for military missions and procedures —
meanwhile says that SOFs are the "force of
choice" for "dynamic, ambiguous, and
politically volatile situations".
The number of participants in the training exercises is
also publicly disclosed prior to each exercise. In the
case of the JSOTF-P, however, this information has been
withheld. Various media reports place the number of
troops deployed to the southern Philippines between 160
and 350, but it isn't clear what the actual figure is for
a specific period. US Embassy spokesman Matthew Lussenhop
has said that it "wouldn't be above 100". But
US Lieutenant Colonel Mark Zimmer, JSOTF- P Public
Affairs Officer, also said it varies "depending on
the season and the mission".
Many of the exercises are conducted inside military
training camps or other designated training areas, and
are done so with no specified target or enemy in mind. By
contrast, the JSOTF-P has been operating in an area in
which combat with forces seen as hostile to the
Philippines government has ensued and is still ongoing.
The exact coverage of its area of operation remains
unclear, but the JSOTF-P has been explicit in targeting
"terrorists," in particular the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG)*, and lately, the Jemaah Islamaiah, both of
which are listed as "designated foreign terrorist
organisations" by the US State Department.
* Abu Sayyaf Group. This bona fide terrorist group (they
are not Muslim separatists, but the latest in a long line
of pirates and bandits who have terrorised their fellow
countrymen and neighbours in the far South for centuries)
is a classic example of “blowback” – a
Frankenstein monster of armed Filipino mujahedin created
by the US Central Intelligence Agency in the 1980s to
fight America’s proxy jihad against the Russians
then occupying Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden is the most
famous of those Muslim terrorists who have “blown
back” into the faces of their 1980s’ American
creators. This tiny band of criminals, confined to the
southernmost islands and the southernmost part of
Mindanao, are now the flimsy reason for the Americans to
get a foothold back in their old colony and for Bush to
have proclaimed the Philippines to be the “Second
Front in the ‘War on Terror’”. Ed.
In truth, from the very start, US and Philippine
officials announced that the deployment was part of the
US-led "global war against terror". The
JSOTF-P's deployment here was even labelled by the US
military as "Operation Enduring
Freedom-Philippines" (OEF-P), signifying that the
nature and the goal of the deployment was in the same
league as the original "Operation Enduring
Freedom" - the invasion of Afghanistan in October
2001.
Finally, the regular training exercises are close-ended
and usually last for no more than a week or two, after
which the participating units return to their home bases.
But the JSOTF-P's stay has been indefinite. Contrary to
the 2002 assurance by then National Security Adviser
Roilo Golez that the US troops would "be gone"
after six months, the troops remain. US and Filipino
officials are mum about any exit date. In a March 2006
interview, Captain Eddie Paruchabutr, then JSOTF-P
information officer, could only say: "It's
continuous as long as we are allowed to stay".
Special Warfare
In writings meant principally for internal US military
consumption, JSOTF-P members reveal how they actually
understand the nature of their mission in the
Philippines. For example, in an article for the US Army
Combined Arms Center's Military Review journal, the first
Commander of the JSOTF-P, Colonel David Maxwell said
their mission was "to conduct unconventional warfare
in the southern Philippines through, by, and with the AFP
[Armed Forces of the Philippines] to help the Philippine
government separate the population and destroy the
terrorist organisation". Their key tasks included
"denying the ASG sanctuary," "surveilling,
controlling, or denying ASG routes," and
"surveilling supporting villages and key
personnel".
In an apparent rebuff to the Supreme Court, Maxwell also
pointed out that — contrary to the Justices' reading
— the Philippine Constitution "does not
prohibit combat operations". According to Maxwell,
the "correct reading" of the charter would show
that it proscribes only the stationing of forces, not
combat operations. Reappointed as JSOTF-P Commander in
October 2006, Maxwell described the operations he led as
being conducted "under the guise of an
exercise".
Maxwell's description is shared by members of the 1st
Special Forces group who wrote a history of their unit's
engagements in the Philippines for Special Warfare, the
bulletin of the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School. According to their own account, their
unit took part in "the ongoing unconventional
warfare operations…". Dr CH Briscoe, the
Command Historian of the US Army Special Operations
Command, interviewed soldiers "who participated at
all levels of operations". In 2004, he wrote how
their mission "transformed from unconventional
warfare to foreign internal defence and
development". The ensuing ground campaign, said
Briscoe, was best described by referring to the
"counterinsurgency model". Eric Wendt, also
writing for the same publication, cited the Joint Task
Force's actions as "a superior example of successful
counterinsurgency". Similarly, Cherilyn Walley,
another US military historian, noted how the Special
Forces in the country turned "from performing
tactical missions to implementing the counterinsurgency
model that had been practiced by the American military in
Vietnam" (in the 1960s & 70s’ war. Ed). An
analyst writing for the National Bureau of Asian Research
meanwhile observed, "[A]lthough US training of
Philippine forces in both Luzon and Mindanao is labelled
counter-terror, in fact, the effort seems to be more
counterinsurgency against the paramilitary forces of the
Abu Sayyaf and the MILF [Moro Islamic Liberation
Front]".
The terms "unconventional warfare,"
"foreign internal defence," and
"counterinsurgency" are rarely, if at all used,
by US and Filipino officials in publicly describing the
JSOTF-P's work. But they are the words of choice of
members of the US military writing on their own mission
in the Philippines. In US military jargon,
"unconventional warfare" and "foreign
internal defence" are among the key missions of
SOFs. Considered their raison d'etre,
"unconventional warfare" refers to all those
operations that SOFs conduct "through, with, or by
indigenous or surrogate forces which are organised,
trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying
degrees by an external source". This covers
"guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage,
intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted
recovery".
The operations under "foreign internal defence"
refer to those activities conducted "to organise,
train, advise, and assist host-nation military and
paramilitary forces". According to the US Army Field
Manual, this mission's goal is to ensure that the kind of
assistance the United States gives to its host's troops
"support US national interests".
"Counter-insurgency" covers all those
"military, paramilitary, political, economic,
psychological, and civic actions" performed by a
government to defeat internal enemies.
“In The Thick Of It”
US and Philippine officials portray the US troops role as
passive "advisers" indirectly engaged in the
operations from a distance. But reports indicate that
their role has been more active and direct. From the
beginning, the US troops were authorised under the terms
of reference between the US and Philippine governments to
fire back if shot at. Under this arrangement, US Special
Forces have "intentionally ventured into known Abu
Sayyaf territory in an attempt to reassure locals while
also dissuading the rebels from operating openly, as well
as possibly tempting them to confront the Americans
militarily," noted an analyst with the Washington
DC-based Center for Defense Information.
Even as "advisers," Briscoe observed that the
"guys were in thick of it" and were anxious to
"get in the fight." He said the US troops
"expected to shoot or to be shot". Such an
expectation would not seem misplaced for, as one writer
for a war veterans' publication pointed out: "Though
the Philippines’ Constitution prohibits foreign
soldiers from fighting within the island nation, US
troops are exposed to the same risks they would see in
combat". In fact, in a June 2002 incident reported
by the Los Angeles Times and confirmed in the Army
magazine, US Marines exchanged gunfire with alleged ASG
members. Another incident reportedly had at least one US
soldier "killed in action," though not during a
patrol. In March 2006, a Huey helicopter carrying US
troops to Sulu was attacked by unidentified assailants.
US officials describe the Special Forces' role as
"training, advising, and assisting" Filipino
troops. During the on the job training against hostile
forces, giving advice, helping, and actually being part
of the action may well have overlapped. As Walley
explained in her 2004 Special Warfare article:
"Security assistance missions preclude the trainers
from being combatants or from performing duties in which
they are likely to become combatants. But the trainers'
credibility and effectiveness as teachers mandated that
they accompany the AFP troops on their graduation
exercise, of which combat was an integral part".
Briscoe, for his part, pointed out that while their
primary role was to train, their "unspoken"
mission later changed to include "facilitating the
rescue" of ASG hostages. He said this entailed
assuming a more assertive and central role in the
planning, decision-making, and execution of the
operations.
At first, the US troops were allowed to operate only at
the battalion level, which left them frustrated. At one
point, several US media reports said, former US Pacific
Command Chief, Admiral Dennis Blair, "tried to get
too aggressive" while others in the military pressed
for a "longer and more intense mission".
JSOTF-P Commander Maxwell also argued that confining the
troops at the battalion was a "strategic
error." But the then US Defense Secretary, Donald
Rumsfeld, later authorised US troops to operate at the
company level and join patrols "as often as
possible." This set up is similar to the US war in
Afghanistan, where Special Forces troops joined and
commanded 120-member companies of the Northern Alliance
(the Afghan rebel army which was the Americans’ ally
in defeating the Taliban government. Ed.).
And so in June 2005, local residents told journalists
that US forces had joined the Philippine military in
their operations against Abu Sayyaf members in
Maguindanao province in mainland Mindanao —even when
no training exercises or civil projects had been
announced. A P3-Orion plane was seen flying over the
area. In November of that year, the AFP launched
operations allegedly against the Abu Sayyaf, even as
those who were fighting back claimed to belong to the
Moro National Liberation Front, a group whose 1996 peace
agreement with the Government had frayed but which was
not tagged a "terrorist group" by either Manila
or Washington.
Eyewitnesses said US troops joined the Filipino soldiers
in operations at the immediate vicinity of the fighting.
US soldiers were seen aboard military trucks with their
Filipino counterparts and in rubber boats, mounting heavy
artillery, operating military equipment, removing
landmines, or evacuating casualties. Throughout the
clashes, a spy plane — which locals said had been
flying over the skies for months — hovered above the
area where fighting was ongoing.
“Special Reconnaissance”
US officials dismissed these reports as "absolutely
not true". Asserted JSOTF-P Public Affairs Officer
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Zimmer: "We are not in any
way involved in military operations conducted by the
Philippine Armed Forces". Other military officials
and reports, however, support the claims of the
witnesses. The Filipino commander during the November
2005 operations, General Nehemias Pajarito confirmed that
US troops were indeed at the vicinity of the fighting,
but that they were just repairing water pipes while
hostilities were ongoing. Another Filipino colonel
attested that he had requested the US troops' help in
clearing landmines.
The US troops' role in evacuating troop casualties had
previously been reported and confirmed by the US military
itself. In 2002, a US Air Force magazine reported that US
soldiers "helped infiltrate and extract ground
forces" in the Philippines. In subsequent operations
in September 2006, a Filipino military spokesperson also
confirmed that US troops assisted in evacuating soldiers.
As for their role in spying, in February 2006 local
residents in the south recovered an unmanned US aerial
vehicle that had crashed. A US military spokesperson then
said the spy planes were used for
"humanitarian" projects, but other US
officials, including a general, have since stated that
these have been used to hunt down targets. A report to
the US Congress also said P-3 aircraft provide
"intelligence and communications support" to
the AFP. In September 2006, Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita himself acknowledged that US troops were using
surveillance equipment to track down the ASG. That the
surveillance was meant for combat had been confirmed as
early as 2002 by then National Security Council adviser
Golez, who was quoted as saying US pilots on surveillance
flights could "call in air strikes" if they
spot ASG fighters.
In at least two reports, the Philippine Star has noted
the US troops' use of "unmanned planes, electronic
tracking devices, eavesdropping mechanisms, experimental
laser beacons, and a full range of US intelligence
gadgets". Such use attests to the "special
reconnaissance" mission that is a forte of Special
Forces troops. According to the Army Field Manual, the
mission's objective is "to confirm, refute, or
obtain — by visual observation or other collection
methods — information on the capabilities,
intentions, and activities of an actual or potential
enemy".
In these operations, the Special Forces were aided by the
US Central Intelligence Agency, which has admitted in one
of its annual reports that it supported the Joint Task
Forces by using "human intelligence" and
through other technical operations. The former Philippine
Ambassador to Washington, Albert del Rosario, also
confirmed the establishment of an "intelligence
fusion centre" staffed by both US and Filipino
troops and the setting up of satellite equipment.
Moreover, US soldiers have apparently enjoyed a special
vantage point inside Philippine military headquarters
during operations (during the rescue of Abu Sayyaf
hostages, for instance, some US soldiers were reportedly
stationed in the Philippine military command post). What
their role in decision-making is exactly and how they
relate with Filipino officials they supposedly
"advise" is not known. US soldiers, however,
are legally barred from being put under the command of
foreign officers. And in at least one incident, Briscoe
said, the US commanders "steer(ed) the AFP
leadership" into supporting a particular plan of
action. To describe what is going on as
"unconventional warfare" may not be farfetched,
since the US military itself defines such missions as
those in which US troops "direct" indigenous
forces.
The Full Range Of Operations
In denying that US troops are engaged in "actual
combat" in the Philippines, US and Philippine
officials have sought to reduce the coverage of the
definition of the phrase to only those actions that
involve the direct application of force. This implies
that US troops could be considered as engaging in combat
only when they themselves personally pull the trigger and
fire guns at their enemies. Yet while US troops have
actually found themselves in this position, US public
information officers continue to stress that their
actions are confined to performing "non-combat"
roles, such as training or undertaking humanitarian
missions.
But even as US and Filipino officials take pains to
publicly draw distinctions between US troops' missions,
the US military apparently does not. As its own Army
Field Manual states: "Military power is not limited
to acts of violence and overt hostilities to achieve
strategic objectives". This view, says the Manual,
is particularly valid for US Special Operations Forces.
It adds: "The principles of war apply to the full
range of operations, specifically where the use of force
is more selective and where restraint and non-lethal
aspects of power are dominant".
The US military also defines "civil-military
operations" or CMOs, including the construction of
deep wells, roads, and school buildings, as well as
medical and dental missions as a "group of planned
activities in support of military operations that enhance
the relationship between the military forces and civilian
authorities and population and which promote the
development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or
behaviour in neutral, friendly, or hostile grounds".
Testifying about their CMOs in Basilan, former US Pacific
Command Chief, Admiral Thomas Fargo, said these
"acted as force multipliers for US and AFP
operations because the programs separated the citizens of
Basilan from supporting the terrorist threat".
The goal is not just to earn the locals' sympathy, but
also to extract information necessary for combat. As one
military writer pointed out, the humanitarian projects'
underlying aim is "not simply to provide feel good
projects that achieve positive perceptions among the
local populace". He added, "The purpose is to
utilise the correct… carrots… that will yield
actionable intelligence that can be used to target and
destroy the insurgent infrastructure…".
After the carrots come the sticks. Or as Wendt put it:
"After the infrastructure has been identified and
exposed by the local population, its members can be
killed or captured”. Even infrastructure projects
— the extension of airport runways, construction of
piers and jetties, road paving, and so on — which
have won over many local authorities have larger military
goals. Pointing out how they enabled troops to move
around more quickly, Walley says these projects
"benefited US trainers and advisers and contributed
to force protection". They are also useful for
meeting the troops' supply and logistics needs. Likewise,
training AFP troops serves US combat-related goals. In US
military terminology, indigenous troops act as
"force multipliers" in projecting power and in
achieving US military objectives but — as the Army
Field Manual says — "with minimum visibility,
risk, and cost". To put it another way, AFP members
are trained so they can be put out front and first in
line when the enemies start firing.
“Long-Term Low-Visibility Presence”
Rather than just lone-standing missions, the US troops'
actions in the Philippines are part of a comprehensive
and wide-ranging transformation of the US military
organisation and its global posture. In fact, their
interrelated missions conform to the overall US military
strategy, as articulated in various official documents,
including the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the
National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military
Strategy (NDS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and
the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism (NSCT), among
others.
At one level, the deployment of troops in the Philippines
is in keeping with Washington's determination to
"focus decisive military power and specialised
intelligence resources to defeat terrorist networks
globally". This is because the challenge to US
interests, as seen by US strategists, no longer comes
just from state but also non-state actors, especially
those taking shelter in states incapable of controlling
their own territory. Says the NSS: "America is now
threatened less by conquering states than we are by
failing ones".
This "failing state" label has been
increasingly pinned on the Philippines, with former US
Embassy officials describing Mindanao as "a doormat
for terrorism in the region" or as the "next
Afghanistan". Faced with these kinds of threats, the
NSS asserts: "The fight must be taken to the enemy,
to keep them on the run". In this fight, the lines
between a defensive war and what the Supreme Court terms
"offensive war" are blurred, if not
indeterminate. For as the NSCT points out: "[T]he
best defence is a good offence".
As a result, the QDR calls for a shift in emphasis
"from conducting war against nations — to
conducting war in countries we are not at war with"
— a category that fits the Philippines. US
journalist Seymour Hersh has written about a presidential
order that allows the Pentagon "to operate
unilaterally in a number of countries where there is a
perception of a clear and evident terrorist threat".
He didn't name the countries, but the description of some
of them again covers the Philippines:
"…friendly to the United States and are major
trading partners". He also said, "Most have
been cooperating in the war on terrorism". In these
countries, the United States will strive to work with
willing governments, but it reserves the right to act
alone and pre-emptively if they so refuse. One analyst
described the new strategy thus: "countries that
harbour terrorists, either by consent or because they are
unable to enforce their laws within their territory,
effectively forfeit their rights of sovereignty".
According to a memorandum prepared by former Joint Chiefs
of Staff Chair General Richard Myers — who had
earlier been reported as pushing for deeper involvement
in the country — the Philippines has been included
in the list of "emerging targets for pre-emptive
war" of a new US military unit authorised to conduct
clandestine operations abroad.
A New Form Of Entrenching US Bases In The
Philippines
Beyond pursuing "terrorists," however, the
SOF's stationing in the Philippines is an important
component of the US military's evolving global
positioning. As the United States embarks on the most
radical realignment of its worldwide presence since World
War II, the aim, according to the QDR, is "to
develop a basing system that provides greater flexibility
for US forces in critical areas of the world, placing
emphasis on additional bases and stations beyond Western
Europe and Northeast Asia". This includes the need
to "provide temporary access to facilities in
foreign countries that enable US forces to conduct
training and exercises in the absence of permanent ranges
and bases". It also entails a change in emphasis
"from static defence, garrison forces" —
such as those the United States had in Subic and Clark
— "to mobile, expeditionary operations" as
exemplified by the operations of the JSOTF-P in Sulu.
While discussing the current realignment of US military
presence, then US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had
confirmed plans to establish "nodes" for
Special Operations Forces in Asia. In 2004, then US
Pacific Command head Admiral Thomas Fargo also announced
their intention to expand SOF presence in the region by
setting up more "cooperative security locations
(CSLs)," or military installations to which the
United States will have access, in Asia. The Overseas
Basing Commission, an official body that reviews the US
overseas military infrastructure, has confirmed the
Philippines is among the Asian countries where such CSLs
are being developed. In November 2002, the Philippine and
US governments signed the Mutual Logistics and Servicing
Agreement that, according to a military publication, made
the Philippines a "supply base" of the United
States.
In these plans, Special Forces hold a special place. More
than other units, SOFs have usually been the contingent
to count on to "gain or maintain US access to
strategically important foreign countries". In fact,
another military contingent also composed mostly of
Special Forces — the Combined Joint Task Force
— Horn of Africa, US — was also established in
Djibouti in 2002. With its mission and objectives very
similar to the JSOTF-P, the Task Force has been described
as a "model for future military operations".
These small and inconspicuous units fulfil the stated
need of "maintaining a long-term, low visibility
presence in many areas of the world where US forces do
not traditionally operate". And as Briscoe noted,
the deployment in Sulu has "established an
acceptable American military presence in the Southeast
Pacific…". In other words, the JSOTF-P may not
only be conducting war within the Philippines, it may
have also entrenched a new form of US bases in the
country.
Herbert Docena is with the Focus on the Global South,
a policy research institute. This article is based on a
40 page special report published by the Institute. It can
be downloaded from
www.focusweb.org/pdf/unconventionalwarfare.pdf
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